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NASA STI Program…in Profile 
 
 
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated  
to the advancement of aeronautics and space 
science. The NASA scientific and technical 
information (STI) program plays a key part in 
helping NASA maintain this important role. 
 
The NASA STI program operates under the 
auspices of the Agency Chief Information 
Officer. It collects, organizes, provides for 
archiving, and disseminates NASA’s STI. The 
NASA STI program provides access to the 
NTRS Registered and its public interface, the 
NASA Technical Reports Server, thus providing 
one of the largest collections of aeronautical and 
space science STI in the world. Results are 
published in both non-NASA channels and by 
NASA in the NASA STI Report Series, which 
includes the following report types: 
 
• TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of 
completed research or a major significant 
phase of research that present the results of 
NASA programs and include extensive 
data or theoretical analysis. Includes 
compilations of significant scientific and 
technical data and information deemed to 
be of continuing reference value. NASA 
counterpart of peer-reviewed formal 
professional papers but has less stringent 
limitations on manuscript length and extent 
of graphic presentations. 
 
• TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. 
Scientific and technical findings that are 
preliminary or of specialized interest, e.g., 
quick release reports, working papers, and 
bibliographies that contain minimal 
annotation. Does not contain extensive 
analysis. 
 
• CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific and 
technical findings by NASA-sponsored 
contractors and grantees. 
• CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. 
Collected papers from scientific and 
technical conferences, symposia, 
seminars, or other meetings sponsored 
or co-sponsored by NASA. 
 
• SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientific, 
technical, or historical information 
from NASA programs, projects, and 
missions, often concerned with 
subjects having substantial public 
interest. 
 
• TECHNICAL TRANSLATION. 
English-language translations of 
foreign scientific and technical 
material pertinent to NASA’s mission. 
 
Specialized services also include creating 
custom thesauri, building customized 
databases, and organizing and publishing 
research results. 
 
For more information about the NASA STI 
program, see the following: 
 
• Access the NASA STI program home page 
at http://www.sti.nasa.gov 
 
• E-mail your question via the Internet to 
help@sti.nasa.gov 
 
• Phone the NASA STI Help Desk at  
(757) 864-9658 
 
• Write to: 
NASA STI Information Desk 
Mail Stop 148 
NASA Langley Research Center 
Hampton, VA 23681-2199 
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Designing Flightdeck Procedures: 
Literature Resources 
 
 
Jolene Feldman1, Immanuel Barshi2, Asaf Degani3, 
Loukia Loukopoulou4, and Robert Mauro5 
 
 
 
 
 
This technical publication contains the titles, abstracts, summaries, descriptions, and/or 
annotations of available literature sources on procedure design and development, 
requirements, and guidance. It is designed to provide users with an easy access to 
available resources on the topic of procedure design, and with a sense of the contents of 
these sources. This repository of information is organized into the following publication 
sources: Research (e.g., journal articles, conference proceedings), Manufacturers’ (e.g., 
operation manuals, newsletters), and Regulatory and/or Government (e.g., advisory 
circulars, reports). An additional section contains synopses of Accident/Incident Reports 
involving procedures. 
  
This work directly supports a comprehensive memorandum by Barshi, Mauro, Degani, 
& Loukopoulou (2016) that summarizes the results of a multi-year project, partially 
funded by the FAA, to develop technical reference materials that support guidance on 
the process of developing cockpit procedures (see “Designing Flightdeck Procedures” 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20160013263.pdf). An 
extensive treatment of this topic is presented in a forthcoming book by the same authors. 
 
 
  
                                                
1 San Jose State University Research Foundation. 
2 NASA Ames Research Center. 
3 General Motors Advanced Technology Center. 
4 San Jose State University Research Foundation; SWISS International Air Lines. 
5 Decision Research; University of Oregon. 
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1. Research Literature 
 
 
Amalberti, R. (2001). The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems. Safety 
Science, 37, 109–126. 
 
Abstract: Safety remains driven by a simple principle: complete elimination of technical 
breakdowns and human errors. This article tries to put this common sense approach back into 
perspective in the case of ultra-safe systems, where the safety record reaches the mythical 
barrier of one disastrous accident per 10 million events (10−7). Three messages are 
delivered: (1) the solutions aimed at improving safety depend on the global safety level of 
the system. When safety improves, the solutions used to improve the safety record should not 
be further optimised; they must continue to be implemented at present level (to maintain the 
safety health obtained), and supplemented further by new solutions (addition rather than 
optimisation rationale); (2) the maintenance and linear optimisation of solutions having 
dwindling effectiveness can result in a series of paradoxes eventually replacing the system at 
risk and jeopardising the safety record obtained in the first place; and (3) after quickly 
reviewing ambiguities in the definition of human error and the development of research in 
this area, this article shows, through recent industrial examples and surveys, that errors play 
an essential role in the acquisition and effectiveness of safety, at individual as well as 
collective levels. A truly ecological theory of human error is developed. Theories of error 
highlight the negative effects of an over-extensive linear extrapolation of protection 
measures. Similarly, it is argued that accepting the limitation of technical systems 
performance through the presence of a minimum breakdown and incident ‘noise’ could 
enhance safety by limiting the risks accepted. New research opportunities are outlined at the 
end of this paper, notably in the framework of systems now safe or ultra-safe. 
 
 
Antonsen, S., Almklov, P., & Fenstad, J. (2008). Reducing the gap between procedures and 
practice—Lessons from a successful safety intervention. Safety Science Monitor, 12(1), 
1–16. Retrieved from Safety Science Monitor website: 
http://ssmon.chb.kth.se/volumes/vol12/2Antonsen.pdf  
 
Abstract: Formal work procedures are central parts of an organization’s safety management 
system. However, there always seem to be some discrepancy between work as prescribed in 
procedures, and the way work is actually carried out. Although it is neither possible nor 
desirable to eliminate this discrepancy completely, too large a gap represents a problem for 
safety management. Furthermore, it is a problem to which traditional approaches to safety 
management have found no solution. In this paper we present an empirical analysis which 
highlights some fundamental conditions that facilitate compliance: by keeping procedures 
few and simple and, more importantly, by emphasizing broad and direct worker participation 
in the process of implementing the procedures, a greater level of commitment and adherence 
to procedures was achieved. It is proposed that addressing the gap between ‘work as 
imagined’ and ‘work as actually done’ can serve as an opportunity for building 
organizational resilience through organizational learning. 
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Antonsen, S., Skarholt, K., & Ringstad, A. J. (2012). The role of standardization in 
safety management—A case study of a major oil & gas company. Safety Science, 
50, 2001–2009. 
 
Abstract: This article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of various kinds of 
standardization, when applied to the field of safety management. Recently, there are signs 
that organizations operating in high-risk environments take further steps towards 
standardization. On the positive side, standardization has the potential to enhance the 
predictability of normal operations as well as facilitating the transfer of lessons learnt across 
organizational contexts. On the negative side, standardization is by definition a strategy for 
dealing with known hazards and accident scenarios. We discuss how too strong an emphasis 
on standardization can involve unintended negative consequences for organizations’ crisis-
handling capabilities. 
 
 
Arriaga, A., Bader, A., Wong, J., Lipsitz, S., Berry, W., Ziewacz, J., Hepner, D., Boorman,  
D., Pozner, C., Smink, D., & Gawande, A. (2013). Simulation-based trial of surgical-
crisis checklists. New England Journal of Medicine, 368(3), 246–253. Retrieved from 
The New England Journal of Medicine 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1204720#t=articleBackground 
 
Abstract: Operating-room crises (e.g., cardiac arrest and massive hemorrhage) are common 
events in large hospitals but can be rare for individual clinicians. Successful management is 
difficult and complex. We sought to evaluate a tool to improve adherence to evidence-based 
best practices during such events. 
 
 
Au, H. (2005). Line pilot performance of memory items. Proceedings of the 13th International 
Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Oklahoma City, OK. Retrieved from 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/human_
factors_maintenance/line_pilot_performance_of_memory_items.pdf 
 
Abstract: An evaluation of Boeing 737 line pilot performance of memory items in 5 
abnormal checklists was performed in a single-blind experiment using tabletop exercises at 
the crew base of a major U.S. airline. A study of 16 pilots shows that performance of 
memory items results in errors in identifying the failure, selecting the proper checklist to be 
completed, and checklist step errors. 
 
 
Bainbridge, L. (1993). Planning the training of a complex skill. Le Travail Humain,  
56(2/3), 211–232. 
 
Abstract: The first half of this paper is on normal operation. This introduction will outline 
how an operator thinks, and the knowledge they use. The first two main sections of the paper 
will then be on training for understanding the process and its constraints, and how to operate 
it. Fault management is treated as a special case, in the second half of the paper, which 
outlines the categorisation and problem solving processes by which operators deal with 
unfamiliar situations. Any situation in which training is needed is by definition unfamiliar. 
However the aim of most training schemes (and the first part of the scheme proposed here) is 
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to minimise the extent to which trainees have to think out for themselves what to do in this 
unfamiliar situation. But in training for fault management the emphasis shifts, to explicit 
training in dealing with unfamiliarity. 
 
 
Bakdash, J. Z., & Drews, F. A. (2012). Using knowledge in the world to improve patient safety: 
Designing affordances in health care equipment to specify a sequential “checklist”. 
Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing & Service Industries, 22(1), 7–20. 
 
Abstract: Use of current health care equipment for medical procedures (e.g., central line 
insertions and central line care) is primarily dependent on the cognition of the health care 
worker. That is, the present design of equipment (typically numerous, separately packaged 
individual items) provides minimal information about the optimal order of procedure steps 
and no defenses against human error, such as omitting steps in procedure. In this article, we 
propose patient safety may be improved by redesigning equipment to integrate a “checklist” 
using sequencing, color-coding, and visual icons. We hypothesize this reduces cognitive 
demand by off-loading knowledge into the world, creating affordances that provide guidance 
reducing the likelihood of errors and promoting adherence to best practices. 
 
 
Baron, R. (1997). The cockpit, the cabin, and social psychology [Online forum]. Retrieved 
from http://airlinesafety.com/editorials/CockpitCabinPsychology.htm  
 
Abstract: All airline pilots are required to receive crew resource management (CRM) 
training, which augments technical flight and ground training with human factors subjects. 
There has also been an increase in this type of training for flight attendants. CRM training 
has been shown to be efficacious for both groups when viewed separately. Unfortunately, in 
real flight operations, there are cognitive and physical factors that cause these disparate 
groups to work less than efficiently between their groups, particularly when a cohesive 
environment is critical, such as in an emergency. This paper looks at the factors that 
influence the separation of these two groups and offers recommendations to address this 
critical issue. 
 
 
Barshi, I. & Healy, A. (1993). Checklist procedures and the cost of automaticity. Memory & 
Cognition, 21(4), 496–505. 
 
Abstract: Automaticity is usually discussed in terms of its benefits. Automaticity has, 
however, a cost that manifests itself in procedures that are highly routinized but require close 
attention, such as verbal checklist procedures. In such procedures, errors occur because the 
routine leads to automaticity. In three paper-and-pen experiments, we tested this 
manifestation and investigated ways to decrease automaticity in verbal checklist procedures. 
In the experiments, subjects proofread sets of multiplication problems to detect erroneous 
operations, simulating the checklist procedure. In Experiments 1 and 2, two conditions were 
compared: a fixed-order condition (in which each set contained operations in the same order) 
and a varied-order condition (in which the operations were in a different order in each set). In 
Experiment 1, proofreading times were measured to establish the role of fixed sequential 
order as a consistent environment promoting the emergence of automaticity. In Experiment 
2, we introduced errors into the material, and in Experiment 3 we introduced "alerting" 
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conditions to interfere with the development of automaticity. The results indicated that the 
subjects in the varied-order and alert conditions detected significantly more errors than did 
those in the fixed-order condition. The implications of the findings for current theories of 
automaticity are discussed as well as those for the design of checklist procedures. 
 
 
Baum, M.S., Neal, D., Peri, R., Randomsky, M., Rhodes, B., Sachs, R., Smith, J., Steinman, D., 
& Turner, T. (Eds.). (n.d.). Helicopter pilots model code of conduct: Tools to advance 
helicopter flight safety and professionalism (Version 1.0). Retrieved from Aviators Model 
Code of Conduct website: http://www.secureav.com/HMCC-v1.0.pdf 
  
Abstract: The Helicopter Pilots Model Code Of Conduct (HMCC) offers recommendations 
to advance helicopter flight safety, airmanship, and professionalism. The Code of Conduct 
presents a vision of excellence for helicopter pilots. Its principles complement and 
underscore legal requirements. The FAA Practical Test Standards (PTS) and comparable 
international materials set the standard of evaluation for pilot certification. As such, the PTS 
focus mainly on basic flying knowledge and skills. However, standards and regulations by 
themselves do not provide a framework for how to think and act in situations that may not be 
covered by procedures, checklists, or operating manuals. In contrast, the HMCC articulates 
broader guidance—a set of values—to help a pilot interpret and apply standards and 
regulations, and to confront the real world challenges that could lead to a mishap. The Code 
of Conduct is a model, not a standard. The Code of Conduct will be most effective if users 
commit to the pursuit of professionalism as well as a firm grasp of the fundamentals of flight. 
The Code of Conduct has seven sections, each presenting Principles and Sample 
Recommended Practices. 
 
 
Baum, M.S., Peri, R., Randomsky, M., Rhodes, B., Sachs, R., Smith, J., Steinman, D., & 
Turner, T. (Eds.). (n.d.). Aviators model code of conduct: Tools to advance aviation safety 
and professionalism (Version 2.0). Retrieved from Aviators Model Code of Conduct 
website: http://www.secureav.com/AMCC-v2.pdf 
 
Abstract: The Aviators Model Code Of Conduct offers recommendations to advance flight 
safety, airmanship, and professionalism. The Code of Conduct presents a vision of 
excellence for aviators. Its principles complement and underscore legal requirements. The 
Code of Conduct is a model, not a standard. Users should customize or otherwise revise the 
document—including title, length, and organization—to fit their needs. See “Additional 
Resources” (below) for materials to help facilitate such customization. The Code of Conduct 
will be most effective if users have a firm grasp of the fundamentals of flight as well as a 
commitment to the pursuit of professionalism. The Code of Conduct has seven sections, each 
presenting Principles and Sample Recommended Practices. 
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Berry, K.A., & Sawyer, M.W. (2013). Understanding the human component of area navigation 
procedures across the national airspace system. Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society 57th Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, 76–80.  Retrieved from Sage 
Journals website: http://pro.sagepub.com/content/57/1/76 
 
Abstract: The FAA intends to considerably increase the usage of area navigation (RNAV) 
approach and departure procedures in order to achieve the proposed NextGen goals for 
improved efficiency and capacity. RNAV procedures enable aircraft to have better access 
and flexibility for point-to-point operations. In an effort to better understand the potential 
impact of increased RNAV usage, a human factors safety assessment was conducted to 
identify the key human factors issues present in current RNAV operations. An analysis of 
100 RNAV narrative-based safety reports from the Air Traffic Safety Action Program 
(ATSAP) and 68 narrative-based safety reports from the Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS) was conducted to identify key causal factors. The analysis found several key causal 
factors related to RNAV procedure design, controller-pilot communication, automation 
systems, and track deviations. Specific human performance concerns and mitigation 
strategies for each causal factor were developed. These results should drive future 
requirements associated with the implementation of future RNAV procedures. 
 
 
Blomberg, R., Ramu J., Degani, A., Speyer, J., & Kanki, B. (1999). Evolving flight operations 
data standards: Is there a need for early identification of specifications? In R. Travers 
(Moderator), Proceedings of American Association for Artificial Intelligence (pp. 195–
197). Retrieved from AAAI website: 
 http://www.aaai.org/Papers/HCI/2002/HCI02-032.pdf 
 
Abstract: There are attempts by organizations and industry research groups to highlight the 
need for common information standards within air carriers. Each of these targets the air 
carriers themselves, and yet often misses the concept of industry wide standards in which 
information should flow more seamlessly. In a variety of aeronautics support groups, 
common data standards are espoused but often overlooked. In today’s information rich 
environment, industry data standards have become essential. Common terminology, data 
standards and cross-functional information libraries are required in order to catalogue, 
analyze and prepare flight operations information systems for the future. 
 
 
Bolton, M.L., & Bass, E.J. (2012). Using model checking to explore checklist-guided pilot 
behavior. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 22(4), 343–366. 
 
Abstract: Pilot noncompliance with checklists has been associated with aviation accidents. 
This noncompliance can be influenced by complex interactions among the checklist, pilot 
behavior, aircraft automation, device interfaces, and policy, all within the dynamic flight 
environment. We present a method that uses model checking to evaluate checklist-guided 
pilot behavior while considering these interactions. We illustrate our approach with a case 
study of a pilot performing the “Before Landing” checklist. We use our method to explore 
how different design interventions could impact the safe arming and deployment of spoilers. 
Results and future research are discussed. 
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Boorman, D. (2000, September). Reducing flight crew errors and minimizing new error modes 
with electronic checklists. Proceedings of the International Conference on Human-
Computer Interaction in Aeronautics, Toulouse, France. 
 
Abstract: This paper discusses electronic checklist (ECL) system design, focusing on ECL as 
an automated tool for reducing or eliminating certain types of flight crew errors. Paper 
checklist error modes are listed. New errors that may be introduced by the ECL and the 
relationship with degree and characteristics of automation are discussed. Examples are 
offered from Boeing 777 ECL design experience. Comparisons are drawn between ECL, 
particularly emergency checklist features which are infrequently used and associated with 
high stress, high workload conditions, and other automated human-computer interfaces 
(HCI). Similar design rationale can be applied to all of these interfaces to ensure that error 
modes are minimized in future automated tools. 
 
 
Boorman, D. (2001). Today’s electronic checklists reduce likelihood of crew errors and prevent 
mishaps. ICAO Journal, 1, 17–36. 
 
Abstract: Automation on the flight deck produces some important benefits but can also bring 
training challenges, mode confusion and new possibilities for errors. With this in mind, 
designers of a modern electronic checklist made a special effort to ensure this automated 
cockpit tool would not introduce new error modes. 
 
 
Bourrier, M., & Bieder, C. (2013). Trapping safety into rules: An introduction. In M. 
Bourrier & C. Bieder (Eds.), Trapping safety into rules: How desirable or avoidable is 
proceduralization? (pp. 1–8). Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
 
Abstract: The provocative title of this book aims to encourage interested readers to think of 
the proceduralization of safety with a renewed perspective. This phenomenon is one of axis 
of a more general trend towards normalization of social interactions and practices, leading to 
the bureaucratization of everyday life, a phenomenon long envisioned by Max Weber and 
regularly re-assessed and commented by sociologists (Perrow, 1991, Shapiro and Carr 1991, 
Webb, 2006). 
 
 
Bovair, S., & Kieras, D. E. (1989). Toward a model of acquiring procedures from text. (No. TR-
89/ONR-30). Michigan University Ann Arbor Technical Communication Program. 
 
Abstract: In this paper, the criteria for the development, implementation, and control of 
operating and safety limits of parameters like pressure, temperature, level, composition, etc., 
are described. Operating and safety limits are required by Elements 2 ‘process safety 
information” and 4 “operating procedures” of the information package for OSHA Process 
Safety Management (PSM). A brief description is also given of how these limits should be 
established and the information, with respect to consequences, safeguards, and corrective 
actions, that should be obtained during a detailed analysis of deviation from an operation or 
process parameter. This paper looks for an easier method of developing operating and safety 
limits within chemical and petrochemical plants to prevent and control undesirable events 
(human losses, material losses, economic losses, or environmental pollution) through 
adequate emergency plans and response programs.  
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Callantine, T.J. (2001, October). The crew activity tracking system: Leveraging flight data for 
aiding, training and analysis. Paper presented at the 20th Digital Avionics Systems 
Conference, Dayton Beach, FL. doi 10.1109/DASC.2001.963408 
 
Abstract: Technological advances have made flight data a viable real-world data source for 
studies of human error and error prevention; hundreds of parameters are currently available 
for analysis. These data have enabled airlines to institute increasingly advanced Flight 
Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs, which analyze flight data from line 
operations to detect "operational irregularities that can foreshadow accidents and incidents," 
and proactively disseminate this information to flight crews and maintenance personnel. This 
paper presents an intent inference technology, referred to as activity tracking, that in the 
future could also support flight-data-driven safety-enhancement efforts. A methodology for 
activity tracking has been implemented and validated in the Crew Activity Tracking System 
(CATS) as implemented for the flight deck, CATS uses knowledge about the pilot's task and 
the current operational context to predict nominal activities and interpret actual pilot actions. 
By analyzing pilot action data in conjunction with clearance constraints and other flight data 
parameters, CATS can help disambiguate errors from other causes of abnormal flight 
conditions, and characterize error-inducing contexts in operational terms. 
 
 
Chandra, D.C., & Grayhem, R. (2013). Evaluation of a technique to simplify depictions of 
visually complex aeronautical procedures for NextGen. Proceedings of the Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society 57th Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, 86–90. Retrieved 
from Sage Journals website: http://pro.sagepub.com/content/57/1/86 
 
Abstract: Performance based navigation supports the design of more precise flight 
procedures. However, these new procedures can be visually complex, which may impact the 
usability of charts that depict the procedures. The purpose of the study was to evaluate 
whether there are performance benefits from simplifying aeronautical charts that depict 
visually complex flight procedures by separating the procedures onto different chart images. 
Forty-seven professional pilots participated. They used high-fidelity current and modified 
charts to find specific information from approach and Standard Instrument Departure (SID) 
chart images that were shown one at a time on a computer monitor. Response time and 
accuracy were recorded. Results show a consistent and significant reduction in the time to 
find information from the simplified chart images. Response time varied linearly with a 
simple clutter metric, the sum of visual elements in the depiction, indicating serial visual 
search. Most questions were answered with high accuracy, but some questions about altitude 
constraints yielded low accuracies. 
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Choi, S.Y., & Park, J. (2012). Operator behaviors observed in following emergency operating 
procedures under a simulated emergency. Nuclear Engineering & Technology, 44(4), 
379–386. 
 
Abstract: A symptom-based procedure with a critical safety function monitoring system has 
been established to reduce the operator’s diagnosis and cognitive burden since the Three-
Mile Island (TMI) accident. However, it has been reported that a symptom-based procedure 
also requires an operator’s cognitive efforts to cope with off-normal events. This can be 
caused by mismatches between a static model, an emergency operating procedure (EOP), and 
a dynamic process, the nature of an on-going situation. The purpose of this study is to share 
the evidence of mismatches that may result in an excessive cognitive burden in conducting 
EOPs. For this purpose, we analyzed simulated emergency operation records and observed 
some operator behaviors during the EOP operation: continuous steps, improper description, 
parameter check at a fixed time, decision by information previously obtained, execution 
complexity, operation by the operator’s knowledge, notes and cautions, and a foldout page. 
Since observations in this study are comparable to the results of an existing study, it is 
expected that the operational behaviors observed in this study are generic features of 
operators who have to cope with a dynamic situation using a static procedure. 
 
 
Clay-Williams, R., & Colligan, L. (2015). Back to basics: Checklists in aviation and healthcare. 
BMJ Qual Saf, 24, 428–431.  
 
Abstract: The checklist approach has the same potential to save lives and prevent morbidity in 
medicine that it did in aviation over 70 years ago by ensuring that simple standards are 
applied for every patient, every time.1 Healthcare safety activists have looked to checklists to 
solve a myriad of problems, particularly with the current iteration of checklists that have been 
imported from aviation. Large-scale implementations with conflicting outcomes suggest that 
these tools are not as simple or effective as hoped. Scholars debating the efficacy of checklist 
implementation in healthcare have identified important reasons for varying results: that 
success requires complex, cultural and organisational change efforts, not just the checklist 
itself confounded by a mix of the technical and socio-adaptive elements, and that local 
contexts may either augment or undermine the implementation with conflicting outcomes; that 
results may be confounded by a mix of the technical and socio-adaptive elements, and that 
local contexts may either augment or undermine the implementation’s outcomes. 
 
 
de Brito, G. (1998, May). Study of the use of airbus flight deck procedures and perspectives for 
operational documentation. In G. Boy, C. Graeber, & J. M. Robert (Eds.), International 
Conference on Human Computer Interaction in Aeronautics, HCI-Aero’98 (pp. 195–201). 
Ecole Polytechnique de Montréal, Montreal, Canada. 
 
Abstract: Cockpit automation is increasing with each new generation of airplane. This 
technological evolution has numerous effects on tasks and activities related to flying. We 
will focus on the use of written procedures. The study reported here deals with the way in 
which pilots use these written procedures. Indeed, even if everyone agrees on the validity of 
written procedures, their content and their use sometimes lead to problems. This article 
presents current trends concerning the use of operator assistance and in particular, written 
procedures in new generation aircraft of the Airbus A320, A330 or A340 family.  
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de Brito, G. (2002). Towards a model for the study of written procedure following in dynamic 
environments. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 75, 233–244. 
 
Abstract: Flight safety relies on a large number of automatisms and on strict written 
procedure following. This article presents a psycho-cognitive analysis of the procedure 
following task. Consequently, we have proposed a model called SPEED (Suivi de Procedures 
Ecrites dans les Environnements Dynamiques: Written Procedure Following in Dynamic 
Environments). SPEED enables the understanding of the use of written procedure in dynamic 
environments. It describes the reasons why pilots do not follow procedures as the 
manufacturers and airlines require. SPEED breaks down the activities involved in the use of 
procedures into nine stages: (1) detecting triggering conditions, (2) elaborating a diagnosis, 
(3) determining whether a procedure is needed, (4) accessing and searching for the 
appropriate written procedure, (5) reading and understanding the items of the procedure, (6) 
assessing the relevance of the procedure, (7) planning actions, (8) executing the planned 
actions and (9) evaluating the outcome of actions. SPEED is not as a sequential model. It is 
an iterative model, where some steps may be optional. 
 
 
de Brito, G., & Boy, G. (1999, September). Situation awareness and procedure following. 
Seventh European Conference on Cognitive Science Approaches to Process Control 
(CSAPC ’99), Paper presented at the European Association of Cognitive Ergonomics, 
Villeneuve d'Ascq, France. 
 
Abstract: Aeronautics procedures are used as prescribed action lists to help human operators 
remember and follow mandatory steps that guarantee safety, workload and performance 
criteria. A study of the use of procedures in the civil aviation domain surveyed 207 pilots 
using four investigation methods, including the observation of 140 hours of full-flight 
simulator. The results of this study are used to address why human operators of safety-
critical systems use, misuse or do not use procedures to keep control of a situation, and how 
they cope with situation awareness. This paper suggests that new perspectives on design may 
be required to support the further development of warning systems, the design of procedure 
and the definition of the pilots’ role. 
 
 
Degani, A. (n.d.). Schemes and techniques of information organization: The case of the London 
underground “diagram” (Human-Machine Interface GM Report). Israel: GM 
Advanced Technical Center. 
 
Abstract: This report describes an analytical approach for considering the schemes and 
techniques used to organize visual information. The approach centers on three dimensions: 
(1) abstraction of data into representational elements, (2) integration of these elements to 
create coherent structures of information, and (3) organization of such coherent structures, by 
means of some (underlying) order, into a whole. To illustrate this approach, we have 
analyzed the abstract map (“Diagram”) of the London underground, and discuss some of the 
schemes and techniques employed in this renowned (information-design) artifact. We also 
try to provide some clues about the creative processes of its designer. We conclude with 
several implications of this analysis to the design of HMI displays such as navigation maps, 
HVAC system layout, and adaptive (i.e., system generated) interfaces. 
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Degani, A. (1999, April). Pilot-error in the 90’s: Still alive and kicking. Paper presented at the 
meeting of the Flight Safety Foundation of the National Business Aviation Association, 
Cincinnati, OH. 
 
Abstract: In this keynote address, I will describe the notion of human- and pilot-error. I will 
show, given actual examples, why it is still alive and kicking, and what can be done to 
ameliorate this problem. The main thesis of this talk is about going beyond the mere 
classification of pilot-error into a detailed analysis of the events and a thorough consideration 
of all other factors that have contributed to the mishap. I will argued using three examples: 
The first example describes a certain crew interaction that, from the outset, appears 
problematic, yet once the details are revealed, all falls into place. The second example is 
about a pilot-error that is actually due to deficiency in the design of a "Before Landing 
Checklist" procedure. The last example describes problems that pilot encounter while 
operating an autopilot. 
 
 
Degani, A. (2003a). Procedures, synchronization, and automation. In Taming Hal (pp. 177–
199). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Notes: Chapter 13 addresses the kinds of problems operators, such as pilots and technicians, 
encounter when using checklists and procedures to manage a complex and dynamic system. 
Although the example in this chapter comes from the world of aviation, the concepts that are 
discussed and developed throughout are common to medical and manufacturing settings, 
nuclear power, space flight, and many other domains where procedures are a necessity.  
 
 
Degani, A. (2003b). Taming Hal. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Abstract: Machines dominate our lives, from alarm clocks that wake us up in the morning to 
radios that lull us to sleep. Most of our interactions with automated machines and computers 
are problem-free, but more often than we would like, they can be irritating and confusing. 
This is frequently harmless, such as a VCR recording the wrong show, but when it involves a 
critical system like an autopilot or medical device it can be a matter of life or death. Taming 
HAL seeks to explain these miscommunications between humans and machines by exploring 
user interfaces of everyday devices. Degani examines thirty different systems for human use, 
including watches, consumer electronic products, Internet applications, cars, medical 
equipment, navigation systems onboard cruise ships, and autopilots of commercial aircraft. 
Readers will discover why interfaces between people and machines all too often do not work 
and what needs to be done to avoid potential tragedies. 
 
 
Degani, A. (2013, July). A tale of two maps: Analysis of the London Underground “Diagram.” 
Ergonomics in Design, 2(3), 7–16. 
 
Abstract: This article presents an analytical approach to the problem of information 
organization, with special emphasis on diagrammatic design. The approach involves three 
levels: (a) abstraction of data into representational elements, (b) integration of these elements 
to create coherent structures of information, and (c) configuration of such coherent 
structures, through underlying order, into a whole. To illustrate this approach, the abstract 
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map (the “Diagram”) of the London underground is analyzed, and the design techniques 
observed are brought to the fore. The article concludes with several principles that can be 
encapsulated as constraints for an algorithmic approach to diagram generation.”  
 
 
Degani, A., Barshi, I., & Shafto, M.G. (2013). Information organization in the airline cockpit: 
Lessons from flight 236. Retrieved from Sage Journals website: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1555343413492983 
 
Abstract: We describe the all-engine-out landing of Air Transat Flight 236 in the Azores 
Islands (August 24, 2001) and use certain aspects of that accident to motivate a conceptual 
framework for the organization and display of information in complex human-interactive 
systems. Four hours into the flight, the aircraft experienced unusual oil indications. Two 
hours later, a fuel system failure led to a full-blown emergency that was not evident to the 
crew until it was too late. Although all relevant data to avoid the emergency were available 
to the aircraft computer systems, the design choices made about what to display and how to 
display it kept the pilots “in the dark.” The framework proposed here consists of six levels, 
beginning from the extraction of data from physical signals, abstracting from raw data to 
form visual representations on the user interface, and finally integrating high-level elements 
and information structures. We illustrate how the framework can be used to analyze some of 
the shortcomings in current display design, and we discuss some principles of information 
organization and formal analysis of task logic that might help to improve design. Finally, we 
sketch a design for a helicopter engine display based on these principles.  
 
 
Degani, A., Heymann, M., & Shafto, M. (1999). Formal aspects of procedures: The problem of 
sequential correctness. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 43rd 
Annual Meeting, TX, Vol. 43(20), 1113–1117. 
 
Abstract: A formal, model-based approach is proposed for the development and evaluation 
of the sequences of actions specified in procedures. The approach employs methodologies 
developed within the discipline of discrete-event and hybrid systems control. We 
demonstrate the proposed approach through an evaluation of a procedure for handling an 
irregular engine-start on board a modern commercial aircraft. 
 
 
Degani, A., & Wiener, E. (1990). Human factors of flight-deck checklists: The normal checklist 
(NASA Contractor Report 177549). Retrieved from SKYbrary: 
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1568.pdf  
 
Abstract: Although the aircraft checklist has long been regarded as the foundation of pilot 
standardization and cockpit safety, it has escaped the scrutiny of the human factors 
profession. The improper use, or the non-use, of the normal checklist by flight crews is often 
cited as the probable cause or at least a contributing factor to aircraft accidents. In this report 
the authors attempt to analyze the normal checklist, its functions, format, design, length, 
usage, and the limitations of the humans who must interact with it. The development of the 
checklist from the certification of a new aircraft to its delivery and use by the customer is 
discussed. The influence of the government, particularly the FAA Principal Operations 
Inspector (POI), the manufacturer’s philosophy, the airline’s “culture,” and the end user—the 
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pilot, all influence the ultimate design and usage of this device. The effects of airline mergers 
and acquisitions on checklist usage and design are noted. In addition, the interaction between 
production pressures (“making schedules”), checklist usage and checklist management are 
addressed. Finally, the authors provide a list of design guidelines for normal checklists. 
 
 
Degani, A., & Wiener, E. (1993). Cockpit checklists: Concepts, design, and use. Human 
Factors, 35(2), 28–43. 
 
Abstract: Although the aircraft checklist has long been regarded as a foundation of pilot 
standardization and cockpit safety, it has escaped the scrutiny of the human factors 
profession. The improper use, or the non-use, of the normal checklist by flight crews is often 
cited as a major contributing factor to aircraft accidents. This paper reports the results of a 
field study of flight-deck checklists, and examines this seemingly mundane, yet critical 
device, from several perspectives: its functions, format, design, length, usage, and the 
limitations of the humans who must interact with it. Certain socio-technical factors, such as 
the airline “culture,” cockpit resource management, and production pressures that influence 
the design and usage of this device are also discussed. Finally, a list of design guidelines for 
normal checklists is provided. While the focus of this paper is on the air transport industry, 
most of the principles discussed apply equally well to other high-risk industries such as 
maritime transportation, power production, weapons systems, space flight, and medical care. 
 
 
Degani, A., & Wiener, E. L. (1994a). On the design of flight-deck procedures (NASA Contractor 
Report 177642). Retrieved from NASA website: 
http://ti.arc.nasa.gov/m/profile/adegani/Flight-Deck_Procedures.pdf 
 
Summary: In complex human-machine systems, operations, training, and standardization 
depend on an elaborate set of procedures, which are specified and mandated by the 
operational management of the organization. These procedures indicate to the human operator 
(in this case the pilot) the manner in which operational management intends to have various 
tasks performed. The intent is to provide guidance to the pilots, to ensure a logical, efficient, 
safe, and predictable (standardized) means of carrying out the mission objectives. However, in 
some operations these procedures can become a hodge-podge, with little coherency in terms 
of consistency and operational logic. Inconsistent or illogical procedures may lead to 
deviations from procedures by flight crews, as well as difficulty in transition training for pilots 
moving from one aircraft to another. In this report the authors examine the issue of procedure 
use and design from a broad viewpoint. The authors recommend a process which we call “The 
Four P's:” philosophy, policies, procedures, and practices. We believe that if an organization 
commits to this process, it can create a set of procedures that are more internally consistent, 
less confusing, better respected by the flight crews, and that will lead to greater conformity. 
The “Four-P” model, and the guidelines for procedural development in Appendix 1, resulted 
from cockpit observations, extensive interviews with airline management and pilots, 
interviews and discussion at one major airframe manufacturer, and an examination of accident 
and incident reports involving deviation from standard operating procedures (SOPs). 
Although this report is based on airline operations, we believe that the principles may be 
applicable to other complex, high-risk systems, such as nuclear power production, 
manufacturing process control, space flight, law enforcement, military operations, and high-
technology medical practice.  
  
14 
Degani, A., & Wiener, E.L. (1994b). Philosophies, policies, procedures, and practices: The four 
‘P’s of flight deck operations. In N. Johnston, N. McDonald, & R. Fuller (Eds.), 
Aviation psychology in practice (pp. 44–67). Aldershot, England: Avebury Technical. 
 
Abstract: This chapter is a continuation of our previous work on the human factors of aircraft 
checklists in air carrier operations (Degani and Wiener, 1990). Our work in this area was 
largely undertaken as a result of the discovery, during the investigation of Northwest 255 
crash, that checklists, for all their importance to safe operation, had somehow escaped the 
scrutiny of the human factors  profession. The same, we found out, can be said of most flight 
procedures. We felt that our work in checklist design and usage would not be complete until 
we gave equal consideration to cockpit procedures. 
 
 
Degani, A., & Wiener, E. (1998). Design and operational aspects of flight-deck procedures. 
Proceedings of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Annual Meeting, 
Montreal, Canada. 
 
Abstract: In complex human-machine systems, training, standardization, quality assurance, 
and actual operations depend on an elaborate set of procedures. These procedures indicate to 
the human operator the manner in which operational management intends to have various 
tasks performed. The objective is to provide guidance to the operators—in this case, pilots—
to ensure a safe, logical, and efficient flight operations. However, all too often these 
procedures can become a hodge-podge, with little internal consistency and lack of a clear 
operational logic. Inconsistent or illogical procedures may lead to deviations from procedures 
by the flight crews, as well as difficulty in transition training for pilots moving from one 
aircraft to another. This paper examines the issue of procedurization from two different, yet 
related, aspects: the overall design process of procedures and operational considerations. 
First, the authors describe a process that we call “The Four P’s”: philosophy, policies, 
procedures, and practices. We argue that an organization which commits to this process can 
create a set of procedures which are more internally consistent, which will be better 
respected by the flight crews, hence leading to greater conformity, and which will reduce the 
cost of transition training. Second, we discuss some of the operational considerations that 
must be taken into account while designing or evaluating flight-deck procedures. We focus 
our attention on extra-cockpit demands (e.g., scheduling of tasks based on demands from the 
environment) and intra-cockpit demands (e.g., procedure flow and cockpit layout). The 
design process and operational considerations resulted from cockpit observations, extensive 
interviews with airline management and pilots, interviews and discussion at one major 
airframe manufacturer, and an examination of accident and incident reports involving 
deviation from standard operating procedures (SOPs). Although this paper is based on airline 
operations, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that these principles are also applicable to 
other complex human-machine systems, such as corporate aviation, nuclear power, chemical 
process control, military operations, and medical practice. 
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Desaulniers, D.R. (1987, September). Layout, organization, and the effectiveness of consumer 
product warnings. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual 
Meeting 31(1), 56–60. SAGE Publications. 
 
Abstract: Three experiments are presented examining the effects of warning layout (spatial 
structure) and organization (semantic structure) on the readability and memorability of 
warning information. In Experiment 1 these factors were tested in a 2 (levels of layout) x 3 
(levels of organization) factorial. design. The two levels of layout were the typical paragraph 
format and an experimental version having the appearance of an outline. Warning content 
was organized according to hazard, type of statement, or randomly. Warnings were ranked 
according to three criteria; eye appeal, ease of processing, and effectiveness. In general, 
warnings in outline layout and type of hazard organization were ranked as having greater eye 
appeal, easier to process, and more effective than alternative organization-layout conditions. 
In Experiments 2 and 3, only warning layout was manipulated and a cover story was used to 
elicit reading and compliance behaviors likely to occur in the home. Experiment 2 results 
indicate that, when asked to read the warnings, subjects spent less time reading warnings in 
paragraph layout than warnings in outline layout. In Experiment 3, the decision to read the 
warning was at the discretion of the subjects. Results indicated that warnings in outline 
layout were read and complied with by a larger proportion of subjects than warnings in 
paragraph layout. Implications for warning design and future research are discussed. 
 
 
Dismukes, R.K., & Berman, B.A. (2010). Checklists and monitoring in the cockpit: Why 
crucial defenses sometimes fail (NASA Technical Memorandum 2010–216396). 
Moffett Field, CA. 
 
Abstract: Checklists and monitoring are two essential defenses against equipment failures 
and pilot errors. Problems with checklist use and pilots’ failures to monitor adequately have a 
long history in aviation accidents. A typical airline flight requires a great number of routine 
flight control inputs and switch actions and frequent reading and verification of visual 
displays. Many of these actions are governed by formal procedures specifying the sequence 
and manner of execution, after which checklists are used to bolster reliability. Throughout 
the flight, pilots are required to monitor many functions, the state of aircraft systems, aircraft 
configuration, flight path, and the actions of the other pilot in the cockpit. Thus, the number 
of opportunities for error is enormous, especially on challenging flights, and many of those 
opportunities are associated with checklists and monitoring—themselves safeguards 
designed to protect against error. Our study was conducted to explore why checklists and 
monitoring sometimes fail to catch errors and equipment malfunctions as intended. In 
particular, we wanted to: 1) collect data on monitoring and checklist use in cockpit 
operations in typical flight conditions; 2) provide a plausible cognitive account of why 
deviations from formal checklist and monitoring procedures sometimes occur; 3) lay a 
foundation for identifying ways to reduce vulnerability to inadvertent checklist and 
monitoring errors; 4) compare checklist and monitoring execution in normal flights with 
performance issues uncovered in accident investigations; and 5) suggest ways to improve the 
effectiveness of checklists and monitoring. 
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Dismukes, R.K., Berman, B.A., & Loukopoulos, L.D. (2007). The limits of expertise: Rethinking 
crew error and the causes of airline accidents. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
 
Abstract: “The Limits of Expertise” reports a study of the 19 major U.S. airline accidents 
from 1991–2000 in which the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found crew 
error to be a causal factor. Each accident is reported in a separate chapter that examines 
events and crew actions and explores the cognitive processes in play at each step. The 
majority of all aviation accidents are attributed to human error, but this is often 
misinterpreted as evidence of lack of skill, vigilance, or conscientiousness of the pilots. Why 
would highly skilled, well-trained pilots make errors performing tasks they had successfully 
executed many thousands of times in previous flights? The approach is guided by extensive 
evidence from cognitive psychology that human skill and error are opposite sides of the same 
coin. The book examines the ways in which competing task demands, ambiguity and 
organizational pressures interact with cognitive processes to make all experts vulnerable to 
characteristic forms of error. The final chapter identifies themes cutting across the accidents, 
discusses the role of chance, criticizes simplistic concepts of causality of accidents, and 
suggests ways to reduce vulnerability to these catastrophes. The authors' complementary 
experience allowed a unique approach to the study: accident investigation with the NTSB, 
cognitive psychology research both in the lab and in the field, enormous first-hand 
experience of piloting, and application of aviation psychology in both civil and military 
operations. This combination allowed the authors to examine and explain the domain-
specific aspects of aviation operations and to extend advances in basic research in cognition 
to complex issues of human performance in the real world. Although "The Limits of 
Expertise" is directed to aviation operations, the implications are clear for understanding the 
decision processes, skilled performance and errors of professionals in many domains, 
including medicine. 
 
 
Dowell, A.M. (2001). Critical safe operating parameters: “Never exceed” limit and “never 
deviate” action. Process Safety Progress, 20(3), 208–214. 
 
Abstract: Where does the human being fit in the normal operating system and where does 
he/she fit in the safety shutdown system? Planning ahead can make human interaction 
inherently safer. This paper offers the following suggestions for managing that interaction: 
(1) Use inherently safer principles in the design of the process and its layers of protection. (2) 
Define “Never Exceed” limits for critical safe operating parameters. (3) Define a mandatory 
action point and a “Never Deviate” action with enough response time to prevent exceeding 
the Never Exceed limit. (4) Train and drill. 
 
 
Drury, C.G. (2000). Development and use of the documentation design aid. Proceedings of the 
IEA/HFES Congress, 44(22), 783–786. Retrieved from: 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/roi/deve
lopment_and_use_of_the_documentation_design_aid_.pdf 
 
Abstract: In aviation maintenance and inspection; work documents are critical to safety, as 
they act as both production control devices and job aids for mechanics and inspectors. Based 
on an analysis of the current state of documentation in aviation maintenance, there was a 
clear need to help document designers/writers utilize good human factors practice. Design 
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guidelines were developed and tested (Pate1 et al, 1994) and then made accessible through a 
Visual Basic window, called the Documentation Design Aid or DDA, available on-screen 
while writing a procedure. This DDA was tested for usability by writers and for 
comprehension of the documents produced. A number of different evaluations showed that 
the DDA reduced comprehension errors significantly. The DDA is now available via’s 
WWW site for users to download and use. 
 
 
Drury, C.G., & Gramopadhye, A.K. (1992, August). Training for visual inspection: Controlled 
studies and field implications. Proceedings of the Seventh Federal Aviation 
Administration Meeting on Human Factor Issues in Aircraft Maintenance and 
Inspection: Science, Technology, and Management: A Program Review, 135–146. 
Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/mx_faa
_%28formerly_hfskyway%29/human_factors_issues/meeting_7/trainingforvisualinspec
tion.pdf 
 
Abstract: The three factors most affecting visual inspection performance were derived from a 
generic task analysis of inspection. For each of these three, possible training interventions 
were found from the literature on industrial inspection. Direct tests of these interventions were 
made through five experiments on a computer-based simulator for aircraft visual inspection. 
One experiment is presented, showing how the size of the area seen by an inspector in a single 
visual fixation can be trained to improve search performance. Implications of the results of 
this controlled study for the training of aircraft inspectors are given. 
 
 
Erdinc, O. (2010). Comprehension and hazard communication of three pictorial symbols 
designed for flight manual warnings. Safety Science, 48(4), 478–481. 
 
Abstract: Military flight manuals contain three types of warnings; WARNING, CAUTION 
and NOTE messages convey personal injury or loss of life hazards, material damage hazards 
and essential information respectively. Effectiveness of these warning messages is crucial for 
flight safety. A way to enhance warning effectiveness is pairing warning messages with 
compatible symbols. However, no symbol was used with warning messages in current flight 
manuals. In this study, three pictorial symbols were designed for flight manual warnings. 
Comprehension and hazard perception of designed symbols were tested through matching 
test and psychometric rating, respectively, by Turkish military pilots. Results showed that 
comprehension and hazard perception of the symbols were sufficient and compatible with 
content of warning messages in flight manuals. It was concluded that accompanying warning 
messages with these symbols could contribute to effectiveness of flight manual warnings. 
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File, S.E., & Jew, A. (1973). Syntax and the recall of instructions in a realistic situation. British 
Journal of Psychology, 64(1), 65–70. 
 
Abstract: Airline passengers were presented with emergency landing instructions, either 
visually or auditorily, and subgroups received instructions of different syntactical forms. 
Regardless of their original form, instructions were mainly recalled in the active affirmative. 
Significantly fewer instructions were recalled when they were in the negative than when they 
were in the affirmative, but the use of the passive, rather than the active, voice did not reduce 
the amount recalled. 
 
 
Flight Safety Foundation. (1993, September-October). ‘Hurry up’ syndrome identified as 
causal factor in aviation safety accidents. Flight Safety Foundation: Human Factors & 
Aviation Medicine, 40(5), 1–5.  
 
Summary: Research indicates that many incidents could have been prevented if the human 
factors elements of time pressure had been better understood. 
 
 
Flight Safety Foundation. (2000a, August-December). FSF ALAR briefing note: 1.1—Operating 
philosophy. Retrieved from FSF website:  
http://flightsafety.org/files/alar_bn1-1-ops_philosophy.pdf 
 
Summary: Adherence to standard operating procedures (SOPs) is an effective method of 
preventing approach-and-landing accidents (ALAs), including those involving controlled 
flight into terrain (CFIT). Crew resource management (CRM) is not effective without 
adherence to SOPs. 
 
 
Flight Safety Foundation. (2000b, August-November). Standard operating procedures template, 6–
9. Retrieved from FSF website: http://flightsafety.org/files/alar_bn1-1-ops_philosophy.pdf 
 
Abstract: The following template is adapted from US. Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) Advisory Circular 12071, Standard Operating Procedures for Flight Deck 
Crewmembers. A manual or a section in a manual serving as the flight crews guide to 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) may serve also as a training guide. The content should 
be clear and comprehensive, without necessarily being lengthy. No template could include 
every topic that might apply unless it were constantly revised. Many topics involving special 
operating authority or new technology are absent from this template, among them extended-
range twin-engine operations (ETOPS), precision runway monitor (PRM), surface movement 
guidance system (SMGS), required navigation performance (RNP) and many others.” The 
document lists industry and FAA examples of topics that constitute a useful template for 
developing comprehensive, effective SOPs. 
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Flight Safety Foundation. (2005a, June). Flight crew procedures streamlines for 
smoke/fire/fumes. Flight Safety Digest, 24(6), 31–36.  
 
Summary: Based on accident/incident research and discussions during international 
meetings, a philosophy and a checklist template aim to standardize and optimize responses to 
non-alerted smoke/fire/fumes events. 
 
 
Flight Safety Foundation. (2005b, June). ‘Paperless cockpit’ promises advances in safety, 
efficiency. Flight Safety Digest, 24(6), 1–30.   
 
Summary: Electronic flight bags are eliminating considerable paper from the flight deck 
while offering the flight crew a wide array of technological assistance. Nevertheless, these 
still-changing tools require more than casual understanding before flight crews can replace 
paper with electronics. 
 
 
Flight Safety Foundation. (2009a). FSF ALAR briefing note 1.2 - Automation (Issue Brief No. 
1.2). Alexandria, VA: Author. 
 
Summary: For optimum use of automation, the following should be emphasized: 
understanding of AP/FD and A/THR modes integration (pairing); understanding of all mode-
change sequences; understanding of the pilot-system interface: pilot-to-system 
communication (mode selection and target entries); and, system-to-pilot feedback (modes 
and target cross-check); awareness of available guidance (AP/FD and A/THR status, modes 
armed or engaged, active targets); and, alertness and willingness to revert to a lower level of    
automation or to hand flying/manual thrust control, if required. 
 
 
Flight Safety Foundation. (2009b). FSF approach and landing accident reduction toolkit briefing 
note: 1.1—Operating philosophy (Issue Brief No. 1.1). Alexandria, VA: Author. 
 
Summary: Deviations from SOPs occur for a variety of reasons; intentional deviations and 
inadvertent deviations from SOPs have been identified as causal factors in many ALAs. 
CRM is not effective without adherence to SOPs, because SOPs provide a standard reference 
for the crew’s tasks on the flight deck. SOPs are effective only if they are clear and concise. 
Transition training provides the opportunity to establish the disciplined use of SOPs, and 
recurrent training offers the opportunity to reinforce that behavior.” 
 
 
Fucks, I., & Dien, Y. (2013). ‘No rule, no use’? The effects of over-proceduralization. In M. 
Bourrier & C. Bieder, Trapping safety into rules: How desirable or avoidable is 
proceduralization? (pp. 27–38). Burlington, VT: Ashgate.  
 
Abstract: After several decades, we are still confronted with a challenge: on the one hand, 
procedures are essential for safety and their role and number are increasing and, on the other 
hand, there are still fuzziness and implicit features related to them. In this chapter we tackle 
the role of procedures and some paradoxes surrounding procedures. We then focus on the 
side effect of the over-proceduralization, a phenomenon we call the ‘no rule, no use’. This 
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side effect will be interpreted as a defensive behavior developed within organizations 
characterized by over-proceduralization, over-control practices and blame culture. This side 
effect will also be discussed within the context of high-risk organizations. 
 
 
Funk, K. (2009). A methodology and tools for the prospective identification of NEXTGEN 
human factors issues. Proceedings of the International Symposium of Aviation 
Psychology, Dayton, OH, 106–111. Retrieved from: 
http://classes.engr.oregonstate.edu/mime/spring2009/ie548/Resources/NextGen.pdf 
 
Abstract: The Human-Machine Systems Engineering Methodology (HMSEM) is a 
systematic method to prospectively identify relevant human fallibilities, potential errors, and 
general human factors issues in a complex, high-risk system, then develop design 
recommendations for remediations to counteract the fallibilities, avoid or mitigate the errors, 
and resolve the issues. HMSEM uses IDEF0 functional modeling, task analysis, human 
fallibilities analysis, and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, organizing the information for 
and from the analyses in a workbook. The results of its application to several tasks on the 
NextGen flight deck suggest that it can be a valuable complement to other means to 
anticipate and resolve human factors issues in NextGen development. 
 
 
Funk, K., Mauro, R., & Barshi, I. (2009). NextGen flight deck human factors issues. 
Proceedings of the 15th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Dayton, OH, 
208–213. Retrieved from: 
http://web.engr.oregonstate.edu/~funkk/Publications/NextGenIssuesISAP2009.pdf 
 
Abstract: This paper describes a project to compile, from a literature review and preliminary 
analyses, an initial but reasonably comprehensive list of NextGen flight deck human factors 
issues. It describes the methodology that was used, presents representative issues from the 
list that resulted, and makes recommendations to continue work to update the list and use it 
as the basis for suggested NextGen flight deck standards and design requirements. 
 
 
Gasser, M., Boeke, J., Hatternan, M., & Tan, R. (2005). The influence of font type on 
information recall. North American Journal of Psychology, 7(2), 181–188. 
 
Abstract: Previous research on reading has primarily focused on the cognitive and 
neurological aspects of learning to read and reading disabilities. In this study, the physical 
characteristics of the text itself were examined in an applied setting. Specifically, the 
influence of two common characteristics of font types (serif or san serif markings and 
proportional or monospacing) on recall of information was investigated. The participants 
were college students (N = 149). Each participant received a one page discussion of 
Tuberculosis, in the form of an office memorandum distributed in a healthcare facility, and 
was then tested on recall of the important points discussed in the memorandum. Serif fonts 
significantly improved recall of the information. 
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Giles, C.N. (2013). Modern airline pilots’ quandary: Standard operating procedures - to comply 
or not to comply. Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering, 2(2), 2–12. 
 
Abstract: Modern airline pilots are tasked every flight with the safe and efficient operation of 
highly automated airliners in today’s complicated global and economic environments. 
Airlines have developed standard operating procedures (SOP) for normal, abnormal, and 
emergency operations. These procedures serve as a script for crews to follow. These 
procedures are designed by airlines to ensure that aircraft are operated in the (1) most safe, 
(2) most efficient, and (3) most on-time manner. For the most part pilots will comply with 
SOP, but when they (1) don’t agree with SOP, (2) don’t understand SOP or the risks 
associated with not complying with SOP, or (3) don’t feel adequately trained to know what 
SOP is, it is difficult to motivate them to comply. Airlines have the means to measure 
compliance through Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) and Line Operations 
Safety Audit (LOSA). The purpose of this research is to determine if increased 
understanding, knowledge and awareness of the risk of noncompliance with SOP increase 
airline pilots’ compliance with SOP. This research explores data from line checks at a major 
US airline that was gathered in pursuit of understanding what drives SOP compliance. 
Baseline data was gathered and analyzed to determine the top 12 noncompliant items. The 
airline provided training during the Human Factors module in each pilots recurrent training 
on Pilot Intentional Non Compliance (PINC). The training including developing pilots’ 
understanding that while most Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) reports grant pilots 
immunity from legal action, if a violation is labeled PINC, ASAP protections do not apply. 
Further line checks were conducted after the pilots received the PINC training. The top 12 
noncompliant items from the pre-PINC training group were compared to the same 12 items 
in the post-PINC training group. Significant improvement in SOP compliance was found in 
six of the 12 items tested. The results established that training pilots on the risk of PINC did 
significantly increase SOP compliance. 
 
 
Gross, R.L. (1995, May). Studies suggest methods for optimizing checklist design and crew 
performance. Flight Safety Digest, 14(5), 1–10. 
 
Summary: Improved readability, color coding, listing steps in logical sequence, thoughtful 
indexing, convenient placement within the cockpit, attention to human factors and many 
other principles will help to ensure that checklists are used as intended. 
 
 
Grote, G. (2009). Coordination in organizations: Creating flexible routines. In Management of 
uncertainty: Theory and application in the design of systems and organizations (pp. 57–
74). London: Springer-Verlag. 
 
Summary: In this chapter, coordination in organizations was discussed with the specific 
focus on rules and routines as a coordination mechanism. From a contingency perspective, 
the issue is to establish a balance between stability and flexibility by rules and routines that 
allow uncertainty to be coped with while at the same time, providing sufficient orientation to 
ease coordination demands. Based on newer research on organizational routines, it was 
argued that routines can be sufficiently flexible to support adaptation in unforeseen 
situations, especially when they are backed by flexible rules. Subsequently, some research on 
different types of rules and their relationship to coordination patterns and performance was 
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discussed, indicating the importance of a more sophisticated perspective on rules and 
standardization. Instead of only taking the amount of rules as an indication of more or less 
standardization, types of rules need to be studied. One way of distinguishing rule types is 
based on the level of action regulation targeted; that is, goal, process, or concrete action. An 
example of a rules analysis was presented which showed a mismatch between rule types, 
uncertainties to be handled and actors’ competence profiles. Such analyses can serve as input 
into the redesign of rules aimed at creating flexible routines capable of absorbing uncertainty 
when needed. As part of a systematic rule management, different ways of managing 
uncertainties by means of different types of rules need to be explored, for which the decision 
process presented in Chapter 3 can provide some guidance. Furthermore, the process used for 
(re)designing rules has to be chosen, considering the participation of future rule users and the 
level of the organization at which decisions on rules are made. Finally, it was acknowledged 
that rule management will only be able to partially resolve the dilemma stemming from the 
contradictory requirements in non-routine situations of reducing demands on cognitive and 
organizational resources, while also increasing more resource-intensive behavioural 
flexibility and adaptability. 
 
 
Grote, G., & Zala-Mezö, E. (2004). The effects of different forms of coordination in coping with 
workload: Cockpit versus operating theatre (Report on the psychological part of the 
project). Retrieved from ETH Institutional Repository website: 
http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:27237/eth-27237-01.pdf 
 
Executive summary: There is a general understanding that rules and standards support safe 
operation in complex systems. At the same time, it is also known that high levels of 
standardization may impede flexible adaptation to changing demands. Comparing team 
coordination in the highly standardized setting of cockpits of commercial aircraft with 
coordination in anesthesia teams who operate with far fewer standards helps to understand 
the impact of rules on team performance. In order to analyze team coordination in these two 
settings, 42 cockpit crews were videotaped during a simulator training session, which 
required performing a so-called clean approach, i.e. a landing without flaps and slats, as well 
as 23 anesthesia teams performing anesthesia inductions. The behavior was coded based on 
four sets of categories, i.e. implicit vs. explicit coordination, leadership, and heedful 
interrelating. Hypotheses concerning the effects of different levels of standardization and 
task load were tested, derived from the general assumption that successful teams change 
between different coordination modes in accordance with changing situational demands. 
Contrary to our original assumptions, we found that anesthesia teams coordinated more 
implicitly than cockpit crews despite having fewer written rules guiding their behavior. 
Several reasons may account for this finding: cockpit crews have been trained much more to 
coordinate explicitly even in seemingly obvious situations in order to prevent over-reliance 
on common standards as basis for a common understanding of the situation and its demands; 
anesthesia teams share a common field of action and use cues provided by each other’s 
actions much more for seamless coordination than pilots who operate in different visual 
fields; there are manifold unwritten rules in medicine which support a common 
understanding of the situation and the actions required. For the aviation data, a clear link 
between higher levels of explicit coordination and higher levels of performance could be 
established, which hints at the importance of backing up standards with a constant effort to 
reassure a common understanding of the situation and the relevance of the standards for the 
situation. A second set of analyses concerned patterns of coordination within each 
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professional setting, comparing work phases with different degrees of standardization and 
task load. One important finding here was that personal leadership is only required in 
situations with few standards. In highly standardized situations, the standards act as a form of 
impersonal leadership, which does not require additional efforts of personal leadership. To 
the contrary, high levels of personal leadership in highly standardized situations appear to be 
related to worse team performance. The results help to improve both our theoretical 
understanding of adaptive coordination as well as practical measures taken to support teams 
in dealing with changing demands on team coordination. Especially in anesthesia more 
research is needed, though, to establish sounder links between coordination behavior and 
team performance than we were able to demonstrate. In a third set of analyses, the rules 
themselves were investigated by determining the level of action regulation they concerned: 
specifying a goal to be achieved vs. specifying the process to be followed to determine the 
correct course of action vs. specifying the course of action to be followed. In aviation, the 
vast majority of rules prescribed the course of action to be taken, while in medicine, more 
often the process to determine the correct course of action is specified. Considering the 
higher degrees of operational uncertainty contained in handling a patient as compared to 
flying an aircraft, the less specific rules in medicine seem appropriate. Such analyses may 
help to support a more systematic rules management taking into account an appropriate 
balance between guidance and scope of action. 
 
 
Hale, J. (1990). Safety rules o.k.? Possibilities and limitations in behavioural safety strategies. 
Journal of Occupational Accidents, 12, 3–20. 
 
Abstract: The paper considers the basis for the development and use of safety rules imposed 
by a company or national organisation. It starts from a consideration of individual behaviour 
and error in terms of cognitive psychological theory. This postulates that behaviour is 
governed by individual “production rules.” Imposed safety rules are only needed where 
individuals’ own rules are not sufficient to prevent accidents. From a classification of error 
types it is possible to derive a classification of types of safety rules and to speculate both 
upon the characteristics, which each type needs to have, and on how and where they need to 
be developed and applied. The paper is illustrated by examples from a number of activities at 
individual, company and national level. 
 
 
Hale A., Borys D., & Else D. (2012). Management of safety rules and procedures: A review of the 
literature (Research Report 12.3). Retrieved from The Institute of Occupational Safety 
and Health website: www.iosh.co.uk/rulesandprocedures 
 
Abstract: A review was conducted of the literature on the management of rules and 
procedures that affect safety, concentrating on rules at the workplace level. A literature 
search in the scientific and grey literature revealed 180 key references for study. The 
literature fell into two contrasting paradigms. The first is a relatively static, rationalist, top–
down view of rules as the one best way of working, devised by experts distant from the 
workplace, imposed on operators as a way of constraining incorrect or inadequate behaviour, 
where violations are seen as aberrations to be suppressed. The second is a relatively dynamic, 
bottom–up view of rules as local, situated, socially constructed, devised by those at the sharp 
end, embodying their tacit knowledge from their experience of diverse reality. The report 
explores these two paradigms, the evidence from theory and field studies which supports or 
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fills them out, and their consequences for procedure management. It proposes a model of 
procedure management that attempts to draw the lessons from both paradigms and combine 
their strong points. This is a nine-step dynamic cycle, driven by the central task of 
monitoring rule and procedure use in order to optimise it through a combination of learning 
and procedure modification, rule scrapping and rule enforcement. This framework forms the 
basis for the stand-alone ‘Notes of guidance,’ including a summary intervention plan to 
review and improve practice in organisations.” 
 
 
Hale, A.R., Heijer, T., & Koornneef, F. (2003). Management of safety rules: The case of 
railways. Safety Science Monitor, 7(1), 1–11. Retrieved from Safety Science Monitor 
website: http://ssmon.chb.kth.se/volumes/vol7/3-2.pdf 
 
Abstract: Every technology and activity has safety rules, which are usually formulated 
explicitly, taught to those operating in the system and imposed on them. Safety rules also 
determine liability after accidents. Yet there is very little systematic scientific or 
management literature on how to devise and manage safety rules. This paper uses a simple 
framework to draw together what is known of good and bad practice in this area, particularly 
in deciding what rules should be explicitly formulated and imposed. It draws on the literature 
on violations, on rule learning and on organizational control. The paper concludes with a 
case study of safety rules in the railways, derived from a larger European study of safety rule 
management for railway operations. It shows that the nature of the system dynamics and the 
current communications within railway operations result in a largely open loop operation of 
the system. This makes it vulnerable to any form of deviation from strictly defined 
operations. Safety rules are part of the apparatus to render the behaviour of the various 
people in the system sufficiently predictable that this open-loop operation can succeed in a 
large proportion of situations. However this requires that adherence to rules is very strict and 
has great problems coping with any deviations, even those required to respond to situations, 
which cannot be dealt with following the existing rules. This requirement conflicts with 
much of the available literature on organisational control and high reliability organisations. 
However, the more interactive derivation of rules specific to the range of system conditions 
requires a far greater communication between system operators than the railway system 
currently requires. The room for manoeuvre in optimising safety rule use in railways is 
therefore currently limited.” 
 
 
Hale, A.R., & Swuste, P. (1998). Safety rules: procedural freedom or action constraint?  
Safety Science, 29, 163–177. 
 
Abstract: The paper presents a partial classification of safety rules as constraints imposed 
from outside on the freedom of choice of individuals or companies. The classification is 
linked to the reason model of skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based behaviour. The imposition 
of constraints is related to a number of criteria concerning the context and use of the rules to 
arrive at proposals for when and where to apply what type of rule. To illustrate the principles 
discussed an example is given of the rule from the Dutch Working Environment legislation 
concerning the requirement to use “current state of the art in prevention” in companies. The 
paper proposes providing procedural rule support to companies on how to meet the rule, in 
the form of a data bank of practicable solutions to health and safety problems. 
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Herry, N. (1987). Errors in the execution of prescribed instructions: Design of process control 
work aids. In J. Rasmussen, K. Duncan, & J. Leplat (Eds), New technology and human 
error (pp. 239–245). Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
 
Abstract: Errors in the execution of prescribed instructions are analysed in terms of deviations 
between the operator’s action logic and the action logic of the designer of the instructions. 
These logics are characterized by the implementation of distinct properties of action 
organization; that of the operator being unsuitable to understand the bases of the instructions. 
 
 
Heymann, M., Degani, A., & Barshi, I. (2007). Generating procedures and recovery sequences: 
A formal approach. Proceedings of the 14th International Symposium of Aviation 
Psychology, Dayton, Ohio, 252–257. 
 
Abstract: This paper presents a formal approach for the analysis and development of 
effective, safe, and efficient procedures for abnormal and emergency situations. The focus is 
on methods for describing the behavior of the underlying machine, specification of desirable 
and unsafe regions of operation, and an algorithmic approach for computation of optimal 
action sequences. We discuss current gaps in procedure development and conclude with 
some of the challenges that lie ahead. 
 
 
Hilton, B. (2012). Comparing the effects of simulated, intelligent audible, checklists and analog 
checklists in simulated flight (Doctoral dissertation, Western Michigan University). 
Retrieved from: http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/dissertations/109/ 
 
Abstract: This study examined the effect of using a simulated intelligent audible checklist in 
simulated flight as compared to a standard analog (paper) checklist. Participants were three 
Western Michigan University students in the College of Aviation. All participants were 
licensed pilots with instrument ratings. The main dependent variable was the number of 
checklist errors or omissions committed by the pilots in simulated flight. During each flight, 
each participant could make up to 42 errors. The error count would initiate at the appropriate 
time to perform the “before-takeoff checklist” and would end one minute after parking the 
plane, the logical time to complete an “after landing checklist.” A multiple baseline design 
was implemented in this research with the treatment being implemented at a different point 
in time for each participant. Either stability in performance or a decrement in performance 
determined the introduction of the audible checklist. Once stability or a descending trend in 
paper checklist use had been established, each participant was placed in the intervention 
phase. During baseline phase the three participants averaged 22.7% compliance per flight. 
After the simulated audible intelligent checklist intervention was introduced compliance 
increased to 97%. During the reversal phase compliance decreased to an average of 34%. 
Visual inspection of the data suggests that an intelligent audible checklist used during actual 
flights may decrease in-flight errors and possibly decrease aviation incidents and accidents. 
 
  
  
26 
Jaynes, L.S., & Boles, D.B. (1990, October). The effect of symbols on warning compliance.  
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, Vol. 34, No. 
14, 984–987. Retrieved from Sage Journals website: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/154193129003401405  
 
Abstract: The present study investigated whether different warning designs, specifically 
those with symbols, affect compliance rates. Five conditions were tested: a verbal warning, a 
pictographs warning with a circle enclosing each graphic, a pictographs warning with a 
triangle on its vertex enclosing each graphic, a warning with both words and pictographs 
(triangular enclosures), and a control (no warning). Participants performed a chemistry 
laboratory task using a set of instructions that contained one of the five conditions. The 
warnings instructed them to wear safety goggles, mask and gloves. All four warning 
conditions had significantly greater compliance than the no-warning condition. The highest 
rate of compliance occurred with the verbal plus pictographs condition, although it did not 
differ significantly from the verbal condition. A significant main effect was found for the 
“presence of pictographs” variable, suggesting that the addition of pictographs to a verbal 
warning will increase compliance rates. The unexpected finding that the pictographs warning 
with triangular enclosures had significantly lower compliance means than the verbal warning 
may be due to the different types of message modes or design criteria used. The enclosure 
shape made no difference in compliance rates, despite research that indicates that unstable 
shapes are preferred as warning enclosures. The results suggest the importance of conducting 
behavioral studies rather than relying on preference data.  
 
 
Johnston, N. (2003). The paradox of rules: Procedural drift in commercial aviation. In R. 
Jensen (Ed), Proceedings of the Twelfth International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology, April 14–17, Dayton, Ohio. 
 
Abstract: This paper considers the inescapable tendency for procedures and remedial rule-
based interventions in organisations to “drift” in a fashion that is often inconsistent with the 
intentions of those responsible for original system design. Taking Snook’s (2000) notion of 
Practical Drift as a point of departure, the paper discusses a range of examples from 
commercial aviation, with a view to establishing the potential implications for safe and 
efficient sociotechnical systems. The paper argues for a programme of research into the 
nature of such drift and its driving forces. 
 
 
Jones, S. (1966). The effect of a negative qualifier in an instruction. Journal of Verbal Learning 
and Verbal Behavior, 5(5), 497–501. 
 
Abstract: This study investigates the effect of using a qualifying negative—“except”—on 
performance of a task, for which an equivalent positive form of instruction was available. The 
hypothesis was tested that in a task requiring response to five out of every eight items, an 
instruction of the form “Respond to all except three items” would be less efficient, in terms of 
speed of performance, than would the positive form of instruction “Respond to five items.” 
The results confirmed this hypothesis. Furthermore, the errors made on the three items, 
specified in the instruction containing “except,” were significantly greater than those made on 
the five items specified in the positive form, despite the fact that the probability of making 
errors on the latter was greater. The difficulty of handling an instruction defined in terms of an 
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exclusion class appeared to be a consequence of having to search for one class of items and 
respond to another. However, in Exp. I the scanning procedures under the two forms of 
instruction were not identical, and a second experiment was carried out in which the number 
of items in both classes was the same. With the scanning process equated for both groups, any 
difference in performance could be attributed to the differing response requirements under the 
two forms of instruction. The results again showed a significantly slower rate of performance 
under the instruction containing “except,” and are discussed in terms of a conflict engendered 
by opposing sets within the linguistic sequence of the instruction. 
 
 
Kanki, B.G., & Seamster, T.L. (2003, February). Operating documents: From documents to 
data. Presented at the FAA Air Transportation Human Factors Research Review 
Meeting, Irvine, CA.  
 
Background: Original goals: Identify key issues in the development of operating 
documents/operational information; Assemble guidelines that will help operators develop 
operating documents/information systems; Incorporate examples of current approaches to 
resolving key issues. 
 
 
Kanki, B.G., Seamster, T.L., Lopez, M., Thomas, R.J., & LeRoy, W.W. (2001). Design and use 
of operating documents. Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology, Dayton, OH.  
 
Abstract: Operating documents, especially those used by crews in the cockpit, need to be 
compatible with regulations, aircraft systems, and, most importantly, the operational 
environment. In addition, operating documents must be internally consistent with the entire 
system of documents. There are many guidelines covering most aspects of document 
development. It is difficult for operators to use these guidelines in their current form, which 
is distributed across a number of reports and other publications. To correct this situation, 
representatives from many of the US operators have been involved in two workshops to 
identify their most important document development issues and to organize those issues in a 
way that is operationally meaningful. Results from the workshops are being used to assess 
existing guidelines and reorganize them into a manual for operators. One group of results 
indicates differences in priorities among the three different types of operations involved in 
these workshops: 1) Majors, 2) Regionals, and 3) Cargo. A second set of results identifies the 
most important guideline issues. These results provide a detailed outline for organizing 
operating document guidelines according to five primary issues: 1) organization of 
documents, 2) standardization of documents, 3) usability of documents, 4) document 
development process, and 5) transition to electronic media. Additional results from these 
workshops have shown the importance of using examples to illustrate issues and to 
demonstrate the application of specific guidelines. Collectively, the results highlight the main 
document development issues and show how guidelines should be organized and presented 
in order to help carriers address those issues. 
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La Cruz-Guerra, D., & Cruz-Gomez, M.J. (2002). Using operating and safety limits to create 
safety procedures. Process Safety Progress, 21(2), 115–118. 
 
Abstract: In this paper, the criteria for the development, implementation, and control of 
operating and safety limits of parameters like pressure, temperature, level, composition, etc., 
are described. Operating and safety limits are required by Elements 2 “process safety 
information” and 4 “operating procedures” of the information package for OSHA Process 
Safety Management (PSM). A brief description is also given of how these limits should be 
established and the information, with respect to consequences, safeguards, and corrective 
actions that should be obtained during a detailed analysis of deviation from an operation or 
process parameter. This paper looks for an easier method of developing operating and safety 
limits within chemical and petrochemical plants to prevent and control undesirable events 
(human losses, material losses, economic losses, or environmental pollution) through 
adequate emergency plans and response programs. 
 
 
Landry, S. J., Jacko, J. A., & Coulter, W. H. (2006). Impact of the use of techniques and 
situation awareness on pilots’ procedure compliance. Proceedings of the Human Factors 
and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 50th, 40–44.  Retrieved from Sage Journals 
website:  http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/154193120605000109 
 
Abstract: In two empirical studies using desktop flight simulators, pilots were monitored 
while following procedures. In both experiments, pilots demonstrated a high degree of 
reliance on rule-based heuristics for following procedures (techniques), rather than on the 
procedures themselves. This was true regardless of the resulting compliance with the 
procedure. Changes to the procedure and changes to the content of displayed information had 
no effect on the use of techniques. In addition, frequent instances of noncompliance to 
procedure were recorded. The most common types of noncompliance, technical failures in 
implementing the procedure, were found to be nearly all-innocuous, while failures related to 
a lack of situation awareness comprised the bulk of unsafe instances of noncompliance. Also 
found were a number of instances of noncompliance, which actually enhanced the safety of 
the procedure. The results have implications for the design of procedures and for automated 
aids for procedure following. 
 
 
Latorella, K.A., & Drury, C.G. (1992). A framework for human reliability in aircraft 
inspection. Proceedings of the Seventh Federal Aviation Administration Meeting on 
Human Factors Issues in Aircraft Maintenance and Inspection: Science, technology, and 
management: A program review, 71–82. Washington, DC: Federal Aviation 
Administration/Office of Aviation Medicine. 
 
Abstract: ...a framework has been provided for the classifications and control of human error 
in aircraft inspection. The proposed system model of aircraft inspection and maintenance 
recognizes the fact that the interaction of the task with the human and the environment is the 
basis of most human errors. Thus an attempt is made to shift the attention from the task to 
these interactions. Based on the system models, the S-R-K framework of Rasmussen (1983) 
and the systemic error categories of Rasmussen and Vicente (1989), a methodology for 
identifying intervention strategies has been proposed. 
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Laughery, K. R., & Wogalter, M. S. (2006). Designing effective warnings. Reviews of Human 
Factors and Ergonomics, 2(1), 241–271. 
 
Abstract: Since the early 1980s there has been an increased interest in research on warnings. 
This chapter has several objectives. First, we describe the purpose of warnings and where 
warnings fit with other safety considerations, such as design and guarding. Next, we present 
a model that incorporates both communication and information-processing concepts, which 
is characteristic of theoretical orientations that have guided much of the warning research. 
The research and application issues have generally focused on two themes: design factors 
and non-design factors that influence warning effectiveness. Third, we review the progress 
and status of research and application, with an emphasis on identifying those factors that 
appear to be most important in determining warning effectiveness. Finally, we conclude with 
a discussion of some of the challenges and opportunities facing warning designers and 
researchers in the future. 
 
 
Lawton, R. (1998). Not working to rule: Understanding procedural violations at work.  
Safety Science, 28(2), 77–95. 
 
Abstract: This paper begins by presenting a brief synopsis of the literature regarding the 
relationship between rule violations and accidents. The paper goes on to report a study of UK 
railway shunters' motives for rule violations. Violations are defined as behaviours that 
involve deliberate deviations from the written rules. Preliminary investigation elicited the 
motives to be included in the main questionnaire survey, which required 36 shunters to rate 
the importance of various motives for violating. Generally, violations were perceived to be 
the result of a well-intentioned desire to get the job done. Together with previous analysis of 
shunting accidents, observations of, and discussions with shunters in the workplace, the 
results of this study were used to develop a classification of violations, which includes 
situational, exceptional and routine violations. Erroneous behaviours that also involved 
deviations from rules were recorded as a separate category, namely unintentional violations. 
The results of the study, together with the findings of other research in this area, are used to 
describe a model for the investigation of violating behaviour in an organizational setting. 
This model depicts the factors that promote violations at work and, as such, may aid 
managers and health and safety practitioners to develop appropriate preventative measures. 
 
 
Layton, C. F. (1992). Emerging technologies for maintenance job aids. Proceedings of the 
Seventh Federal Aviation Administration Meeting on Human Factors Issues in Aircraft 
Maintenance and Inspection: Science, Technology, and Management: A Program Review, 
107–124. Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration/Office of Aviation 
Medicine. Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/mx_faa_
%28formerly_hfskyway%29/human_factors_issues/meeting_7/emergingtechnologies.pdf 
 
Abstract: Maintenance is fast becoming one of the most frequent applications of computer-
based job aiding. Maintenance job aids range from automatic preventive maintenance 
schedulers, to systems that monitor equipment status and recommend maintenance, to 
systems that aid in fault diagnosis and repair. Application domains range from production 
equipment (e.g., clutch assembly machines), to process equipment (e.g., turbine generators), 
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to high technology specialized equipment (e.g., fighter aircraft). There is a range of 
methodologies employed, including algorithmic approaches for preventive maintenance 
schedulers to expert systems for fault diagnosis and repair. The technologies employed 
encompass a range from mini computers to desktop microcomputers linked to video disks. 
This paper addresses extant approaches to job aiding in maintenance, the prospects for using 
emerging technologies for such systems, and the impact of emerging technologies on human 
performance, particularly in aviation maintenance applications. It also calls for a new design 
philosophy in building job aids. A study, which used this philosophy and compared three 
different levels of aiding on a task is also discussed. Some of the results of the study and 
their applicability to maintenance job aids are presented. 
 
 
Lindvall, J. (2011). Aeronautical decision-making in context: Influence of affect and experience 
on procedure violations (Doctoral dissertation, Department of Psychology, University of 
Gothenburg, Sweden). Retrieved from: 
https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/27956/4/gupea_2077_27956_4.pdf 
 
Abstract: Although pilots are well trained and there are rules, models and standard 
operating procedures to use in decision-making situations, aviation accidents do occur. One 
reason why accidents may occur is because pilots sometimes decide to violate, or deviate 
from standard operating procedures. The overall aim of the present thesis was to explore 
possible reasons for violating behavior. In Study I and II, cognitive and affective processes 
were studied in experimental designs. Study I took place in a laboratory setting where non-
pilots made a choice between a sure or uncertain loss. Study II took place in naturalistic 
settings were car drivers and commercial airline pilots made a choice between either, 
comply with or violate a rule. In Study I and II participants made the choice either after 
reading or experience a probability distribution. The conditions were either affect-rich or 
affect-poor in both studies. Some support was found for underweighting of small 
probabilities in Study I replicating Hertwig, Baron, Weber and Erev (2004). Overall, the 
affect rich condition in Study I produced more random choices compared to the affect poor 
condition. However, no effect of probability presentation format or affect was found in the 
naturalistic settings of Study II. Data for Study III and IV were collected in connection with 
Study II. In Study III, other possible reasons for violating procedures among airline pilots 
were added, such as organizational, social, and individual factors. The result of Study III 
showed differences between violators and compliers in terms of subjective risk judgment, 
attitudes and, reasons for violation. In addition, it was found that the majority used 
experience-based decision-making. In Study IV focused turned towards individual 
differences in decision-making style, non-technical skills, and overconfidence as possible 
antecedents to violations. Decision-making styles were measured with the GDMS 
inventory (Scott & Bruce, 1995). Non-technical skills were measured with the NOTECHS 
system (Flin et al., 2005). Pilots were found to have a predominantly rational decision-
making style. A relation between decision-making style and procedure violation was found 
were violators are less rational and more spontaneous compared to compliers. The result 
showed that not all NOTECHS items correlated with the decision-making styles in the 
expected direction. Furthermore, overconfidence about own non-technical skills were 
related to procedure violation. The results of Studies I-IV demonstrate that underweighting 
of probabilities might exist in a laboratory setting and that affect cannot be ignored. 
However, probabilities were not automatically used when people made decisions about 
whether to follow a rule or not, in naturalistic settings. Instead organizational, social, and 
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individual factors were more important. The NOTECHS system may be thought of as 
reflecting systematic, analytic and normatively correct decision-making. The result from 
Study IV show that this is not always the case and that there might be reason to further 
develop the NOTECHS system. In conclusion: to take safety a step further and create a 
resilient system it is necessary to take both an individual and systemic viewpoint, and to 
acknowledge that these viewpoints may interact.” 
 
 
Lorch, R.F., & Chen, A.H. (1986). Effects of number signals on reading and recall. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 78(4), 263. 
 
Abstract: In this study, we investigated the effects of number signals on text recall, College-
age subjects (N = 120) read and recalled two texts containing 10 target sentences each. 
Reading times were recorded for each target sentence. For half of the subjects, the target 
sentences were preceded by numbers indicating their organization; for the other half, the 
target sentences were not signaled. Half of the subjects did a free-recall task, whereas half 
did a cued recall task. Subjects read target sentences more slowly if they were signaled than 
if they were unsignaled. Subjects' recalls of target information followed the text organization 
more closely if the sentences were signaled. Finally, signaling aided free recall of target 
sentences but had no effect on cued recall. The results demonstrated that number signals 
directed attention to the sentences they marked, led to better encoding of the organization of 
target information, and influenced the process of recalling the target information. 
 
 
Loukopoulos, L.D., Dismukes, R.K., & Barshi, I. (2009). The multitasking myth: Handling 
complexity in real-world operations. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
 
Abstract: Despite growing concern with the effects of concurrent task demands on human 
performance, and research demonstrating that these demands are associated with 
vulnerability to error, so far there has been only limited research into the nature and range of 
concurrent task demands in real-world settings. This book presents a set of NASA studies 
that characterize the nature of concurrent task demands confronting airline flight crews in 
routine operations, as opposed to emergency situations. The authors analyze these demands 
in light of what is known about cognitive processes, particularly those of attention and 
memory, with the focus upon inadvertent omissions of intended actions by skilled pilots. The 
studies reported within the book employed several distinct but complementary methods: 
ethnographic observations, analysis of incident reports submitted by pilots, and cognitive 
task analysis. They showed that concurrent task management comprises a set of issues 
distinct from (though related to) mental workload, an area that has been studied extensively 
by human factors researchers for more than 30 years. This book will be of direct relevance to 
aviation psychologists and to those involved in aviation training and operations. It will also 
interest individuals in any domain that involves concurrent task demands, for example the 
work of emergency room medical teams. Furthermore, the countermeasures presented in the 
final chapter to reduce vulnerability to errors associated with concurrent task demands can 
readily be adapted to work in diverse domains. 
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Lupton, L.R., Lipsett, J.J., Olmstead, R.A., & Davey, E.C. (1990, July). A foundation  
for allocating control functions to humans and machine in future CANDU nuclear power 
plants. Paper presented at the International Symposium on Balancing Automation and 
Human Action in Nuclear Power Plants, Munich, Germany. Retrieved from 
International Atomic Energy Agency website: 
http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/23/002/23002192.pdf 
 
Abstract: Since the control room for the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited CANDU 6 plant 
was designed in the 1970s, requirements for control rooms have changed dramatically as a 
result of new licensing requirements, evolution of major new standards for control centre 
design and technological advances. The role of the human operator has become prominent in 
the design and operation of industrial and, in particular, nuclear plants. Major industrial 
accidents in the last decade have highlighted the need for paying significantly more attention 
to the requirements of the human as an integral part of the plant control system. A Functional 
Design Methodology has been defined that addresses the issues related to maximizing the 
strengths of the human and the machine in the next generation of CANDU plants. This 
method is based, in part, on the recently issued international standard IEC 964. The 
application of this method will lead to the definition of the requirements for detailed design 
of the control room, including man-machine interfaces, preliminary operating procedures, 
staffing and training. Further, it provides a basis for the verification and validation of the 
allocation of functions to the operator and the machine.” 
 
 
Mauro, R., Barshi, I., & Pederson, S. (2001). Affect, experience, & aeronautical decision-
making. Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Ohio 
State University. 
 
Description: To examine how individual differences in cognitive and affective processes 
interact with differences in training, experience, and decision strategy we observed how 431 
pilots made decisions related to a simulated flight in a General Aviation (GA) aircraft. The 
research was conducted remotely over the Internet using the newly developed Internet Based 
Decision Research System. The time the pilots spent accessing different sources of 
information related to the flight and the order in which this information was accessed was 
related to measures of affective and cognitive processing, training, and experience. 
 
 
Mauro, R., Degani, A., Loukopoulos, L., & Barshi, I. (2012). The operational context of 
procedures and checklists in commercial aviation. Proceedings of the 56th Annual 
Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 758–762. Retrieved from: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1071181312561158 
 
Abstract: To design effective and efficient procedures and checklists, one must take into 
account the full operational context within which these procedures are embedded. This 
context is defined by the requirements of the technology, the limitations and capabilities of 
the human operators, and the constraints and affordances of the operational environment. The 
complexity of this context arises from the interactions of the human, machine, and 
environment. We present a model of that operational context, THE Model, that lays the 
foundations for analyzing each of these elements and their interactions, and illustrate its 
application through the analysis of an aviation accident.  
  
33 
Moore, C.J. (1991). Cross references in step-by-step procedures: uses, usability problems, and 
possible solutions. Professional Communication Conference, 1991. IPCC ’91 
Proceedings. The Engineered Communication. International (Vol. 1), 369–374. Retrieved 
from 10.1109/IPCC.1991.172808 
 
Abstract: Cross-references, a form of nonlinear information common in some procedures, 
can create substantial usability problems in procedures. These usability problems can be 
reduced by minimizing the use of cross references, formatting cross references effectively, 
and incorporating place keeping aids in documents that contain cross references. 
 
 
Moret-Tatay, C., & Perea, M. (2011). Do serifs provide an advantage in the recognition of 
written words? Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 23(5), 619–624. 
 
Abstract: A neglected issue in the literature on visual-word recognition is the careful 
examination of parameters such as font, size, or interletter/interword spacing on reading times. 
Here we analysed whether serifs (i.e., the small features at the end of strokes) play a role in 
lexical access. Traditionally, serif fonts have been considered easier to read than sans serif 
fonts, but prior empirical evidence is scarce and inconclusive. Here we conducted a lexical 
decision experiment (i.e., a word/nonword discrimination task) in which we compared words 
from the same family (Lucida) either with a serif font or with a sans serif font - in both block 
list and a mixed list. Results showed a small, but significant advantage in response times for 
words written in a sans serif font. Thus, sans serif fonts should be the preferred choice for text 
in computer screens - as already is the case for guide signs on roads, trains, etc. 
 
 
Mosier, K.L., Palmer, E.A., & Degani, A. (1992). Electronic checklists: Implications for 
decision making. Proceedings of the 36th Annual Meeting of the Human Factors Society. 
Santa Monica, CA, 7–11. doi: 10.1177/154193129203600104. Retrieved from SAGE 
website: http://pro.sagepub.com/content/36/1/7.full.pdf+html 
 
Abstract: Checklists are a way of life on the flight deck, and, undoubtedly, are indispensable 
decision aids due to the volume of technical knowledge that must be readily accessible. The 
improper use of checklists, however, has been cited as a factor in several recent aircraft 
accidents (National Transportation Safety Board, 1988, 1989, 1990). Solutions to checklist 
problems, including the creation of electronic checklist systems, which keep track of skipped 
items, may solve some problems but create others. In this paper, results from a simulation 
involving an engine shutdown are presented, and implications of the electronic checklist and 
“memory” checklist are discussed, in terms of potential errors and effects on decision-
making. Performance using two types of electronic checklist systems is compared with 
performance using the traditional paper checklist. Additionally, a “performing from 
memory” condition is compared with a “performing from the checklist” condition. Results 
suggest that making checklist procedures more automatic, either by asking crews to 
accomplish steps from memory, or by checklists that encourage crews to rely on system state 
as indicated by the checklist, rather than as indicated by the system itself, will discourage 
information gathering, and may lead to dangerous operational errors. 
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Norman, D.A. (2005, July/August). Human-centered design considered harmful. Interactions, 
12(4), 14–19. 
 
Abstract: Human-centered design has become such a dominant theme in design that it is 
now accepted by interface and application designers automatically, without thought, let 
alone criticism. That’s a dangerous state—when things are treated as accepted wisdom. The 
purpose of this essay is to provoke thought, discussion, and reconsideration of some of the 
fundamental principles of human-centered design. These principles, I suggest, can be 
helpful, misleading, or wrong. At times, they might even be harmful. Activity-centered 
design might be superior. 
 
 
Novick, D., & Chater, M. (1999, September). Evaluating the design of human-machine 
cooperation: The cognitive walkthrough for operating procedures. Proceedings of the 
Conference on Cognitive Science Approaches to Process Control, Villeneuve d'Ascq, FR. 
Retrieved from University of Texas at El Paso Computer Science website: 
http://www.cs.utep.edu/novick/papers/cw-op.csapc99.html 
 
Abstract: The methodology of development of interfaces can be adapted to development of 
operating procedures. In particular, the cognitive walkthrough can be adapted to account for 
steps and resources outside the computer's part of the system interface. Empirical evaluation 
suggests that a cognitive walkthrough for operating procedures (CW-OP) is reasonably 
efficient and can provide useful information for developers. 
 
 
Ockerman, J. (2007). Task-guidance systems and procedure context: Enabling procedures to 
enhance worker performance. In D. Alamargot, P. Terrier, & J.M. Cellier (Eds.), Studies 
in writing: Written documents in the workplace (pp. 217–230). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
Abstract: In work practice, the term “procedure” almost always refers to a written document. 
Procedures are an integral part of many work environments. They provide a structured and 
tested method of completing an often-complicated task. With the miniaturization of highly 
capable technology, it is possible to provide procedures on small, easily transported 
electronic devices that have been defined as task-guidance systems. Task-guidance systems 
have been shown to be feasible and effective, but care needs to be taken in their design to 
ensure this outcome. Procedure context has been suggested as one important component of 
well-designed procedures, and has also been shown to positively impact worker performance 
when presented to the worker, either in a task-guidance system or other format. This chapter 
provides a background on the use of procedures, a description of task-guidance systems, and 
an explanation of procedure context, including results of some empirical investigations into 
their efficacy. 
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Ockerman, J., & Pritchett, A. (2000). A review and reappraisal of task guidance: Aiding 
workers in procedure following. International Journal of Cognitive Ergonomics, 4(3), 
191–212. 
 
Abstract: Procedures can greatly benefit workers at tasks such as inspection, maintenance, 
and assembly. Procedures may serve as a guideline for expert workers or they may provide a 
list of directives to be followed exactly; either way, procedures serve to structure a task, to 
aid worker memory, and to guarantee consistency and safety. Light, inexpensive electronics 
may allow for the development of task guidance systems to further help workers by 
presenting procedures and associated information about the task. This article reviews the 
current state of knowledge about the development of task guidance systems, and highlights 
their potential value in a variety of domains. First, the characteristics of procedural tasks are 
discussed, as a basis for a discussion on the benefits of procedure following that task 
guidance systems can support, and potential problems in procedure following that task 
guidance systems can mitigate. Then, current research results in task guidance systems are 
summarized. Finally, a discussion is given on the contextual information that a task guidance 
system may need to provide. 
 
 
Olson, D.R., & Filby, N. (1972). On the comprehension of active and passive sentences. 
Cognitive Psychology, 3(3), 361–381. 
 
Abstract: In a series of five experiments the ease of processing active and passive sentences 
was shown to be a function of the prior coding of a perceptual event. When the event was 
coded in terms of the actor, active sentences were more easily verified, when the event was 
coded in terms of the receiver of the action, passive sentences were more easily verified. This 
same pattern was shown to hold for answering active and passive questions. From this it was 
inferred that a passive sentence can be comprehended directly in the logical object-verb-
logical subject word order without recovering its active sentence equivalent base structure. A 
processing model for the verification of active and passive sentences was proposed in terms 
of a series of binary comparison operations each of which requires additional time; this 
model was shown to account for about 90% of the variance in the time Ss required to verify 
these sentences. 
 
 
Orasanu, J., Mosier, K., & Fischer, U. (2012). Recommended updates to FAA Advisory Circular 
No. 120-51E on crew resource management (Report #4). FAA/NASA NextGen Flight 
Deck Human Factors Research Interagency Agreement #DTFAWA-10-X-80005, Annex 
9. Unpublished report. 
 
Annotation: Researcher recommendations regarding the following topics: system awareness 
and interaction with automation, changing expertise, crew communication in NextGen, 
erosion of skills, stress and fatigue effects on crew decision making, and team biases and 
decision making. This document provides useful recommendations that apply to the current 
AC120-51E (1/22/04).   
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Palmer, E.A., and Degani, A. (1991). Electronic checklist: Evaluation of two levels of 
automation. Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 
178–183. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University. 
 
Abstract: Two versions of an electronic checklist have been implemented in the Advanced 
Concepts Flight Simulator (ACFS) at NASA Ames Research Center. The two designs differ 
in the degree of pilot involvement in conducting the checklists. One version (manual-sensed), 
requires the crew to manually acknowledge the completion of each checklist item. The other 
version (automatic-sensed), automatically indicates completed items without requiring pilot 
acknowledgement. These two designs and a paper checklist (as a control condition) were 
evaluated in line-oriented simulation. Twelve aircrews from one major air carrier flew a 
routine, four-leg, short-haul trip. This paper presents and discusses the portion of the 
experiment that was concerned with measuring the effect of the degree of automation on the 
crews’ performance. It discusses and presents evidence for a potential down side of 
implementing an electronic checklist that is designed to provide fully redundant monitoring 
of human procedure execution and monitoring. 
 
 
Park, J., & Jung, W. (2003). The operators’ non-compliance behavior to conduct emergency 
operating procedures—Comparing with the work experience and the complexity of 
procedural steps. Journal of the Korean Nuclear Society, 35(5), 412–425. 
 
Abstract: According to the results of related studies, one of the typical factors related to 
procedure related human errors is the complexity of procedures. This means that comparing 
the change of the operators’ behavior with respect to the complexity of procedures may be 
meaningful in clarifying the reasons for the operators’ non-compliance behavior. In this study, 
to obtain data related to the operators’ non-compliance behavior, emergency training records 
were collected using a full scope simulator. And three types of the operators’ behavior (such 
as strict adherence, skipping redundant actions and modifying action sequences) observed 
from the collected emergency training records were compared with the complexity of the 
procedural steps. As the results, two remarkable relationships are obtained. They are: 1) the 
operators seem to frequently adopt non-compliance behavior to conduct the procedural steps 
that have an intermediate procedural complexity, 2) the operators seems to accommodate their 
non-compliance behavior to the complexity of the procedural steps. Therefore, it is expected 
that these relationships can be used as meaningful clues not only to scrutinize the reason for 
non-compliance behavior but also to suggest appropriate remedies for the reduction of non-
compliance behavior that can result in procedure related human error. 
 
 
Park, J., Jung, W., & Ha, J. (2001). Development of the step complexity measure for 
emergency operating procedures using entropy concepts. Reliability Engineering & 
System Safety, 71(2), 115–130. 
 
Abstract: For a nuclear power plant (NPP), symptom-based emergency operating procedures 
(EOPs) have been adopted to enhance the safety of NPPs through reduction of operators' 
workload under emergency conditions. Symptom-based EOPs, however, could place a 
workload on operators because they have to not only identify related symptoms, but also 
understand the context of steps that should be carried out. Therefore, many qualitative 
checklists are suggested to ensure the appropriateness of steps included in EOPs. However, 
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since these qualitative evaluations have some drawbacks, a quantitative measure that can 
roughly estimate the complexity of EOP steps is imperative to compensate for them. In this 
paper, a method to evaluate the complexity of an EOP step is developed based on entropy 
measures that have been used in software engineering. Based on these, step complexity (SC) 
measure that can evaluate SC from various viewpoints (such as the amount of 
information/operators’ actions included in each EOP step, and the logic structure of each 
EOP step) was developed. To verify the suitableness of the SC measure, estimated SC values 
are compared with subjective task load scores obtained from the NASA TLX (task load 
index) method and step performance time obtained from a full scope simulator. From these 
comparisons, it was observed that estimated SC values generally agree with the NASA-TLX 
scores and step performance time data. Thus, it could be concluded that the developed SC 
measure would be considered for evaluating SC of an EOP step. 
 
 
Park, J., Jung, W., Kim, J., Ha, J., & Shin, Y. (2001). The step complexity measure for 
emergency operating procedures—comparing with simulation data. Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety, 74(1), 63–74. 
 
Abstract: In complex systems, such as nuclear power plants (NPPs) or airplane control 
systems, human errors play a major role in many accidents. Therefore, to prevent 
occurrences of accidents or to ensure system safety, extensive effort has been made to 
identify significant factors that cause human errors. According to related studies, written 
manuals or operating procedures are revealed as one of the most important factors, and 
complexity or understandability of a procedure is pointed out as one of the major reasons that 
make procedure-related human errors. Many qualitative checklists are suggested to evaluate 
emergency operating procedures (EOPs) of NPPs. However, since qualitative evaluations 
using checklists have some drawbacks, a quantitative measure that can quantify the 
complexity of EOPs is imperative to compensate for them. In order to quantify the 
complexity of EOPs, Park et al. suggested the step complexity (SC) measure to quantify the 
complexity of a step included in EOPs. In this paper, to ensure the appropriateness of the SC 
measure, SC scores are compared with averaged step performance time data obtained from 
emergency training records. The total number of available records is 36, and training 
scenarios are the loss of coolant accident and the excess steam dump event. The number of 
scenario is 18 each. From these emergency training records, step performance time data for 
39 steps are retrieved, and they are compared with estimated SC scores of them. In addition, 
several questions that are needed to clarify the appropriateness of the SC measure are also 
discussed. As a result, it was observed that estimated SC scores and step performance time 
data have a statistically meaningful correlation. Thus, it can be concluded that the SC 
measure can quantify the complexity of steps included in EOPs. 
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Parker, J.F., & White, A.D. (1992). Maintenance 2000. Proceedings of the Sixth Meeting on 
Human Factors Issues in Aircraft Maintenance and Inspection, Alexandria, VA. 
Retrieved from FAA website: 
https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/human
_factors_maintenance/maintenance_2000.pdf 
 
Executive Summary: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) program on Human 
Factors in Aviation Maintenance includes support of a series of meetings addressing specific 
topics of interest in air carrier maintenance. The purpose of this two-day meeting, held in 
January 1992, was to consider maintenance support for the air carrier industry a decade from 
now, to identify problems likely to exist at that time, and to begin planning toward solutions 
for these problems. The meeting was attended by representatives of all segments within the 
air carrier industry, including airline operators, manufacturers, maintenance managers, union 
representatives, regulators, and scientists and engineers working on new technologies of 
possible applicability. Presentations reviewed problems facing the air carrier maintenance 
industry at this time and trends likely to affect these problems in coming years. Other 
presentations reviewed information management technologies which are just becoming 
available and which might be employed to advantage as the industry works toward solutions 
in the coming decade. Specifically, the goal of the meeting, as supported by these 
presentations, was to ensure that over the next ten years the industry could achieve: 
continuing improvement in the quality and effectiveness of air carrier maintenance, 
productive and efficient utilization of maintenance personnel, incorporation of new 
technologies beneficial to the air carrier maintenance industry, and adherence to rigorous 
cost control procedures. Based on presentations given and ensuing discussions, 
recommendations are presented. 
 
 
Parsons, S.O., Seminara, J.L., & Wogalter, M. S. (1999). A summary of warnings research. 
Ergonomics in Design: The Quarterly of Human Factors Applications, 7(1), 21–31. 
 
Abstract: Over the past decade and a half, a tremendous volume of research has accumulated 
in the area of warnings and risk perception. We have learned a great deal about the factors 
that influence safety-related information processing and behavior. Guidelines for warning 
design no longer need to be based on expert opinion; they can now be supported by the 
results of empirical research. This article reviews and summarizes data from more than 150 
laboratory and field studies published mainly in the last 15 years and mostly in the 
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting (HFES). A 
broad overview of research findings is presented in 24 alphabetized sections. Although we do 
not explicitly give design recommendations, these studies contain implicit design guidelines. 
The summaries reflect our current knowledge on the factors that influence warning 
effectiveness. We believe this review will be useful to human factors designers and 
consultants who produce and evaluate warnings. Additionally, it can serve as a handy 
reference guide that could be useful to government regulators, industry managers, consumer 
product organizations, industrial hygienists, marketers, researchers, expert witnesses, and 
attorneys who need guidance on warnings. As is common in many kinds of active research 
activities, the results of studies on any given topic will not concur with other study results. 
Despite this, we try to give general conclusions in our summaries. Further research will bring 
more detail and clarity to the field. The major findings are given below in alphabetical order. 
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Pélegrin, C. (2013). The never-ending story of proceduralization in aviation. In M. Bourrier & 
C. Bieder, Trapping safety into rules: How desirable or avoidable is proceduralization? 
(pp. 13–24). Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
 
Summary: The aviation answer to internalization is proceduralization. The aviation answer to 
the increasing complexity of organizations has also been proceduralization. We have seen 
that high proceduralization does not guarantee safety. 
 
 
Rantz, W.G. (2005). Strategies for controlling checklist behaviors: A literature review. 
Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 497–503. 
Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. 
 
Abstract: One of the highest frequencies of errors recorded by recent Line Oriented Safety 
Audits (LOSA) is within the category of intentional non-compliance of which checklists use 
is included. These errors have led to serious lapses in risk management and many well-
documented cases of aircraft accidents. This paper reviews the literature of both 
organizational behavior management and applied behavior analysis where checklist use is an 
independent variable. This report presents various methods and technologies from other 
settings, which may prove useful in the flight-training environment. Also included is a 
proposed study that will be conducted at a major flight training facility using undergraduate 
participants involved in checklist use while undergoing instrument flight training. This study 
applies various treatments to the participants to measure the effectiveness of checklist 
reading behavior and performance. Measures examine both, short term and long-term effects 
of treatment, as well as any generalization of checklist reading performance to more 
advanced training environments. 
 
 
Rantz, W.G. (2009). Comparing the accuracy of performing digital and paper and pencil 
checklists using a feedback package during normal workload conditions in simulated 
flight (Doctoral dissertation). Western Michigan University: Michigan. 
 
Abstract: This study examined whether pilots completed airplane digital or paper checklists 
more accurately when they received post-flight graphic and verbal feedback. Participants were 
6 college student pilots with instrument rating. The task consisted of flying flight patterns 
using a Frasca 241 Flight Training Device, which emulates a Cirrus SR20 aircraft. The main 
dependent variable was the number of checklist items completed correctly per flight. An 
alternating treatment, multiple baseline design across pairs with reversal, was used. During 
baseline, the average percent of correctly completed items per flight varied considerably 
across participants, ranging from 13% to 57% for traditional paper checklists and ranging 
from 11% to 67% for digital checklists. Checklist performance increased to an average of 
90% for paper checklist and an average of 89% for digital checklists after participants were 
given feedback and praise, and continued to improve to an average of nearly 100% for paper 
checklists and an average of 99% for digital checklists after the feedback and praise were 
removed. A slight decrement in performance was observed during a post-experiment probe 
between 60–90 days. Visual inspection and statistical analysis of the data suggest that paper 
checklist accuracy does not differ significantly from digital checklist accuracy. The results 
suggest that graphic feedback and praise can be used to increase the extent to which pilots use 
both digital and paper checklists accurately during normal workload conditions.  
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Rantz, W.G. (2010). Using graphic feedback to eliminate checklist segment timing errors. 
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, 20(1), 23–40. Retrieved from: 
http://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol20/iss1/8 
 
Abstract: This study examined whether pilots initiated paper or digital checklist use from 
environmental prompts accurately when they receive post-flight graphic and limited verbal 
feedback. Participants were 6 college students who are pilots with instrument rating. The task 
consisted of flying a designated flight pattern using a Frasca 241 Cirrus Flight Training 
Device. The dependent variable was the percentage of paper and digital checklist segments 
initiated at the proper time. A single-subject, alternating treatment, multiple baseline design 
with withdrawal and delayed probes was employed in this study. During baseline, 
participants were given only post-flight technical skills feedback. During intervention, 
participants were given both technical skills feedback and post-flight graphic feedback on 
both paper and digital checklist use and praise for improvements. A probe was used between 
60-90 days to assess any decrement in participant's performance. The intervention produced 
highly improved paper and digital checklist timing performance, which improved to nearly 
perfect following the withdrawal of treatment and increased to perfect performance through 
the probe sessions. 
 
 
Rantz, W.G., Dickinson, A. M., Sinclair, G.A., & Van Houten, R. (2009). The effect of 
feedback on the accuracy of checklist completion during instrument flight training. 
Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 42(3), 497–509. 
 
Abstract: This study examined whether pilots completed airplane checklists more accurately 
when they receive post flight graphic and verbal feedback. Participants were 8 college 
students who are pilots with an instrument rating. The task consisted of flying a designated 
flight pattern using a personal computer aviation-training device (PCATD). The dependent 
variables were the number of checklist items completed correctly. A multiple baseline design 
across pairs of participants with withdrawal of treatment was employed in this study. During 
baseline, participants were given post flight technical feedback. During intervention, 
participants were given post flight graphic feedback on checklist use and praise for 
improvements along with technical feedback. The intervention produced near perfect 
checklist performance, which was maintained following a return to the baseline conditions. 
 
 
Rantz, W.G., & Van Houten, R. (2011). A feedback intervention to increase digital and paper 
checklist performance in technically advanced aircraft simulation. Journal of Applied 
Behavior Analysis, 44(1), 145–150. 
 
Abstract: This study examined whether pilots operating a flight simulator completed digital 
or paper flight checklists more accurately after receiving post flight graphic and verbal 
feedback. The dependent variable was the number of checklist items completed correctly per 
flight. Following treatment, checklist completion with paper and digital checklists increased 
from 38% and 39%, respectively, to nearly 100% and remained close to 100% after feedback 
and praise for improvement were withdrawn. Performance was maintained at or near 100% 
during follow-up probes. 
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Romera, M.E. (2000). Using finite automata to represent mental models (Unpublished master’s 
thesis). San Jose State University, San Jose, CA. 
 
Abstract: The element lacking from past Human-Computer Interaction research is a method 
for systematically comparing a user's mental model to the way the machine actually works. 
The formal language of automata was used to represent both a device and students' mental 
models of it. Mental models were elicited during an interview with two parts. The first part 
consisted of a spontaneous description. The second part consisted of structured questions 
used to confirm what was said in the description, and uncover any further knowledge. 
Student models were compared to the model of the device to find missing or incorrect 
information. Participants were also tested with a compound task and true-false and multiple-
choice problems to see if the mental model predicted task performance. The more similar the 
student's model was to model of the device, the better their performance. This methodology 
holds promise for examining the mental model of any system. 
 
 
Russell-Minda, E., Jutai, J. W., Strong, J. G., Campbell, K. A., Gold, D., Pretty, L., & Wilmot, 
L. (2007). The legibility of typefaces for readers with low vision: A research review. 
Journal of Visual Impairment & Blindness, 101(7), 402–415. 
 
Abstract: This article presents a systematic review of the research evidence on the effects of 
the characteristics of typefaces on the legibility of text for adult readers with low vision. The 
review revealed that research has not produced consistent findings and thus that there is a 
need to develop standards and guidelines that are informed by evidence. 
 
 
Schelling, T.C. (1985). Enforcing rules on oneself. Journal of Law and Economics, 1(2), 357–374. 
 
Introduction: How does one devise a contract that it is easily enforced on each party by the 
other? How are rules designed for the behavior of each party, and incentives attached to 
compliance, so that the temptations and opportunities for non-compliance are minimized? 
How does an agreement make room for exceptions, for discretionary judgment about what is 
required, and for penalties on violations so that the whole arrangement need not collapse 
upon the first failure? How are the terms of agreement structured so that invisible noncom- 
pliance can be made visible or noncompliant intention be revealed in time to be 
challenged…I am interested in the special case of rules that people impose on themselves.” 
 
 
Scholtz, C. R., & Maher, S. T. (2014). Tips for the creation and application of effective 
operating procedures. Process Safety Progress, 33(4), 350-354. Retrieved from Wiley 
Online Library website: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.v33.4/issuetoc 
 
Abstract: Specific requirements exist in all Safety Management Systems Requirements (e.g., 
Process Safety Management and Risk Management Program) for the creation, content, and 
periodic update of operating procedures (OP). However, the development and actual 
implementation of OP has challenges that often result in deficiencies, regulatory citations, 
and in some cases, unfortunate tragedies. Although OP concepts involve the straightforward 
documentation of specific steps for safe and effective operation, many process facilities 
struggle with: securing the focus from operations personnel for the creation of quality 
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procedures, securing feedback from operations personnel if procedural steps do not coincide 
with actual practices, ensuring the steps outlined in procedures avoid introducing additional 
process hazards, creating procedures that are in a user-friendly format, identifying the most 
effective level of information and depth to include in the procedure, and addressing all 
modes of operations, including defining appropriate responsibilities. Good-quality OP are 
critical for encapsulating operational best practices and also provide a basis for ensuring 
consistent quality assurance. The objective of this article is to convey an understanding of the 
challenges that must be considered with the development of OP and provide specific 
examples that will facilitate the creation and ongoing application of OP. 
 
 
Schulmann, P. (2013). Procedural paradoxes and the management of safety. In C. Bieder & M. 
Bourrier (Eds.), Trapping safety into rules (pp. 243–254). Burlington, VA: Ashgate. 
 
Abstract: Schulmann considers the characteristics of the situations procedures are designed 
for and he proposes to revisit and adapt the notion and philosophy of procedure to the 
dominant characteristics, especially task repetitiveness and knowledge available to perform it. 
 
 
Seamster, T.L., & Kanki, B.G. (2000). User-centered approach to the design and management 
of operating documents. Proceedings of the HCI-Aero International Conference on 
Human-Computer Interaction in Aeronautics. Eurisco: Toulouse, France. 
 
Abstract: This paper presents the ongoing process and current results of a collaboration 
between NASA/FAA researchers and commercial aviation operators to restructure and 
update operating document guidelines and to develop a user interface for managing those 
documents. The paper first presents the background of this collaborative effort that started 
with a review of existing flight operating document guidelines. There are many guidelines 
covering most aspects of document development, but they can be difficult to access because 
they are distributed across different reports or hard to locate publications. To correct this 
situation, researchers and US operators have identified the most important document 
development topics and organized them in operationally meaningful ways. This paper 
outlines the user-centered approach taken to identify the key flight document issues and 
presents two applications based on the results: 1) a new structure for an operating document 
guidelines manual, and 2) a prototype user interface for a tool to manage the development 
and maintenance of documents. 
 
 
Seamster, T.L., & Kanki, B.G. (2003) Structured information for flight operations and the 
flight deck. Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 
1042–1046. Dayton, OH: Wright State University. 
 
Abstract: As operators move from paper to electronic documentation within flight operations 
and on the flight deck, there is a growing need for standards and efficient information 
structures. The current state of operational information, with its different formats and varying 
degrees of structure has complicated its management and hampered repurposing, the efficient 
reuse of information within flight operations. Long-term data standard efforts, such as that of 
the Air Transport Association's Flight Operations Working Group, have been developing a 
comprehensive model for the interchange of operational data, but there has been limited 
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success in developing common information structures for the near-term interchange and 
management of data and documents for such applications as automated revisions and the 
electronic flight bag. The challenge for industry is to develop information structures that 
meet near-term operator needs in a relatively short period of time based on the best emerging 
data models available today so they will be consistent with longer-term data standards. To 
develop these near-term common structures, industry needs an understanding of the functions 
that must be addressed and the main information categories that must be targeted or tagged. 
Working with representatives of North American operators and suppliers, this study collected 
data on the most important near-term electronic data functions, to identify the common needs 
of operators and suppliers. Additional data was collected to identify the key data elements for 
a common information structure. The results of this study support the development a 
common data structure needed for the repurposing of flight operational information as it is 
used across flight operations and on the flight deck. 
 
 
Seamster, T.L., & Kanki, B.G. (2005). Human factors design of electronic documents. 
Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium of Aviation Psychology. Dayton, OH: 
Wright State University.  
 
Abstract: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), working with the Master Minimum 
Equipment List (MMEL) Industry Group, is developing a new MMEL electronic format. The 
MMEL refers to a series of documents controlled by the FAA that lists equipment that may 
be inoperative under certain conditions while still allowing the aircraft to be airworthy. Each 
aircraft model has an MMEL, and operators must work with that master document to 
determine the relief items for their specific aircraft. The resulting Minimum Equipment List 
(MEL) for an operator's aircraft is used by both ground personnel and pilots to determine the 
procedures for maintaining airworthiness. Currently, the MMEL is available in text format, 
and the industry needs an electronic format that is more efficient and that will be compatible 
with key aspects of future data standards. Members of the MMEL Industry Group were 
surveyed to determine the main user needs and human factors considerations for the 
development and evaluation of the MMEL electronic format. This study identifies key 
operator needs that can direct the development of not only the new MMEL format but also 
the broader category of aviation electronic documents.  
 
 
Singer, G., & Dekker, S.W.A. (2000). Pilot performance during multiple failures: An empirical 
study of different warning systems. Transportation Human Factors, 2(1), 63–76. 
 
Abstract: Dynamic fault management—that is, dealing with a cascade of failures while 
maintaining process integrity—is a dominant human task in various transportation modes 
(e.g., commercial aviation, shipping). The way in which a warning system represents failures 
and the way in which the system contributes to failure management jointly determine the 
amount and kind of cognitive work in which the human has to engage to manage multiple 
failures. In this study pilot performance on 4 different commercial aviation warning systems 
was tested by measuring time and error rates in identifying root causes in a cascade of 
failures. All systems tested represent failures in the same basic way (a message list) but differ 
in the kind of contribution they make to the failure management task; for example, by sorting 
failures, prioritizing them, selecting only some failures for presentation, guiding the pilot on 
what to do next, or showing the pilot which systems are still operational. Human 
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performance benefits accrued in systems that (a) provided guidance on what to do next and 
(b) showed which systems were still operational. These findings are consistent with the 
cognitive demands of dynamic fault management and carry important messages for how 
those demands should be supported. The results suggest that rather than automating even 
more of the human role in fault management to minimize error counts, attention should be 
paid to the kinds of referents and representations that are most useful in informing the 
operator of what is going on in the underlying process and how best to cope with it. 
 
 
Sukenik, N. (1998). Coordination in the cockpit: A game-theory view of standard operation 
procedures. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 8(4), 405–412. 
 
Abstract: Some basic principles of game theory confirm that flying according to standard 
operating procedures (SOP) leads to greater flight safety. In this article, the interaction in the 
cockpit is analyzed as a game whose goal is flight safety. The crewmembers are involved in 
interactions that determine the extent of their utility. It is demonstrated that adhering to SOP 
leads to maximum utility and, thus, to greater flight safety than deviating from it, even if an 
alternative procedure is equivalent as far as safety is concerned or seems to lead to greater 
utility. 
 
 
Surabattula, D., & Landry, S.J. (2011, August). Toward providing guidance for procedure 
design: Formal definitions of procedure characteristics. Proceedings of the 2001 
International Symposium on Resilient Control Systems, Boise, ID. Retrieved from IEEE 
Xplore website:  http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6016079/ 
 
Abstract: Researchers from Purdue University develop a framework - a symbolic 
formulation - that can be applied by designers to quantify the various characteristics of the 
procedure. They discuss issues around compliance, procedure development, and 
characteristics of checklists, the environment, and of the operator. Need for validation and 
refinement are the next steps proposed for the framework. 
 
 
Tremaud, M. (2002, October). Operational and human factors involved in situations beyond the 
scope of published procedures. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the Airbus 16th 
Human Factors Symposium, Singapore. 
 
Annotation: Michel Tremaud, Sr. Dir. of Operational Standards Development and Flight 
Operations Safety, presents a review of operational and human factors in: in-service 
occurrences, runway excursions and overruns, non-adherence to published procedures, 
unstabilized approaches, situations beyond the scope of published procedures, and 
situational awareness. 
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Tremaud, M. (2005, December). Guidelines for management of complex situations: An 
operational and human factors view. Presentation at the Flight Operations Safety 
Awareness Seminar, Moscow, Russia. 
 
Summary: Michel Tremaud, Senior Director and Head of Safety Management and Customer 
Services, follows up his previous work (see Tremaud, 2002) with a presentation based on the 
operational and human factors analysis of events involving complex situations within or 
beyond the scope of published procedures. This synthesis provides an overview of observed 
factors and related prevention strategies in terms of situation recognition, crew diagnosis 
(warnings/cockpit effects), procedures (access, contents, execution), crew performance 
(actions/flight-path control), and crew coordination. 
 
 
Trommelen, M. (1997). Effectiveness of explicit warnings. Safety Science, 25(1), 79–88. 
 
Abstract: In the present study the effectiveness of explicitness in warnings provided with 
children's products was investigated. Unsafe use of children's products leads to many 
accidents. One way to reduce the number of accidents is to provide products with adequate 
warnings. A consistent finding in the literature is that a consumer's responsiveness to 
warnings is affected by perceived hazardousness, which in turn is affected by explicit 
warnings. A warning is explicit when it informs a consumer on 1.(1) what to do/avoid. 2(2) 
the product-related hazards. 3(3) the consequences of unsafe behaviour in terms of injuries. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. They were presented with a 
product manual of a child-care product, either a baby carrier or a feeding bottle, in which 
1.(i) no warnings 2.(ii) non-explicit warnings 3.(iii) explicit warnings were provided. The 
effect of warning condition on perceived hazardousness, perceived severity of injury, 
intended compliance, comprehension, and recall of the warning was measured. The results 
indicate that with explicit warnings, subjects perceived the products investigated as more 
hazardous and the possible injuries as more severe. Results also show that explicit warnings 
were better understood and remembered. However no significant offer of explicitness was 
found on intended compliance. 
 
 
Turner, T.P. (2001). Controlling pilot error: Checklists and compliance. McGraw-Hill: New York. 
 
Summary: CHECKLISTS & COMPLIANCE: Do it or don't fly. Read and learn: Why 
highly skilled, highly proficient pilots make tragic errors, reasons that pilots too often take 
off without fuel, how to avoid a myriad of mishaps and accidents resulting from inadequate 
attention to protocols and details, why gear-up landings are a recurring pattern, despite 
safeguards, how to beat the most common causes of takeoff and landing misconfigurations, 
ways to build good piloting habits and keep them strong, real-life pilot near-miss stories 
you won't forget. FAST & FOCUSED RX FOR PILOT ERROR: The most effective 
aviation safety tools available, CONTROLLING PILOT ERROR guides offer you expert 
protection against the causes of up to 80% of aviation accidents--pilot mistakes. Each title 
provides: Related case studies, valuable "save yourself" techniques, clear and concise 
analysis of error sets. 
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Turner, J.W., & Huntley Jr., M.S. (1991, April). The use and design of flightcrew checklists and 
manuals (Report No. FAA-AM-91-07). Washington, D.C. 
 
Abstract: A survey of aircraft checklists and flight manuals was conducted to identify 
impediments to their use and to determine if standards or guidelines for their design were 
needed. Information for this purpose was collected through the review of checklists and 
manuals from six Part 121 and nine Part 135 carriers, review of NTSB and ASRS reports, 
analysis of an ALPA survey of air carrier pilots, and by direct observation in air carrier 
cockpits. The survey revealed that some checklists and manuals were difficult to locate and 
were poorly designed for use in the cockpit environment, the use of checklists by flight crews 
was not always well defined, the use of checklists interfered with other flight operations, and 
flight operations often made it difficult to use checklists effectively. The report contains 
recommendations for the formatting and content of checklists and manuals, their use by 
flight crews, and areas of research relevant to checklist design. 
 
 
Van der Meij, H., & Gellevij, M. (2004). The four components of a procedure. Professional 
Communication, IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication, 47(1), 5–14. 
 
Abstract: As they guide people in performing a task, procedures are the heart of most 
manuals. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that the theoretical and empirical knowledge of 
their nature has remained somewhat elusive. This paper describes a theoretical framework 
for procedures, summarized as the four components model, which is grounded in systems 
theory and rhetoric. The study addresses two research questions: (1) What are procedures 
made of? and (2) Which design guidelines for procedures can be abstracted from theory and 
research? The model distinguishes between: goals, prerequisite states, unwanted states 
(warnings and problem-solving information), and actions and reactions. For each component 
pertinent research findings are summarized and lead to the formulation of design guidelines. 
Occasionally these guidelines are compared with existing procedures from a sample of 104 
manuals to see how well theory and practice agree. The model offers a manageable and 
expandable framework for creating user support that is based on scientific research. It can be 
used for a systematic analysis of procedures and for their (re)design. 
 
 
Wickens, C.D. (1999). Aerospace psychology. In M. Friedman, & E. Carterette (Eds.), 
Handbook of perception and cognition: Human performance and ergonomics (pp. 195–
243). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
 
Summary: This chapter highlights the critical relationship between theoretical constructs in 
the study of perception and cognition on the one hand, and the pilot’s (and air traffic 
controller’s) tasks on the other. The chapter begins by presenting a broad model of the flight 
task, written from a perceptual-cognitive perspective (more than from an aviation 
perspective), and then describes in detail certain key areas where the study of perception and 
cognitive psychology has provided insights to the task of controlling the aircraft, whether 
from within the cockpit (the pilot) or from the ground (the controller).” Many areas of a 
pilot’s task are discussed; other areas include display integration, air traffic control, and 
knowledge. Key references described in the paper are also noted. 
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Wickens, C.D. (1999). Cognitive factors in aviation. In F.T. Durso, R.S. Nickerson, R.W. 
Schvaneveldt, S.T. Dumais, D.S. Lindsay, & M.T.H. Chi (Eds.), Handbook of applied 
cognition (pp. 247–282). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Summary: This chapter describes the task of flying an aircraft from a cognitive perspective as 
involving a time-shared collection of four meta tasks: aviating, navigating, communicating, 
and systems management. The pilot is described within an information processing 
framework and then each of the four meta tasks are described in detail, considering their 
implications for displays, pilot error and automation. We then consider the cognitive 
constructs for decision-making, situation awareness, procedures following and mental 
workload, which apply across all four metal tasks. The last section addresses the cognitive 
issues as pilots deal with aircraft automation. 
 
 
Wickens, C.D. (2003). Pilot actions and tasks: Selections, execution, and control. In P. Tsang, 
& M. Vidulich (Eds.), Principles and practices of aviation psychology (pp. 147–199). 
Mahwah: NJ. 
 
Summary: In most circumstances, a pilot’s task involves a continuous stream of activities. 
Many of these activities are overt and easily observable, such as movement of the flight 
control sticks, communications with air traffic control, or manipulating switches. Others are 
much more covert and less observable, such as planning, diagnosing or monitoring. A skilled 
pilot will selectively choose which tasks and actions to perform at the appropriate time, 
knowing which tasks to emphasize and which ones to ignore when workload is high (Adams, 
Tenney, & Pew, 1995; Funk, 1991; Orasanu & Fischer, 1997). This skilled pilot will also 
execute those actions smoothly and appropriately, the most important of which is control of 
the aircraft. In this chapter, we will first focus on the choice of actions and tasks, and then 
describe the execution of the most important of those tasks - those involved in flight control 
and navigation. 
 
 
Wickens, C.D., & Andre, A.D. (1998). Psychology applied to aviation. In A. M. Stec, &  
D. Bernstein (Eds.), Psychology: Fields of application (pp. 184–198). Stamford, CT: 
Cengage Learning. 
 
Summary: Aviation psychology is the study of the psychological aspects of flying an aircraft. 
In order to demonstrate some of these aspects, we will first take a look at the pilot’s tasks. 
Then we will trace the important historical developments in aviation psychology, and follow 
with a description of current themes in aviation psychologists’ research. We will also discuss 
where aviation psychologists work and what they do, and list some challenges in the future 
of aviation psychology. 
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Wieringa, D.R., & Farkas, D.K. (1991). Procedure writing across domains: Nuclear power 
plant procedures and computer documentation. Proceedings of the 9th Annual 
International Conference on Systems Documentation, SIGDOC, New York, NY, 49–58. 
Retrieved from University of Washington faculty website:  
http://faculty.washington.edu/farkas/dfpubs/Weiringa-Farkas-
Nuclear%20PowerPlant%20Procedures%20And%20Computer%20Doc.pdf 
 
Abstract: Computer documentation, and in particular documentation for end-user software 
applications, is so prevalent today that it is easy to forget the larger world of procedure 
writing, of which computer documentation is only a part. Numerous types of procedures 
exist, ranging from administrative procedures that focus on human activities, to procedures 
for assembling consumer products, to procedures governing the operation, maintenance, and 
repair of complex industrial equipment. One domain in which procedures play an important 
role is the large and complex process-control facilities such as oil refineries and chemical 
plants. This paper discusses procedures and procedure writing at one kind of process-control 
facility--the nuclear power plant. We think that the differences between nuclear power plant 
documentation and the documentation of computer systems--especially software 
applications--are interesting and instructive, and we will try to point out some lessons learned 
from procedure writing in the nuclear power industry that apply directly to software 
documentation. We first provide an overview of recent efforts to improve procedure quality 
at nuclear power plants and discuss some of the distinctive challenges faced in documenting 
nuclear power plant procedures. We then describe how some of the techniques used by 
nuclear power plant procedure writers can be applied to software documentation. We cover 
the process of developing and testing nuclear power plant procedures and two of the formats 
that have proven valuable in creating usable plant documentation. The first is a two-column 
text format in which users can select either general or highly detailed instruction. The second 
is a flowchart format that reduces the user’s cognitive burdens in following highly branching 
procedures. The paper concludes with comments on the potential of online procedures, an 
area in which the nuclear power industry could learn from the writers of computer 
documentation. This paper has its basis in the work that Battelle’s Human Affairs Research 
Centers (HARC)l has done with nuclear power plant procedures over the past twelve years, 
working for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the U.S. Department of 
Energy, and various private utilities2 Over a 5-year period, Wieringa has taken part in and 
managed numerous projects pertaining to nuclear power plant procedures. Farkas has worked 
for Battelle as a consultant and contributes to the paper an understanding of the relationship 
between documentation in the nuclear power and computer industries. 
 
 
Wieringa, D.R., Moore, C., & Barnes, V. (1998). Procedure writing: Principles and practices. 
Battelle Press: Columbus, OH. 
 
Description: A definitive guide for writing procedures in business, ISO compliance, plant, or 
safety procedures. Written in easy-to-understand terms, it presents principles that underlie 
effective procedures. 
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Wogalter, M.S. (1999). Factors influencing the effectiveness of warnings. In H. Zwaga, T. 
Boersema, & H. Hoonhout (Eds.), Visual information for everyday use: Design and 
research perspectives (pp. 93–110). London: Taylor & Frances, Ltd. 
 
Description: Warnings are necessary when other hazard-control methods cannot be 
effectively employed. Given this state of affairs and the fact that warnings are not totally 
reliable, the principle question is: How can warnings be designed to maximize their 
effectiveness. This chapter addresses this question. 
 
 
Wogalter, M., Sojourner, R., & Brelsford, J. (1997). Comprehension and retention of safety 
pictorials. Ergonomics, 40(5), 531–542. 
 
Abstract: The use of pictorials to communicate safety-related information has been widely 
offered as a way of reaching diverse users owing to the pictorials' assumed universal 
information transmission potential. The present study examined comprehensibility of a set of 
safety pictorials, and then employed a training procedure (providing short verbal descriptions 
of the pictorials) to enhance comprehension and retention. Comprehension was tested for all 
participants prior to training, and after 1 week. Additionally, comprehension was also tested 
for some participants immediately following training, and 6 months after training. Also 
manipulated was the content of instruction (supplying either the pictorial's associated verbal 
label or verbal label plus a more detailed explanatory statement), and difficulty level (‘easy’ 
versus ‘difficult’ to understand pictorials, as determined by prior research). The results 
showed that training led to a significant increase in pictorial comprehension. Easy pictorials 
were comprehended (both initially and following training) better than difficult pictorials, with 
the latter showing a more dramatic improvement in comprehension following training. Post-
training pictorial comprehension was also relatively stable over time. The additional 
explanatory content statement had no effect on comprehension and recall. The substantial 
gains in understanding the more difficult pictorials suggest that brief training can substantially 
facilitate comprehension for pictorials that would otherwise not be readily understood. 
 
 
Wogalter, M.S., & Young, S.L. (1994). The effect of alternative product-label design on 
warning compliance. Applied Ergonomics, 25(1), 53–57. 
 
Abstract: Many potentially hazardous products are packaged in small containers. Because of 
the limited amount of space available on these containers for warnings and other information, 
manufacturers often reduce the size and amount of printed material on the labels. This 
frequently impairs the message's legibility, noticeability and comprehensibility. Recently, 
several alternative label designs have been investigated using preference ratings, but whether 
the designs facilitate safer behaviour has not been determined. In the present experiment, two 
alternative designs (tag and wings) were compared with a conventional (control) design for 
their effect on behavioural compliance with a warning on a very small container of glue. 
Participants performed a parts-assembly task using the glue without being informed of the 
study's real purpose. Whether participants wore protective gloves as directed by the warning 
was measured. Results showed that the tag design produced significantly greater compliance 
than the other two designs. Measures of noticing, reading and recall of the warning mirrored 
the compliance results. While participants generally preferred the control label, they most 
preferred the tag warning. Overall, the results suggest that alternative designs like the tag can 
enhance warning communication and compliance in cases where surface area is limited.”  
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Wright, P., & McCarthy, J. (2003). Analysis of procedure following as concerned work. In E. 
Hollnagel (Ed.), Handbook of cognitive task design (pp. 679–700). Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Summary: In this chapter our concern is with the design and use of operating procedures. 
Operating procedures feature strongly in safety-critical work domains, where it is argued they 
reduce the likelihood of human error. Procedures can be viewed as the result of cognitive task 
design. Information processing analyses of procedure following have shown how the design 
of procedures can be improved. Here we explore an alternative to the prevalent information 
processing approach to take a more critical view of the proceduralization of the workplace. 
Our approach takes as its starting point ideas from the field of literary studies and narrative 
rather than information processing psychology. The analysis focuses on autobiographical data. 
Unlike a more traditional cognitive analysis, it highlights the concerns facing operators who 
have to make procedures work in practice, the paradoxes and dilemmas they face in doing 
this, and the amount of intelligent effort that goes into making sense of procedures. Our 
analysis leads us to conclude that the gap between procedures and practice is filled by the 
creative work of the operator. Such creative work is based on a history of experiences both 
inside and outside the workplace. Currently, there are very few ways in which this experience 
can be given a legitimate voice in the process of procedure design. 
 
 
Wynne, B. (1988). Unruly technology: Practical rules, impractical discourses, and public 
understanding. Social Studies of Science, 18, 147–167. 
 
Abstract: This paper examines technologies as rule-following behaviour, arguing that 
emerging practices define ‘rules’, rather than rules controlling practices. With the aid of 
several examples, it suggests that technologies should be conceptualized as extensive, open-
ended technical-social systems whose local behaviour is underdetermined by any overall 
rationality. Contextual normalization of working technologies takes place according to local 
rationalities, but this may fragment the overall technology, whilst evolving its informal 
practical ‘rules’. Expert and public discourses present a more rule-bound concept of 
technology than the more private, contingent world of practice. The implications for public 
decisions and social control of technology are examined. 
 
 
Young, S.L. (1991, September). Increasing the noticeability of warnings: Effects of pictorial, 
color, signal icon and border. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society Annual Meeting, 35(9), 580–584. SAGE Publications. 
 
Abstract: Because of the importance of noticeability on subsequent comprehension and 
compliance to warnings, guidelines suggest increasing the salience or conspicuity of warnings. 
Surprisingly, only a small amount of research has examined different methods of increasing the 
noticeability of warnings. Therefore, the current research orthogonally manipulated four 
salience variables (pictorial, color, signal icon and border) to determine their effect on 
noticeability of warning information. Subjects viewed 96 simulated alcohol labels on a 
computer, half with a warning and half without. Subjects indicated whether or not a warning 
was on the label and response latencies were recorded. The results showed that warnings 
containing a pictorial, color or an icon had significantly faster response times than warnings 
without them. However, the addition of a border did not improve response times. More detailed 
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analyses showed interactions between the four-salience manipulations. These results 
demonstrate that pictorials, color and icons can enhance the noticeability of warning 
information. Moreover, it is clear that these salience manipulations interact with each other and 
that they should not be used indiscriminately without adequate knowledge of these interactions. 
 
 
Young, S.L., & Wogalter, M.S. (1990). Comprehension and memory of instruction manual 
warnings: Conspicuous print and pictorial icons. Human Factors: The Journal of the 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 32(6), 637–649. 
 
Abstract: Two experiments examined the effects of increasing the noticeability of 
instruction manual warnings on subsequent comprehension and memory performance. 
Participants read one of four instruction manuals for a gas-powered electric generator 
(Experiment 1) or a natural-gas oven (Experiment 2) on the assumption that they would 
later operate the equipment. The appearance of eight different warning messages in the 
manuals was altered in two ways: (1) the verbal messages were printed either in 
conspicuous print (larger text with color highlighting) or in plain print (same as the other 
text), and (2) either the verbal warning messages were accompanied by compatible pictorial 
icons or the icons were absent. Results showed that participants who received the 
conspicuous print, icons present manual better comprehended and recalled the verbal 
warning messages (Experiments 1 and 2) and better identified the semantic meaning of the 
icons (Experiment 1) than did participants who received the other three manuals. 
Implications for the design of instruction manual warnings are discussed. 
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2. Manufacturers’ Literature 
 
 
Aarons, R. N. (2001, March). Customizing your aircraft’s checklist. Business & Commercial 
Aviation. Retrieved from: http://aviationweek.com/awin/customizing-your-aircrafts-
checklist 
 
Summary: Checklists have popped up in several recent Cause & Circumstance columns and 
safety articles—checklists ignored, misread, misplaced and misunderstood. We all agree, I 
think, that checklists deserve better treatment from us in that they are the undisputed mom and 
apple pie of cockpit management philosophy. Several training experts we consulted suggest all 
operators design their checklists and related SOPs to optimize their operational environment. 
 
 
Airbus. (n.d.). Auto flight: General (1.22.10, Seq 100, Rev 32). Flight Crew Operating Manual 
A320 - For Training Only (Volume 1), 1–2. France: Author. 
 
Description: Preamble, description and general philosophy for A320. 
 
 
Airbus. (n.d.). FMGS overview - General philosophy (4.01.10, Seq 001, Rev 06). Flight Crew 
Operations Manual A320 - For Training Only (Volume 4). France: Author. 
 
Description: Preamble and general philosophy of FMGS from training manual. 
 
 
Airbus. (n.d.). Standard operating procedures - General information (3.03.01, Seq 001, Rev 
35). Flight Crew Operating Manual A320 (Volume 3), 1. France: Author. 
 
Description: SOPs for A320. 
 
 
Airbus. (2002). Operational philosophy: Introduction (01.010, July 28/05).  
A318/A319/A320/A321: Flight Crew Training Manual. France. Author. 
 
Description: Operational philosophy from flight crew training manual. 
 
 
Airbus. (2013a). Flight operations briefing notes: Standard operating procedures - Normal 
checklists. Retrieved from: https://www.scribd.com/document/55881534/Airbus-Safety-
Lib-Flt-Ops-Sop-Seq05 
 
Description: This briefing note provides an overview of the scope and use of normal 
checklists, and the factors and conditions that may affect the normal flow and completion of 
normal checklists. 
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Airbus. (2013b). Flight operations briefing notes: Standard operating procedures - Operating 
philosophy. Retrieved from: 
https://www.scribd.com/document/267692395/Airbussafetyib-Flt-Ops-Sop-Seq01-1 
 
Description: This flight operations briefing note provides an overview of the following 
aspects: establishment and use of (SOPs), training aspects, and factors and conditions that 
may affect the compliance with published rules and procedures. 
 
 
Baldwin, H. (2010, June). Rethinking the checklist. Overhaul & Maintenance. Retrieved from: 
http://aviationweek.com/awin/rethinking-checklist 
 
Summary: Why is it that despite revolutionary training, advanced technology and 
unprecedented knowledge of the causes of errors, we continue to make those errors? That, of 
course, is the million-dollar question, a question that Atul Gawande, a Harvard Medical 
School associate professor and thought leader in error reduction, seeks to answer in his book 
The Checklist Manifesto: How to Get Things Right. Gawande’s research spans multiple 
industries, including aviation. 
 
 
Boeing. (1999, July 30). Checklist information—Normal checklists (Chapter 1, Section 1).  
737 Quick Reference Handbook. Washington: Author. 
 
Description: This introduction contains guidelines for checklist operations. 
 
 
Boeing. (2013a, October 21). Aviation safety: Working together to make sure flying is as safe as 
possible. Retrieved from: http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/safety/industry.page 
 
Description: This is a description on Boeing’s company website about the company’s 
position and approach to aviation safety, and collaborative work with Commercial Aviation 
Safety Team and the Industry Safety Strategy Group. 
 
 
Boeing. (2013b, October 21). The boeing edge: Electronic checklist. Retrieved from: 
http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/aviationservices/flight-services/flight-
operations/flight-documents/ecl.page 
 
Description: This is a statement on Boeing’s company website about the use of electronic 
checklists and updates. 
 
 
Boeing. (2013c, October 21). The boeing edge: Flight operations. Retrieved from: 
http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/aviationservices/flight-services/flight-
operations/index.page 
 
Description: This is a statement on Boeing’s company website about their flight operations. 
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Boeing Flight Technical & Safety. (2011, May). The checklist builder (Rev 3). Washington: 
Author.  
 
Description: Defines what a checklist is, the kinds of checklists and steps in the checklist 
builder; it also covers operational concepts, critical items, pause points, and guidance to 
reduce and phrase, format, and test and improve. 
 
 
George, F. (2015, April). Checklists and callouts: Keep it simple, avoid distraction, prevent 
ineptitude. Business & Commercial Aviation. Retrieved from: 
http://aviationweek.com/business-aviation/checklists-and-callouts-keep-it-simple-avoid-
distraction-prevent-ineptitude 
 
Description: ‘Less is more’ appears to be the current checklist design theme. 
 
 
Kurtz, K. (2013, Quarter 01). Interactive version of the quick reference handbook: Fault 
troubleshooting with interactive fault isolation manual. The Boeing Edge Aeromagazine, Is. 
49, 11–13. Retrieved from Boeing website: 
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/2013_q1/pdf/AERO_2013q1.pdf 
 
Description: A Senior Manager from Boeing describes the electronic tablet version of the 
QRH and its advantages and regulations. 
 
 
Lacagnina, M. (2013, July). Automation surprise. Aerosafety World Magazine, 50–51. 
Retrieved from FSF website: http://flightsafety.org/aerosafety-world-magazine/july-
2013/on-record 
 
Summary: The captain’s reaction to an unexpected autopilot pitch change resulted in an 
unsafe descent… The following information provides an awareness of problems that might 
be avoided in the future. The information is based on final reports by official investigative 
authorities on aircraft accidents and incidents. 
 
Neville, R. & Dey, M. (2012, Quarter 01). Innovative 787 flight deck designed for efficiency, 
comfort, and commonality. Boeing Aeromagazine, Is. 45, 11–17. Retrieved from Boeing 
website: http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/2012_q1/index.html 
 
Annotation: An article, by a Boeing Chief Pilot and a Flight Deck Product Developer, that 
describes the new 787 displays, dual EFBs, and dual HUDs. Authors describe “operational 
commonality”, or the similarity between airplanes (e.g., 787 vs. 777) in operating procedures, 
checklists, and flight crew interfaces - to reduce training time for pilots between aircraft. 
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Pélegrin, C. (2007, December). Compliance to operational procedures: Why do well trained 
and experienced pilots not always follow procedures? Safety First: The Airbus 
Magazine, 5, 20–23. 
 
Abstract: In the aviation domain, the purpose of introducing procedures was to enhance 
safety in normal and abnormal conditions, by reducing uncertainty and thus risks. The 
rationale was obvious, and the benefits so blatant that the aeronautical industry has been 
using procedures for many years. It is now undisputed that pilots shall adhere to the 
procedures designed for them. But real life is not always that simple. The objective of this 
article is to understand the complete picture: good procedures design is important as well as 
appropriate explanations to ensure pilots have sufficient confidence in their skills and 
judgment to manage the situation. Each procedure is designed as the best and safest way to 
do a given task. Flight deck procedures are the skeleton of flight operations. They are the 
structure and the organisation by which a pilot can fly and interact with the aircraft and other 
crewmembers. When incidents or accidents occur, most of the time a non-adherence to 
procedures is mentioned. But this is not sufficient to explain accidents, because every day 
pilots do not follow procedures and this does not always lead to accidents! 
 
 
Shaw, J. (2013, Quarter 02). Faster troubleshooting with interactive fault management. 
Fault troubleshooting with interactive fault isolation manual. The Boeing Edge 
Aeromagazine, Is. 50, 19–23. Retrieved from Boeing website: 
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/2013_q2/pdf/AERO_201
3q2.pdf 
 
Description: Boeing has developed an Interactive Fault Isolation Manual that makes it easier 
to identify and correct faults. A Senior Airplane Maintenance Engineer describes fault 
conditions, codes, operations and provides examples. Shaw describes procedure blocks and 
procedure maps. 
 
 
Sumwalt, R. (2003, August). Using procedures to enhance crew vigilance. Professional Pilot, 2–6. 
 
Annotation: Airbus Captain for a major US airline, Robert Sumwalt, describes instances of 
failure of pilots to adequately monitor the aircraft. The article includes reference to the AC 
120-71A and how operators should review existing SOPs and modify those that can detract 
from monitoring. Other areas of discussion include improving taxi awareness, critical-phase 
monitoring (waiting for level-off for example, on activities that can increase errors during 
times when monitoring is required), avoiding automation traps (Wierner’s FMS-vacuum 
comparison), and balancing pilot workload. 
 
 
Veillette, P. R. (2006a, May). A non-error resistant checklist. Business & Commercial Aviation. 
Retrieved from: http://aviationweek.com/awin/non-error-resistant-checklist 
 
Summary: An abnormal procedures checklist should help us determine the cause of a 
malfunction, and take the proper corrective actions, but sometimes what seems obvious to a 
procedure designer on the ground is much less so to the busy pilot who must deal with the 
malfunction in flight.  
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Veillette, P. R. (2006b, May). The what and whys of good procedures. Business & Commercial 
Aviation. Retrieved from: http://aviationweek.com/awin/what-and-why-good-procedures 
 
Summary: When an organization has an aircraft accident, it is inevitable that upper 
management will focus on the aviation unit to avoid a recurrence. I know of a Twin Otter 
belonging to a large government agency that landed hard on a canted nose wheel and quickly 
departed the runway, plowing through bushes and a fence before coming to a halt. Both the 
aircraft and airman's ego suffered substantial damage in the mishap. 
 
 
Veillette, P. R. (2006c, May). The who, what, when of your SOPs. Business & Commercial 
Aviation. Retrieved from: http://aviationweek.com/awin/who-what-when-your-sops 
 
Summary: What follows is a compilation of subjects SOP designers need to consider and 
address. The list was culled from SOP post-accident recommendations by the NTSB as well as 
from similar investigative bureaus in other countries. It was also assembled from input by the 
Human Factors Division at NASA Ames Research Center and the FAA’s Advisory Circulars. 
 
 
Veillette, P. R. (2007, August). The problem of checklist errors. Business & Commercial 
Aviation. Retrieved from: http://aviationweek.com/awin/problem-checklist-errors 
 
Summary: “Dangle the Dunlops!” Heard that before? How about, “Rollers!”? These are two 
of the colorful, but definitely non-standard expressions used to call for extending the landing 
gear. While some might regard such callouts as those of a pilot merely trying to introduce 
some originality and humor in the cockpit, and dismiss any suggestion that they pose some 
kind of a problem, statistics suggest otherwise. 
 
 
Veillette, P. R. (2008, August). The benefits of proper checklist design. Business & Commercial 
Aviation. Retrieved from: http://aviationweek.com/awin/benefits-proper-checklist-design 
 
Summary: Recently one of your flight crews took off after wrongly assuming they had been 
refueled, but then discovered the mistake en route and diverted for an unplanned fuel stop. 
(This happens with surprising frequency.) You've been tasked with preventing this from 
happening again. You consider adding an item to the checklist reminding the flight crews to 
check fuel before leaving the ramp, but where do you put the new line item, and how will 
you phrase it? 
 
 
Wiley, J. (2003, July). To call out or clam up? Business & Commercial Aviation. Retrieved 
from: http://aviationweek.com/awin/call-out-or-clam 
 
Summary: “Start valve open...Rotation...Oil pressure...Fuel flow...Ignition... Peak EGT...Start 
valve closed...Turning number two.'” This was the litany heard every time we cranked the 
JT-8Ds that powered Boeing's mighty tri-motor, the B727. The flight engineer and first 
officer would go through this singsong duet, calling out what was expected and normal in a 
routine engine start. Time and again.  
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3. Regulatory and/or Government Literature 
 
 
Barazandeh, A.F. (2012). Aviation checklists: Normal/abnormal & emergency for fixed-wing & 
helicopters (EASA Research Project EASA.2012/1 Principles and guidelines relative to 
the design of checklists and working methods in the cockpit). Retrieved from the EASA 
website: https://www.easa.europa.eu/safety-and-research/research-projects/docs/large-
aeroplanes/Final_Study_Report_1-2012.pdf 
 
Summary: Performing normal/abnormal and emergency checklist is one of the key tasks of 
the flight crew. This paper present a summary of the results of studies and works done, as 
well as latest instructions and directives issued by Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs), 
concerning the principles and guidelines relative to the design of checklist and working 
methods in the cockpit for fixed-wing and helicopters. This allows European manufacturers 
and operators as well as National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) to have clear references on 
the state of the art in the design and application of checklists. Numerous accidents and 
occurrences caused by performing checklist incorrectly were searched and analysed. Various 
research institutions, National Aviation Authorities, operators and aircraft manufacturers 
have given their feedbacks on how to design and perform a checklist. Also Human Factor has 
been taken into account. 
 
 
Civil Aviation Authority. (2002). CAP 719: Fundamental human factors concepts. Retrieved from 
the Civil Aviation Authority website: https://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP719.PDF 
  
Summary: The scope of this digest includes: a) the meaning and definition of Human 
Factors, a conceptual model of it, and clarification of common misconceptions; b) the 
industry need for Human Factors; c) the application of Human Factors in flight operations; 
and d) the levels of expertise required and the formal approaches to education. 
 
 
Civil Aviation Authority. (2005). CAP 708: Guidance on the design, presentation and use of 
electronic checklists. Retrieved from the Civil Aviation Authority website: 
https://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP708.PDF 
 
Summary: Objectives: 1.1 This guidance is intended to promote best practice amongst UK 
aircraft operators with regard to electronic checklists (ECLs), maximising the potential safety 
benefits and minimising the potential disbenefits. The document complements CAP 676, 
which provides guidance on paper-based checklists. In some areas the guidance outlines the 
factors to take into account when deciding which approach is appropriate for the particular 
circumstances at the time, rather than providing a definitive answer. 1.2 Details of the 
process by which the guidance was derived, and discussion of aspects on which it is not 
possible to issue definitive guidance, are provided in CAA Paper 2000/09. 
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Civil Aviation Authority. (2006). CAP 676: Guidance on the design, presentation and use of 
emergency and abnormal checklists. Retrieved from: 
http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP676.PDF 
 
Executive Summary: Concern has been expressed that the potential for an accident or 
incident is increased by the pilot misinterpreting the checklist due to poor design. The 
primary goal of this guidance is to improve Emergency and Abnormal Checklist usability in 
assisting the flight crew to manage and contain system faults and other situations that 
adversely affect flight safety. Additionally this CAP will assist all stakeholders involved in 
the design, presentation and use of Emergency and Abnormal Checklists to take account of 
best human factors principles within their processes. It is the responsibility of both the 
aircraft manufacturer and aircraft operator to work together throughout the Emergency and 
Abnormal Checklist design, development and amendment process to ensure that optimum 
system configuration following a failure is assured commensurate with best operational 
practice. In addition to providing process information in Chapters 2 through to 6 of this 
document, guidance is provided in the application of good human factors principles in the 
design of the checklist. This covers the physical structure, content and layout. A Checklist 
Assessment Tool (CHAT) has been developed to allow Regulators, Manufacturers and 
Operators to review checklists against these design principles and thus be able to recognise a 
potentially error-prone checklist. The tool provides usability rationale to support the design 
attributes, which are contained in Chapter 7 of this document. CHAT is a stand-alone paper 
based tool and is presented as part of the Executive Summary. 
 
 
Commercial Aviation Safety Team. (2008). Mode awareness and energy state management 
aspects of flight deck automation, Final report—Safety enhancement 30, Revision 5. 
Retrieved from: http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1581.pdf 
 
Summary: Automation has contributed substantially to the sustained improvement in air 
carrier safety around the world. Automation increases the timeliness and precision of routine 
procedures, and greatly reduces the opportunity to introduce risks and threatening flight 
regimes. In short, automation has been very positive for safety. Nevertheless, in complex and 
highly automated aircraft, automation has its limits. More critically, flight crews can lose 
situational awareness of the automation mode under which the aircraft is operating or may 
not understand the interaction between a mode of automation and a particular phase of flight 
or pilot input. These and other examples of mode confusion often lead to mismanaging the 
energy state of the aircraft or to the aircraft’s deviating from the intended flight path for other 
reasons. The Loss of Control (LOC) Joint Safety Analysis Team (JIMDAT), chartered by the 
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), identified these issues as factors or problems in 
several major accidents in the United States and around the world. Subsequently, a Joint 
Safety Implementation Team recommended in Safety Enhancement (SE) 30 that CAST 
charter a JIMDAT sub-team to address mode confusion in cooperation with a working group 
chartered earlier by the Performance-Based Aviation Rulemaking Committee (PARC), which 
was in the midst of a more broadly based study of issues related to automation. In late 2005, 
CAST chartered the SE-30 Data Review Team to undertake this task. CAST directed the 
team to restrict its work to the issues of mode confusion and mode awareness, and to work 
closely with PARC, which continued to address a more comprehensive range of automation 
issues. The SE-30 Data Review Team was charged with producing a prototype automation 
policy, or an “exemplar,” for air carriers. The ultimate objective of any policy exemplar 
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would be to help minimize the frequency with which pilots experience mode confusion and 
undesirable energy states. This, in turn, required some assurance that crews understand the 
functions of the various modes of automation. Accordingly, this report presents a policy 
exemplar based on a set of common industry practices that are known to be effective, against 
which operators may compare their existing policies and identify any appropriate changes in 
their policies. In addition, the exemplar includes practical guidance that air carriers could 
include in their policies in order to help pilots respond effectively to particular types of 
automation anomalies. The suggested guidance is intended only as examples of effective 
responses to selected circumstances. The suggested guidance does not necessarily identify 
the only proper response. Note, too, that the terminology used in this document and in the 
examples reflects terminology for Airbus and Boeing aircraft. Air carriers may need to 
amend the terminology to apply this document to their own fleet mixes, the need for 
consistent language within a single air carrier, or other unique characteristics. However, the 
use of Airbus and Boeing terminology is reasonable for this type of document, since Airbus 
and Boeing products account for 80 percent of in-service air transport aircraft in the world 
(as of mid-2008). 
 
 
Dismukes, K., Young, G., & Sumwalt, R. (1998). Cockpit interruptions and distractions. ASRS 
Directline (Issue No. 10). Washington DC: FAA.  
 
Summary: Distraction is a commonly cited contributor to incidents in ASRS reports. This 
excellent article examines common sources, results, and management strategies for cockpit 
interruptions and distractions. 
 
 
European Aviation Safety Agency IGPT. (2013). EASA automation policy: Bridging design and 
training principles, EASp Action SYS5.6—Automation policy. Retrieved from EASA 
website: http://easa.europa.eu/sms/docs/EASp%20SYS5.6%20-
%20Automation%20Policy%20-%2014%20Jan%202013.pdf 
 
Introduction: The EASA Automation Policy adopts an innovative approach consisting of 
mapping crew automation interaction issues, design and certification and training principles, 
and respective regulatory provisions to identify top challenges and paths for improvement. It 
was developed by the EASA Internal Group on Personnel Training (IGPT) set up by Agency 
to follow up the EASA International Conference on Pilot Training of Nov 2009. Modern 
aircraft are increasingly reliant on automation for safe and efficient operations, whether 
commercially operated or not. Automation has brought significant advantages for flight 
safety and operations and is required for certain types of operations and for precision 
navigation. Automation can however cause problems for instance to senior pilots who may 
be less comfortable with automation while the new generation of pilots may lack basic flying 
skills when the automation disconnects or fails or when there is a need to revert to a lower 
automation level, including hand flying the aircraft. Development and promotion of an 
EASA Automation Policy are actions of the European Aviation Safety plan (EASp), Editions 
2011-2014 and 2012-2015, Section Next Generation of Aviation Professionals. 
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Federal Aviation Administration. (1978). Water, slush, and snow on the runway. (Advisory 
Circular 91-6A). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentID/23145 
 
Summary: This advisory circular is issued to provide information, guidelines, and 
recommendations concerning the operation of turbojet aircraft when water, slush, and snow 
are on the runway. A memorandum cancelled this AC on 1/19/2016, and has been updated 
and incorporated into AC 91.79A, Mitigating the Risks of a Runway Overrun Upon Landing. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (1981). Operations of large airplanes subject to federal 
aviation regulation part 125. (Advisory Circular 125-1). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentID/22524 
 
Annotation: This advisory circular provides guidance for operators to comply with Part 125 
requirements. It also includes an interesting discussions about “policy vs. procedure” - 
addressing issues/concerns that remain relevant today. This depth of discussion of procedures 
and development is similar to the FAA “Human Performance Considerations in the Use and 
Design of Aircraft Checklists” (1995) document. The circular states, “The user must know 
the purpose of the procedure and view the procedure as an acceptable method of 
accomplishing that purpose’’. It also covers what authors of procedures should identify, 
including the need to consider and adapt to the user. This AC was cancelled on 9/15/2016. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (1983). Pilots’ role in collision avoidance. (Advisory Circular 
90-48c). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentID/23090 
 
Summary: This advisory circular is issued for the purpose of alerting all pilots to the 
potential hazards of midair collision and near midair collision, and to emphasize those basic 
problem areas related to the human causal factors where improvements in pilot education, 
operating practices, procedures, and improved scanning techniques are needed for reduced 
midair conflicts. This AC was cancelled on 4/19/2016. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (1990a). Operational landing distances for wet runways; 
Transport category airplanes. (Advisory Circular 121-195(d)-1A). Retrieved from FAA 
website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentID/22523 
 
Summary: This advisory circular (AC) sets forth an acceptable means, but not the only 
means, of showing compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 8 121.195(d) 
pertaining to operating landing distances on wet runways. It is for guidance purposes and 
provides an example of a method of compliance that has been found acceptable. 
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Federal Aviation Administration. (1990b). Traffic advisory practices at airports without 
operating control towers. (Advisory Circular 90-42F). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentID/23088  
 
Summary: This advisory circular (AC) contains good operating practices and procedures for 
use when approaching or departing airports without an operating control tower and airports 
that have control towers operating part time. This AC has been updated to include changes in 
radio frequencies and phraseology. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (1993). Recommended standards traffic patterns and practices 
for aeronautical operations at airports without operating control towers. (Advisory 
Circular 90-66A). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentid/23093 
 
Summary: This advisory circular (AC) calls attention to regulatory requirements and 
recommended procedures for aeronautical operations at airports without operating control 
towers. It recommends traffic patterns and operational procedures for aircraft, lighter than 
air, glider, parachute, rotorcraft, and ultra light vehicle operations where use is not in conflict 
with existing procedures in effect at those airports. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (1995). Human performance considerations in the use and 
design of aircraft checklists. Retrieved from SKYbary website: 
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1566.pdf 
 
Annotation: This document describes some history of checklist usage and design. It also 
details incidents and accidents from ASRS reports, and takes a human factors perspective by 
answering the “whys” of specific design recommendations – citing relevant human factors 
work (by Degani & Weiner). It cites some FAA requirements (e.g., sequencing of checklist 
items). It also describes some areas and requirements, backed by research, to support the 
evidence (e.g., at age 50, 50% reduction in retinal illumination as compared to age 20 – 
which ties directly to recommendations to checklist format). It covers an analysis of checklist 
error incident data (from 300 “checklist” reports) and discusses the following areas: fatigue 
and stress effects (“getting behind the aircraft”), “chunked responses” from lengthy checklist 
items, illogical flow patterns that lead to omissions, cueing, checklist content and criticality, 
workload, and typography. It also includes sections from the FAA FSIMs 8400.10 document. 
A solid list of reference material and related reading material, which are worth further 
exploration. A good overall document that provides background research on the “whys” of 
the reported guidelines. 
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Federal Aviation Administration. (1996). Operational use and modification of electronic 
checklists. (Advisory Circular 120-64). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentID/23204 
 
Summary: This advisory circular addresses the processes for approval, operational use, and 
modification of electronic checklists (ECL) and ECL data by air carriers. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2000). Standard operating procedures for flight deck 
crewmembers (Advisory Circular 120-71). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/list/AC
%20120-71/$FILE/AC120-71.pdf 
 
Summary: Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are universally recognized as basic to safe 
aviation operations. Effective crew coordination and crew performance, two central concepts 
of crew resource management (CRM), depend upon the crew’s having a shared mental model 
of each task. That mental model, in turn, is founded on SOPs. This advisory circular (AC) 
presents background, basic concepts, and philosophy in respect to SOPs. It emphasizes that 
SOPs should be clear, comprehensive, and readily available in the manuals used by flight 
deck crewmembers. This AC is designed to provide advice and recommendations about 
development, implementation, and updating of SOPs. Many important topics that should be 
addressed in SOPs are provided in Appendix 1, Standard Operating Procedures Template. 
Stabilized Approach, characterized by a constant-angle, constant-rate of descent ending near 
the touchdown point, where the landing maneuver begins, is among the SOPs specifically 
identified in this AC, and is described in Appendix 2, Stabilized Approach: Concepts and 
Terms. These and the other Appendices following them represent a baseline and a starting 
point. Start-up certificate holders and existing certificate holders should refer to the Template 
in Appendix 1, to Stabilized Approach in Appendix 2, and to the other Appendices to this 
AC in developing comprehensive SOPs for use in training programs and in manuals used by 
their flight deck crewmembers. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2002). Aviation safety reporting system (ASRS). (Advisory 
Circular 120-66B). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/list/AC
%20120-66B/$FILE/AC120-66B.pdf 
 
Summary: This Advisory Circular (AC) provides guidance for establishing an air 
transportation Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP). The objective of the ASAP is to 
encourage air carrier and repair station employees to voluntarily report safety information 
that may be critical to identifying potential precursors to accidents. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) has determined that identifying these precursors is essential to further 
reducing the already low accident rate. Under an ASAP, safety issues are resolved through 
corrective action rather than through punishment or discipline. The ASAP provides for the 
collection, analysis, and retention of the safety data that is obtained. 
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Federal Aviation Administration. (2003a). Parts 91, 121, 125, and 135 flightcrew procedures 
during taxi operations. (Advisory Circular 120-74A). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentid/23220 
 
Summary: [Cancelled] Provides guidelines for the development and implementation of 
standard operating procedures for conducting safe aircraft operations during taxiing. It is 
intended for use by persons operating aircraft under parts 121, 125, and 135 (those part 135 
flight operations where two or more pilots are in the cockpit) of Title 14 CFR. This AC was 
cancelled on 7/30/2012. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2003b). Standard operating procedures for flight deck 
crewmembers (Advisory Circular 120-71A). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentID/23216 
 
Annotation: This advisory circular provides guidelines and requirements for operators in 
developing FAA standard operating procedures (SOPs). It is described as a baseline or 
starting point for POI guidance. The document discusses how the development and revision 
of procedures should be meaningful, iterative, and with no inappropriate carryovers. Several 
“templates” or topics are included in the Appendices - which are the “to dos” and answers 
some of the “why” of procedure development. This circular focuses on the need for operators 
to be congruent in their philosophy, policies, procedures, and practices (cited work by 
Degani & Weiner, 1994). Also included are discussions addressing: “techniques” – personal 
methods for carrying out a task (e.g., pilot “tricks” computer for passenger comfort), 
automation, crew monitoring and cross-checking, and issues around “systems procedures” – 
involves not only cockpit crew but external agents, task de-coupling, sequencing of tasks, 
changes and updates to checklists when new designs exist, and the role of managers to 
minimize changes just for the sake of changes but to truly explain/clarify the rationale behind 
the changes. This AC was cancelled on 1/10/2017.  
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2003c). Standard terminal arrival program and procedures 
[Order 7100.9D]. Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/7100.9D.pdf 
 
Description: This order provides guidance and standardization for procedures development 
and management of the Standard Terminal Arrival (STAR) program. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2004a). Airplane flying handbook. Retrieved from FAA website: 
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/airplane_handbook/ 
 
Summary: The Airplane Flying Handbook is designed as a technical manual to introduce 
basic pilot skills and knowledge that are essential for piloting airplanes. It provides 
information on transition to other airplanes and the operation of various airplane systems. It 
is developed by the Flight Standards Service, Airman Testing Standards Branch, in 
cooperation with various aviation educators and industry.  
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Federal Aviation Administration. (2004b). Crew resource training. (Advisory Circular 120-
51E). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC120-51e.pdf 
 
Summary: This Advisory Circular (AC) presents guidelines for developing, implementing, 
reinforcing, and assessing crew resource management (CRM) training for flight 
crewmembers and other personnel essential to flight safety. CRM training is designed to 
become an integral part of training and operations. These guidelines were originally intended 
for Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 certificate holders who are 
required by regulation to provide CRM training for pilots and flight attendants, and dispatch 
resource management (DRM) training for aircraft dispatchers. Fractional ownership program 
managers, required by 14 CFR part 91, subpart K to provide CRM training to pilots and 
flight attendants, and those 14 CFR part 135 operators electing to train in accordance with 
part 121 requirements, should also use these guidelines. Certificate holders and individuals 
operating under other operating rules, such as parts 91 (apart from subpart K), 125, and part 
135 operators not electing to train in accordance with part 121, and others, should find these 
guidelines useful in addressing human performance issues. This AC presents one way, but 
not necessarily the only way, that CRM training may be addressed. CRM training focuses on 
situation awareness, communication skills, teamwork, task allocation, and decision making 
within a comprehensive framework of standard operating procedures (SOP). 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2004c). Flight operational quality assurance. (Advisory 
Circular 120-82). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentID/23227 
 
Summary: “This Advisory Circular (AC) provides guidance on one means, but not 
necessarily the only means, of developing, implementing, and operating a voluntary Flight 
Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program that is acceptable to the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA).” 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2005). Dispatch resource management (DRM) training. 
(Advisory Circular 121-32A). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentID/22513 
 
Annotation: This Advisory Circular (AC; a non-regulatory document) provides guidelines to 
developing, implementing, reinforcing, and assessing DRM training programs for aircraft 
dispatchers. It defines and describes human factors, and also describes DRM training, 
information transfer, dissemination, and problem solving. Discussion includes how the 
NTSB and FAA have found that failing to adhere to SOPs is a persistent element in these 
problems encountered by flight crews and aircraft dispatchers – some SOPs have 
unconsciously and consciously ignored – or, significant SOPs have been omitted from an 
operator’s training program. The circular also refers to the Commercial Aviation Safety 
Team (CAST) to address such issues and decrease accident rates. An interesting description 
of the focus and process of DRM is included. There is no discussion on how to develop 
procedures, but discusses human factors and the focus by CAST on non-adherence to SOPs.  
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Federal Aviation Administration. (2007a). Confirming the takeoff runway [Safety Alert for 
Operators 07003]. Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/a
ll_safos/media/2007/safo07003.pdf 
  
Description: This SAFO emphasizes the importance of implementing standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) and training for flight crews to ensure that an airplane is at the desired 
takeoff runway, and to recommend some modern resources and procedures for doing so. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2007b). Manuals, procedures, and checklists for 14 CFR 
Parts 91K, 121, 125, and 135 (Flight Standards Information Management Systems 
8900.1, Vol 3, Chapter 32, Section 1). Washington: Author. 
 
Description: This chapter contains direction and guidance to be used by principal operations 
inspectors (POI) and inspectors for processing, reviewing, and accepting or approving 
manuals, procedures, and checklists. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2007c). Manuals, procedures, and checklists for 14 CFR 
Parts 91K, 121, 125, and 135 (Flight Standards Information Management Systems 
8900.1, Vol 3, Chapter 32, Section 12). Washington: Author. 
 
Description: This section contains direction and guidance for principal operations inspectors 
(POI) for the review of aircraft checklists for Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 
CFR) part 121 and 135 operators. All part 121 and 135 operators must provide aircraft 
checklists to their flight crewmembers. Flight crewmembers are required to use these aircraft 
checklists in air transportation operations. For part 121 operators, aircraft checklists must be 
approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and for part 135 operators these 
checklists must be acceptable to the FAA (see section 1 of this chapter for definitions of 
acceptance and approval). 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2007d). Pilot guide: Flight in icing conditions. (Advisory 
Circular 91-74A). Retrieved from FAA website:  
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentID/74471 
 
Summary: This advisory circular (AC) contains updated and additional information for the 
pilots of airplanes under parts 91, 121, 125, and 135 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (14 CFR). The purpose of this AC is to provide pilots with a convenient reference 
on the principal factors related to flight in icing conditions and the location of additional 
information in related publications. This AC does not authorize deviations from established 
company procedures or regulatory requirements. This AC was cancelled on 10/8/2015. 
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Federal Aviation Administration. (2007e). Runway light required for night takeoffs part 121 
[InFO 07009]. Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/Comair5191/InFO_07009.pdf 
 
Description: This InFO reminds pilots operating under 14 CFR part 121 that runway lights 
are required for takeoff at night, and that checking pertinent Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) 
and doing some extra headwork are essential in making a “go/no go” takeoff decision. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2007f). Runway overrun prevention. (Advisory Circular 91-
79). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentID/73552 
 
Summary: This advisory circular (AC) provides ways for pilots and operators of turbine-
powered airplanes to identify, understand, and mitigate risks associated with runway 
overruns during the landing phase of flight. It also provides operators with detailed 
information that may be used to develop company standard operating procedures (SOP) to 
mitigate those risks. This AC was cancelled on 9/17/2014. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2008a). Approach and landing accident reduction (ALAR): 
Recommended flightcrew training [InFO 08029]. Retrieved from FAA website: 
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/
all_infos/media/2008/info08029.pdf  
 
Description: More than half of all transport category airplane accidents occur during 
approach and landing. This InFO promotes flightcrew training to reduce approach and 
landing accidents, using new training materials developed specifically for that purpose and it 
applies to the operations of transport category airplanes under parts 121 and 135. In addition, 
this InFO has been developed in response to NTSB recommendations A-00-93, A-00-94, and 
A-00-99 and supersedes Flight Standards Information Bulletin for Air Transportation 
(FSAT) 01-12. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2008b). Design and content of check-lists for in-flight smoke, 
fire and fumes (SFF) [InFO 08034]. Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/a
ll_infos/media/2008/info08034.pdf 
 
Description: To make known a philosophy and a template for use in designing checklists for 
flight crews in response to evidence of a fire in the absence of a cockpit alert. 
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Federal Aviation Administration. (2008c). Checklist review [InFO 08041]. Retrieved from FAA 
website: 
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/
all_infos/media/2008/info08041.pdf 
 
Description: This InFO provides guidance for air carriers, which operate under Title 14 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) parts 121 and 135. The guidance is intended to 
ensure that all checklists comply with the information presented in the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) report, “Human Performance Considerations in the Use and Design of 
Aircraft Checklists,” dated January 1995. In addition, this InFO has been developed in 
response to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendation A-97-9 
and supersedes Flight Standards Information Bulletin for Air Transportation (FSAT) 98-08. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2010a). Industry best practices reference list [InFO 10002). 
Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/a
ll_infos/media/2010/info10002SUP.pdf 
 
Description: To consolidate guidance on industry best practices in operational areas such as 
checklist design, training, procedures, crew resource management, and error trapping… 
Recommended Action: Directors of safety, directors of operations, training managers, and 
trainers of flight crew should be familiar with the list of best practices resources in this InFO. 
Directors of operations and training managers should review their approved programs and 
operating procedures to determine if any areas of operation need to be improved based on 
these best practice documents. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2010b). NAV lean: Instrument flight procedures. Retrieved 
from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/media/NAV%20Lean%20Final%20Report.pdf 
 
Description: As the demand for Instrument Flight Procedures (IFP) has grown over the past 
decade and in order to meet the needs of the Next Generation (NextGen) Air Transportation 
System, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has sought opportunities to streamline 
and optimize current processes. In response to an RTCA NextGen Mid-Term Implementation 
Task Force Report (TF-5) recommendation to identify and solve operational approval and 
certification issues that may impede adoption and acceleration of NextGen capabilities, the 
FAA initiated a cross-agency Navigation Procedures project to streamline all policies and 
processes used to implement IFPs. This initiative was headed by Aviation Safety (AVS) and 
the Air Traffic Organization (ATO). Using the “Lean Management Process,” the Working 
Groups reviewed all processes used to request, prioritize, process, improve, and implement 
IFPs, and provided recommendations to maximize customer value and reduce waste in the 
development and delivery of all IFPs in the National Airspace System (NAS). 
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Federal Aviation Administration. (2010c). Part 121 air carrier operational control. (Advisory 
Circular 120-101). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentid/305074 
 
Annotation: This Advisory Circular provides guidelines and requirements for aviation safety 
inspectors and air carrier management personnel to comply with regulations, and describes 
information to consider regarding certificate management and internal evaluation of 
operational control functions. It documents the requirements and includes reference to the 
FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 25, and Operational Control for Air Carriers. The 
circular does not provide guidance for developing procedures, but lists requirements (e.g., 
“manuals and checklists must contain clear and concise instructions and information”). 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2010d). Scope and recommended content for a contractual 
agreement between an air carrier and a contract maintenance provider (CMP). (Advisory 
Circular 120-106). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentID/780197 
 
Annotation: This Advisory Circular describes the scope and recommended content 
requirements between an air carrier and contract maintenance provider for contractual 
agreements. It describes what “should be” included in procedures (e.g., “all policies and 
procedures are mutually agreed upon”), and who is specifically responsible for the various 
parts. Some discussion on subcontractors, and what requirements need to be followed by 
CMPs. This AC was cancelled on 1/4/2016. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2011). Title 14 Aeronautics and space [electronic database]. 
Retrieved from FAA website: http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/faa_regulations/  
 
Annotation: The Title 14 Aeronautic and Space regulations are rules, established by the 
FAA, governing all aviation activities in the United States. These regulations are organized 
into sections, called parts. Many Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) are designed to 
regulate certification of pilots, schools or aircraft rather than the operation of airplanes. Once 
an airplane design is certified using some parts of these regulations, it is certified regardless 
of whether the regulations change in the future. Subparts 1-59 and 60-109 cover some areas 
of standard operating procedures (SOPs). Part 25.1585 describes normal and non-normal 
operating procedure requirements. Part 91.1033 describes general operating information 
requirements and state “what to” include. Part 121.315 describes the cockpit check procedure 
requirements. A Safety Attribute Inspection (SAI) Data Collection Tool (3.1.3. Airman 
Duties - Flight deck Procedures (OP) Revision #: 10 Revision Date: 03/01/2012) is also 
included, to ensure that the procedures and duties meet all of the Title 14 requirements, 
incorporates the safety attributes, and identifies any shortfalls in the operator’s procedures. 
The SAI is a “check the box” document to verify that the operator’s procedures identify 
“who, what, where, and how those procedures are accomplished”. It also refers to the FAA 
Order 8900.1 document and to various Advisory Circulars (i.e., AC 120-71, AC 120-48). 
The following regulations are referenced in the FAA AC 120-71A: 14 CFR part 121, 
sections 121.133 (Preparation), 121.141 (Airplane flight manual), 121.401 (Training 
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program: General); 14 CFR part 125, section 125.287 (Initial and recurrent pilot testing 
requirements); and 14 CFR part 135, section 135.293. This guidance establishes regulations, 
general requirements, and “what to” include for checklists and types of procedures but not 
“how to” develop or write them. It is similar to the Flight Standards Information 
Management Systems (FSIMs) in terms of “check the box” requirements. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2012a). Parts 91, 121, 125, and 135 flightcrew procedures 
during taxi operations. (Advisory Circular 120-74B). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.info
rmation/documentID/1020233 
 
Annotation: This Advisory Circular provides guidelines and requirements that cover the rules 
to follow and things to consider for SOP guidance during taxiing and also for flight crew 
workload during taxi. It does not include how to setup or design procedures themselves. The 
Appendices are not directive or prescriptive and do not represent a rigid view of FAA Best 
Practices. The document lists several related reading materials such as: AC 90-42, AC 90-66, 
AC 120-57, AC 120-71, and other sources of guidance such as: AIM, SAFO, and ASRS. 
Some websites referenced include: AOPA and NOTAMS. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2012b). Standard operating procedures (SOP) for title 14 of 
the code of federal regulations (14 CFR) part 135 certificate holders and part 91K 
program managers [Safety Alert for Operators 12003]. Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/a
ll_safos/media/2012/SAFO12003.pdf  
 
Description: This SAFO reminds part 135 certificate holders and part 91K operators of the 
criticality of using SOPs during all phases of flight. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2013a). Aircraft equipment and operational authorization. 
Flight Standards Information Management Systems 8900.1, Vol 4, Chapter 2, Section 5. 
Retrieved on 8/16/2012 from FAA website: 
http://fsims.faa.gov/PICDetail.aspx?docId=8900.1,Vol.4,Ch2,Sec5 
 
Summary: This section includes guidance for operations other than Category (CAT) II/III 
approaches for Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) parts 91, 91 subpart K 
(part 91K), 121, 125, 129, and 135 operators. Approach and landing operations other than 
CAT II/III include visual approaches, contact approaches, circling approaches, Non-precision 
Approaches (NPA), approach procedures with vertical guidance (APV), and CAT I instrument 
landing system (ILS) approaches. This section includes guidance for both approach 
procedures using ground-based and/or satellite-based Navigational Aids (NAVAID). 
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Federal Aviation Administration. (2013b). Flight standards information management systems 
8900.1. Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://fsims.faa.gov/PICResults.aspx?mode=EBookContents&restricttocategory=all~menu 
 
Annotation: This evolving reference document provides guidance or principal operations 
inspectors (POIs), in the development of procedures and checklists with operators. Volume 3 
entitled, “General Technical Administration”, within the chapter “Manuals, Procedures, and 
Checklists for 14 CFR Parts 91K, 121, 125, and 135” is a section specifically dedicated to 
procedure and checklist development. It is intended to direct and guide the processing, 
reviewing, and accepting or approving of manuals, procedures, and checklists. This 
document is THE guiding document for POIs – providing the regulatory guidelines. It does 
not include the history, research, or background about procedures or checklists, or the 
“how’s” of checklist and procedures design. This document focuses primarily on the rules, 
“check the box” requirements (e.g., if a procedure exists or not). 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2013c). Safety attribute inspection (SAI) data collection tool: 
3.1.3 Airman duties / flightdeck procedures (OP). Flight Standards Information 
Management Systems 8900.1, ATOS Data Collection Tool, 3.0 Flight Operations, 3.1 
Air Carrier Programs and Procedures, SAI 3.1.3. Retrieved on from FAA website: 
http://fsims.faa.gov/PICDetail.aspx?docId=SAI%203.1.3%20%28OP%29 
 
Description: Purpose (operator's responsibility): To ensure that Airman Duties/Flightdeck 
Procedures provide for the safe operation of the airplane. Objective (FAA oversight 
responsibility): To determine if the operator's Airmen Duties/Flightdeck Procedures: Meets 
all applicable requirements of Title 14 of the Code of the Federal Regulations (14 CFR) and 
FAA policies’, Incorporates the safety attributes, and Identifies any shortfalls in the 
operator's Airman Duties/Flightdeck Procedures. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2016). Airplane flying handbook. Retrieved from FAA 
website: 
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/airplane_handb
ook/media/airplane_flying_handbook.pdf 
 
Description: This technical manual to introduce basic pilot skill and knowledge is an update 
to the FAA’s Airplane Flying Handbook 2004 edition. 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2017). Standard operating procedures and pilot monitoring 
duties for flight deck crewmembers (Advisory Circular 120-71B). Retrieved from FAA 
website: https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_120-
71B.pdf 
 
Description: This Advisory Circular (AC) provides guidance for the design, development, 
implementation, evaluation, and updating of standard operating procedures (SOP), and for 
pilot monitoring (PM) duties. SOPs are universally recognized as fundamental to safe 
aviation operations. Their importance cannot be overstated, especially in light of the advent 
of PM standards with respect to the use of increasingly modernized automated systems. This 
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AC provides a process for developing procedures that meet clear and specific requirements. 
Safe operations are founded on comprehensive SOPs made readily available within the 
manuals used by flight deck crewmembers. This AC also provides guidance on the definition 
and the training of PM duties and their integration into SOPs. Although this AC is directed 
towards Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 and part 135 air 
carriers, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) encourages all air carriers, aircraft 
operators, pilot schools, and training centers to utilize this guidance.  
 
Annotation: Some concepts from Barshi, Mauro, Degani, & Loukopoulou’s “Designing 
Flightdeck Procedures” memorandum (2016) are included in this updated AC (e.g., 
Characteristics of Good Procedures). See memorandum for a more in depth understanding 
and rationale of these concepts, and for further procedure development process guidance.  
 
 
Flight Deck Automation Working Group. (2013). Operational use of flight path management 
system—Final report of the PARC/CAST flight deck automation WG. Retrieved from 
FAA website: http://www.nbaa.org/ops/safety/Final_Report_Recommendations.pdf  
 
Description: In summary, the Working Group identified numerous areas that contribute to 
safety and operational effectiveness. However, vulnerabilities were identified in the accident, 
incident and operational data reviewed by the Working Group. Some underlying themes that 
the Working Group has identified include complexity (in systems and in operations); 
concerns about degradation of pilot knowledge and skills; and integration and 
interdependence of the components of the aviation system. Since the Working Group 
completed its data collection and analysis, several accidents have occurred where the 
investigative reports identified vulnerabilities in the events that are similar to those 
vulnerabilities identified in this report. The Working Group believes that implementing these 
recommendations will be necessary to make improvements in safety and operational 
effectiveness, especially considering the expected changes in future operations. The findings 
listed include various issues (e.g., vulnerability with automation use), and raised an important 
recommendation stating that, “This guidance should be updated to reflect operational 
experience and research findings on a recurring basis.” 
 
 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. (2009). Procedure use and adherence. (INPO 09-004). 
Retrieved from Smart Procedures website: 
http://www.smartprocedures.com/pdfs/inpo-09-004-use-and-adherence-guidelines.pdf 
 
Summary: The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), as part of an industry task 
force, started work in June 2007 to develop an industry standard for the scope of a procedure 
use and adherence document. This task force was composed of representatives from INPO 
and Nuclear Information Management Strategic Leadership (NIMSL), as well as industry 
subject-matter experts. This document describes components of procedure use and adherence 
to assist the nuclear utility industry in the operation and support of nuclear plants. For a 
utility, effective implementation of sound procedure use and adherence methods is tied 
directly to human error reduction, event prevention, and safety and is an integral part of 
sound revenue generation and maintaining shareholder value. The purposes of this procedure 
use and adherence document are as follows: Provide an industry guideline based on the 
experience and knowledge of nuclear industry peers, factoring in the best available human 
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performance strategies. Provide procedure use guidance based on the types of procedures. 
Provide guidance for adherence to procedures by establishing principles, guidelines, and 
rules. This will help ensure safe, effective application and use of procedures in the 
administration and performance of activities at nuclear power stations. Although most 
stations differentiate between procedures and work instructions, part of the guidance 
provided herein can be applied to work instructions. This guidance does not apply to the use 
of emergency and abnormal operating procedures. Each owners group provides standard 
guidance for its procedure set. INPO 09-004 is intended to be used by nuclear plant owners 
and operators as part of their procedure use and adherence programs. Each facility is 
encouraged to assess its own procedure-writing process and to adapt this information as 
appropriate to best meet its unique needs. The intent of this guideline is to identify standard 
elements that should be considered, not to provide an all-inclusive list. 
 
 
International Civil Aviation Organization. (2006). Aircraft Operations: Volume 2—Procedures 
for air navigation services—Construction of visual and instrument flight procedures (Doc 
8168, 5th ed.). Montréal, Canada: Author. 
 
Summary: The Procedures for Air Navigation Services: Aircraft Operations (PANS-OPS) 
consists of two volumes as follows: Volume I: Flight Procedures and Volume II: 
Construction of Visual and Instrument Flight Procedures. Volume II is intended for the 
guidance of procedures specialists and describes the essential areas and obstacle clearance 
requirements for the achievement of safe, regular instrument flight operations. It provides the 
basic guidelines to States, and those operators and organizations producing instrument flight 
charts that will result in uniform practices at all aerodromes where instrument flight 
procedures are carried out. 
 
 
International Civil Aviation Organization. (2007). Aircraft operations: Volume 1—Flight 
procedures (Doc 8168, 5th ed.). Retrieved from Information Handling Services website: 
http://www.ihs.com/products/industry-standards/org/icao/manuals/index.aspx 
 
Summary: The Procedures for Air Navigation Services: Aircraft Operations (PANS-OPS) 
consists of two volumes as follows: Volume I: Flight Procedures and Volume II: 
Construction of Visual and Instrument Flight Procedures. Volume I describes operational 
procedures recommended for the guidance of flight operations personnel and flight crew. It 
also outlines the various parameters on which the criteria in Volume II are based so as to 
illustrate the need to adhere strictly to the published procedures in order to achieve and 
maintain an acceptable level of safety in operations. 
 
 
Joint Aviation Authorities. (2007). JAR-OPS subpart P: Manuals, logs and records. Joint 
aviation requirements JAR-OPS 1 Commercial air transportation (Aeroplanes), 
Section 1, Amendment 12, 229–238. Retrieved from JAA website: 
http://www.jaa.nl/publications/jars/jar-ops-1.pdf 
 
Summary: The members of the Joint Aviation Authorities Committee are representatives of 
the Civil Aviation Authorities of the countries that have signed the ‘Arrangements 
Concerning the Development and the Acceptance of Joint Aviation Requirements’. The Civil 
Aviation Authorities of certain European countries have agreed common comprehensive and 
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detailed aviation requirements, referred to as the Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR), with a 
view to minimising Type Certification problems on joint ventures, to facilitate the export and 
import of aviation products, to make it easier for maintenance carried out in one European 
country to be accepted by the Civil Aviation Authority in another European country and to 
regulate commercial air transport operations. JAR–OPS has been issued with no National 
Variants. It may be felt that the document does not contain all of the detailed compliance and 
interpretative information, which some Civil Aviation Authorities and Industry organisations 
would like to see. However, it has been accepted that JAR–OPS should be applied in practice 
and the lessons learned embodied in future amendments. The Civil Aviation Authorities of 
the JAA are therefore committed to amendment in the light of experience. 
 
 
Klement, R. E. (1995). Procedure preparation for ISO 9000 certification. Paper presented at the 
American Production Inventory Control Society International Conference and 
Exhibition, Orlando, FL. Retrieved from OSTI website: 
http://www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl/132703 
 
Summary: The purpose of this paper is to share information about the successful 
implementation of centralized procedure administration and the re-engineering of the 
procedure system, leading to successful ISO 9001 certification at AlliedSignal Inc., Kansas 
City Division. The Kansas City Division (KCD) produces non-nuclear components for 
nuclear weapons. The company has operated the plant for the US Department of Energy 
since 1949. Throughout the history of the plant, procedures were written to reflect the 
nuclear weapons industry best practices, and the facility built a reputation for producing high 
quality products. In 1991 a critical process team was asked to use Just In Time principles to 
determine a better way to administrate procedures. By 1992 the team was successful in 
implementing a full-time centralized procedure group to handle the creation, coordination, 
review, resolution, and publication of plant-wide administrative and operating procedures. In 
1993 AlliedSignal was commissioned by its President and CEO Larry Bossidy to register all 
of the worldwide sites under the ISO 9000 quality standard. This presented a formidable 
challenge for the Kansas City Division. Though the independent third-party auditors 
conceded during a pre-assessment that the company did in fact build high quality products, 
the procedures and procedure system did not accurately reflect the current business practices. 
The purpose of this paper is to share information about the successful implementation of 
centralized procedure administration and the re-engineering of the procedure system, leading 
to successful ISO 9001 certification at AlliedSignal Inc., Kansas City Division. 
 
 
McLaughlin, A.C. (2010). What makes a good checklist: Perspective [online forum]. Retrieved 
from the United States Department of Health and Human Services Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality: Morbidity & Mortality Rounds on the Web website: 
http://webmm.ahrq.gov/perspective.aspx?perspectiveID=92 
 
Summary: The use of checklists is a primitive yet remarkably effective strategy for ensuring 
accuracy in complex tasks. Checklists have long been used in fields such as aviation and 
space exploration but have only recently made headway in medicine. The reluctance of 
medical professionals to adopt checklists is often framed as pushback against “more 
paperwork” and “cookbook medicine,” or due to disbelief in their effectiveness. However, a 
rich literature has helped establish many best practices in checklist design, and health care 
now stands to benefit.  
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration, & Federal Aviation Administration. (2000). 
NASA/FAA Operating documents project: Developing operating documents: A manual of 
guidelines—E-Version. Retrieved from Airsafety website:  
http://www.airsafety.aero/getattachment/Requirements-and-Policy/OTACs/OTAR-
Part-119-Air-Operator-Certification/Flight-Safety-Documents-System/Useful-
references/Developing_Operating_Documents_Manual.pdf.aspx?lang=en-US 
 
Annotation: A collaborative work involving NASA, the FAA, and several corporations and 
industries—including Boeing, United Airlines, Bombardier Aerospace, and many others. 
This manual provides an internally and externally consistent document that covers the entire 
flight document development process. It reviews best practices, but does not represent 
regulatory requirements. Some areas of development include: organization of documents, 
standardization, usability, and transition to electronic media. The manual also addresses 
important issues (e.g., optimizing and coordinating procedures), and provides several 
relevant guidelines, with industry participation and from a human factors perspective, for 
developing procedures and checklists. It is a solid and informative document for reference. 
 
 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, & Federal Aviation Administration. (2004). 
ASRS Callback: Checklist checkup (Issue 292). Retrieved from: 
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback/cb_292.htm 
 
Description: An FAA review of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident 
data revealed that during the period 1983 to 1993, approximately 279 aircraft accidents 
occurred in which a checklist was improperly used or not used. A review of ASRS 
"checklist" related reports for 2003 suggests that many of the same errors identified by the 
FAA and NTSB continue to be reported. The most common checklist errors include the 
following: 1. Failure to use a checklist., 2. Use of the wrong checklist., 3. Checklist flow 
interrupted., and 4. Checklist item(s) overlooked. Recent examples of these errors are 
detailed in the following ASRS reports. 
 
 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, & Federal Aviation Administration. (2014). 
ASRS Callback: Checklist checkup (Issue 410). Retrieved from: 
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback/cb_410.html 
 
Description: Checklists are used by pilots to assure that the aircraft is properly configured for 
each phase of flight. Checklists are also used to provide appropriate response to abnormal or 
emergency situations. While checklists do provide a means of guiding a pilot or flight crew 
through complex procedures, they are not impervious to human error. Reports submitted to 
ASRS indicate that errors related to checklist usage generally fall into one of these five 
categories: (1) Checklist interrupted, (2) Checklist item overlooked, (3) Use of the wrong 
checklist, (4) Failure to use a checklist, and (5) Checklist confusion. Examples of these errors 
are found in the following reports. 
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration, & Federal Aviation Administration. (2015). 
ASRS Callback: A checklist checklist (Issue 428).  Retrieved from NASA website: 
https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback/cb_428.html 
 
Description: Checklists were developed to ensure consistency and completeness in the 
performance of complex tasks. Aviation checklists provide an orderly and sequential 
collection of vital steps for configuring an aircraft for different phases of flight or for 
resolving abnormal situations. Since ASRS continues to receive a significant number of 
incident reports related to checklist errors, perhaps another look at some of the factors 
affecting proper checklist usage is warranted. See CALLBACK Issues #292 and #410. These 
recent ASRS reports highlight five items that should be on everyone’s Preventing Checklist 
Errors checklist. 
 
 
NLR Air Transport Safety Institute. (2003). Airline industry survey of hazards associated with 
reliance on flight deck automation. Retrieved from NLR-ATSI website:  http://www.nlr-
atsi.nl/fast/downloads/AIRLINE%20INDUSTRY%20SURVEY 
%20OF%20HAZARDS%20ASSOCIATED%20WITH%20RELIANCE.pdf 
 
Summary: Scope of Survey - The objective of this questionnaire was to determine the 
opinion by senior members from the airline sector to the JAA industry based research project 
“Future Hazards Associated with Flight Deck Automation”. This particular questionnaire 
was seen as an integral part of the validation process of the work performed by the ad-hoc 
expert panel, which was convened for this area of research. The target response group for 
this questionnaire was the more experienced and senior members of the various airline 
operations and regulatory departments. More specifically this survey was aimed at those 
involved in pilot training and testing at different levels. Statistical data has been generated as 
a result of the answers given and is presented in this report. 
 
 
Nuclear Energy Institute. (2014). Emergency response procedures and guidelines for extreme 
events and severe accidents. Retrieved from: 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1404/ML14049A005.pdf 
 
Summary: U.S. nuclear power plant licensees currently maintain the capability to implement 
beyond design basis accident mitigation and management strategies developed through 
several separate initiatives. Each strategy has been converted into implementing actions and 
recommendations within three separate sets of procedures and guidelines: Emergency 
Operating Procedures (EOPs), Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs), and 
Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs). In addition to these existing procedure 
and guideline sets, the industry is currently developing a new set of guidelines, referred to as 
FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs), in response to Order EA-12-049 issued by the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Having been developed separately, each of these 
procedure and guideline sets are subject to varying levels of regulatory requirements and 
industry commitments, as are the training, drills, and exercises intended to maintain the 
capability for effective implementation. The EOPs were designed to restore and maintain 
safety functions, and place the plant in a safe shutdown condition. This document provides 
guidance for ensuring that EOPs, EDMGs, FSGs and SAMGs are integrated in a cohesive, 
effective and usable manner. It also addresses recommendations for the development of 
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accident or event mitigation and management guidelines, and command and control 
structures for responding to severe accidents and extreme events4. Guidance concerning the 
related aspects of training, drills and exercises is contained in NEI 13-06, Enhancements to 
Emergency Response Capabilities for Beyond Design Basis Accidents and Events. 
 
 
Nuclear Information Management Strategic Leadership. (2006). Procedure writers’ manual 
(NEI AP-907-005, Rev. 0). Nuclear Energy Institute: Washington, DC. 
 
Summary: The purpose of this Procedure Writers’ Manual is to provide an industry standard 
based on the consensus of nuclear industry peers. NEI AP-907-005 is a general Procedure 
Writers Manual and is intended to be used by nuclear plant owners or operators to assess 
their procedure writing process. This standard should be used in conjunction with NEI AP-
907-001, Procedure Process Description. The standard for writing procedures is intended to 
be applied at sites as appropriate, considering corporate and site-specific policies and 
objectives. The format and writing methodology contained within NEI AP-907-005 should 
be considered for incorporation into site-specific procedures. Each facility is encouraged to 
assess their own procedure writing process and to adapt this information as appropriate to 
best meet its unique needs. The intent of this manual is to identify standard elements that 
should be considered, not to provide an all-inclusive list. The basic elements in this standard 
apply whether the document is an administrative or technical procedure. However, the level 
of detail required is greatest for technical procedures. Therefore, this standard as written and 
the detailed information contained in this document may not apply to all procedures. 
 
 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (1995). NRC Inspection manual—Inspection procedure 42700. 
Retrieved from NRC website: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-
manual/inspection-procedure/ip42700.pdf 
 
Summary: Objectives. To verify that plant procedures are reviewed and approved in 
accordance with technical specifications and regulatory requirements. To verify that the 
technical adequacy of procedures is consistent with desired actions and modes of operation. 
To verify the usability of procedure content and format by determining the degree to which 
accepted human factors principles have been incorporated. To verify that temporary 
procedure changes were made in accordance with plant administrative procedures and 
technical specification requirements. 
 
 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2007). Standard review plan: Human factors engineering 
(NUREG 0800, Rev 2). Retrieved from NRC website: 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0706/ML070670253.pdf 
 
Summary: This SRP chapter will be used by the staff when performing safety evaluations of 
license applications submitted by applicants pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52. 
This SRP chapter describes a process for evaluating (1) designs, (2) design processes, (3) 
design reviews, and (4) operator actions submitted by applicants and licensees for the broad 
range of NRC review responsibilities. Chapter 18 contains an area of review titled 
"Procedure Development," which provides criteria for the review of the procedure 
development process rather than the actual procedures. Procedure Development - The 
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objective of this review is to confirm that the applicant's procedure development program 
incorporates HFE principles and criteria, along with all other design requirements, to develop 
procedures that are technically accurate, comprehensive, explicit, easy to utilize, validated, 
and in conformance with 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(ii). Because procedures are considered an 
essential component of the HFE design, they should be derived from the same design process 
and analyses as the other components of the HSI (e.g., displays, controls, operator aids) and 
subject to the same evaluation processes. The applicant's procedure development program 
should be evaluated in accordance with the review criteria of NUREG-0711. The review 
should be coordinated with the review of procedures described in SRP Section 13.5. The full 
procedures program is considered to be an operational program as discussed in SECY-05-
197 and in RG-1.206 Section C.IV.4. 
 
 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2010). NRC Inspection manual—Inspection procedure 42401. 
Retrieved from NRC website:  http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0801/ML080140332.pdf 
 
Summary: Objectives. To confirm that the scope of the plant procedures are adequate to 
control safety related operations within applicable regulatory requirements. To determine the 
adequacy of management controls in implementing and maintaining a viable procedure 
control process. To verify that the technical adequacy of procedures is consistent with desired 
actions and modes of operation. To verify the usability of procedure content and format by 
determining the degree to which accepted human factors principles have been incorporated. 
 
 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2012). Human factors engineering—Program review model 
(NUREG-0711, Rev. 3). Retrieved from NRC website: 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1232/ML12324A013.pdf 
 
Summary: This document is used by the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to 
review the human factors engineering (HFE) programs of applicants for construction permits, 
operating licenses, standard design certifications, combined operating licenses, and license 
amendments. The purpose of these reviews is to verify that the applicant’s HFE program 
incorporates HFE practices and guidelines accepted by the staff as described within the 
twelve elements of an HFE program: HFE Program Management, Operating Experience 
Review, Functional Requirements Analysis and Function Allocation, Task Analysis, Staffing 
and Qualifications, Treatment of Important Human Actions, Human - System Interface 
Design, Procedure Development, Training Program Development, Human Factors 
Verification and Validation, Design Implementation, and Human Performance Monitoring. 
Each element encompasses five sections: Background, Objective, Applicant Products and 
Submittals, Review Criteria, and Bibliography. 
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Planzer, N., & Hofmann, M.A. (1995). Advancing free flight through human factors. Retrieved 
from: https://ntl.bts.gov/lib/000/800/833/freeflt.pdf 
  
Executive summary: This report describes the results of the Advancing Free  Flight Through 
Human Factors technical workshop held on June 20 and 21, 1995. The purpose of this 
technical workshop was to begin the process of identifying and solving human factors issues 
related to a new aviation concept called "free flight." The FAA sponsored an RTCA select 
committee to define the concept of free flight and to identify the issues and activities that 
must be undertaken to advance the concept. The select committee prescribed free flight as a 
concept encompassing a real time air traffic management triad: People, Procedures, and 
Technologies. The long range changes envisioned by the RTCA select committee to move 
the system toward free flight will involve the human as the most critical element in the use of 
new technologies, equipment, and procedures…The findings and conclusion of the workshop 
provide insight into the challenges associated with human factors and free flight.  
 
 
Procedures Professionals Association. (2011). Procedures process description PPA AP 907-001 
Revision 1. Retrieved from PPA website: http://www.ppaweb.org/documents/PPA-AP-
907-001.pdf 
 
Description: Forward - In March 2005, at the direction of the Nuclear Information 
Management Strategic Leadership (NIMSL) steering committee, an Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operations (INPO) Community of Practice (CoP), an industry task force was 
chartered to address the broader scope of the procedure process through the development of 
an industry process description. This task force was composed of representatives from the 
NIMSL CoP and industry subject matter experts. In 2010, the Procedure Professionals 
Association (PPA) assumed ownership and maintenance responsibilities for AP-907-001 
(Procedure Process) and AP-907-005 (Procedure Writers’ Manual). PPA is an industry-
working group for procedure related interests and is composed of subject matter experts from 
the U.S. commercial nuclear field, the U.S. Department of Energy, and other similar business 
interests. PPA is an open forum for procedure related issues and accepts membership from In 
November 2010, PPA formed a standards committee and commenced work on a revision to 
AP-907-001 and AP-907-005. These revisions were completed and published in August 
2011. Purpose and scope: The purpose of this procedure process description is to provide a 
standard process for creating and altering procedures. This document is intended to be used 
by nuclear facility owners and operators to assess their organization's management of the 
procedure process as defined in the EUCG Standard Nuclear Performance Model. This 
process description establishes a baseline for consistent procedure activities and discusses 
performance measures. This document is also intended to be used as a tool for performing 
effective self-assessments and benchmarking. An effective process description enables 
standardized comparisons to be made and provides a basis for improvement suggestions. 
This document was revised and updated in January 2016. 
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Sands, J.I. (2003). Technical evaluation report. McLean, Virginia: MITRE Corporation.  
 
Description: Overview - Automation may increase efficiency, but it also raises doubts about 
adequate human control over automated systems and making sure that system effectiveness 
is not jeopardized. This symposium focused on the interaction of humans with a growing 
array of automated functions and automated and intelligent systems. During the symposium, 
participants discussed how to harmonize the interactions of humans with automated and 
semi-automated systems to increase overall mission performance. The symposium 
participants outlined recommendations for development of human-centered automation in 
military environments, addressing key areas such as providing levels of automation that are 
appropriate to levels of risk, examining procedures for recovery from emergencies, and 
ensuring human control of automation. This evaluation presents an overview of the problem, 
and reviews design philosophy, methodology and evaluation as presented by paper authors. 
The report also evaluates the content presented, discussions, and recommendations.  
 
 
Schutte, P.C., & Willshire, K.F. (1997). Designing to control flight crew errors (Technical 
Report #200401106681). Retrieved from NASA Technical Reports Server website: 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20040110681 
 
Abstract: It is widely accepted that human error is a major contributing factor in aircraft 
accidents. There has been a significant amount of research in why these errors occurred, and 
many reports state that the design of flight deck can actually dispose humans to err. This 
research has led to the call for changes in design according to human factors and human-
centered principles. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Langley 
Research Center has initiated an effort to design a human-centered flight deck from a clean 
slate (i.e., without constraints of existing designs.) The effort will be based on recent research 
in human-centered design philosophy and mission management categories. This design will 
match the human's model of the mission and function of the aircraft to reduce unnatural or 
non-intuitive interfaces. The product of this effort will be a flight deck design description, 
including training and procedures, and a cross reference or paper trail back to design 
hypotheses, and an evaluation of the design. The present paper will discuss the philosophy, 
process, and status of this design effort. 
 
 
Seamster, T.L., Boehm-Davis, D.A., Holt, R.W., & Schultz, K. (1998). Developing advanced 
crew resource management (ACRM) training: A training manual. Retrieved from the 
FAA website: 
https://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/aqp/training/manual/media/dacrmt.pdf 
 
Summary: ACRM is a comprehensive implementation package including the CRM 
procedures, training of the instructor/evaluators, and training of the crews, a standardized 
assessment of crew performance, and an ongoing implementation process. ACRM has been 
designed and developed through a collaborative effort between the airline and research 
community. ACRM training is an ongoing development process that provides airlines with 
unique CRM solutions tailored to their operational demands. Design of CRM procedures is 
based on critical CRM principles that require emphasis in airline’s specific operational 
environment. Procedures were developed to emphasize these CRM elements by incorporating 
them into SOPs for normal as well as abnormal and emergency flight situations.  
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Tarnowski, E. (1999). Understanding design philosophy can help pilots benefit from  modern 
automated flight systems. ICAO Journal, 22–30. 
 
Summary: A set of guidelines or “golden rules for the operation of automated systems can 
help crew members to remain fully aware of the status of the aircraft and its sophisticated 
systems - ready to react should an unexpected or critical event arise. 
 
 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, The National Commission for the Protection 
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. (1979). The belmont report - 
Ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human subjects of research. 
Retrieved from the United States Department of Health and Human Services website: 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html 
 
Summary: On July 12, 1974, the National Research Act (Pub. L. 93-348) was signed into 
law, thereby creating the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research. One of the charges to the Commission was to identify 
the basic ethical principles that should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral 
research involving human subjects and to develop guidelines, which should be followed to 
assure that such research is conducted in accordance with those principles. In carrying out 
the above, the Commission was directed to consider: (i) the boundaries between biomedical 
and behavioral research and the accepted and routine practice of medicine, (ii) the role of 
assessment of risk-benefit criteria in the determination of the appropriateness of research 
involving human subjects, (iii) appropriate guidelines for the selection of human subjects for 
participation in such research and (iv) the nature and definition of informed consent in 
various research settings. The Belmont Report attempts to summarize the basic ethical 
principles identified by the Commission in the course of its deliberations. It is the outgrowth 
of an intensive four-day period of discussions that were held in February 1976 at the 
Smithsonian Institution's Belmont Conference Center supplemented by the monthly 
deliberations of the Commission that were held over a period of nearly four years. It is a 
statement of basic ethical principles and guidelines that should assist in resolving the ethical 
problems that surround the conduct of research with human subjects. By publishing the 
Report in the Federal Register, and providing reprints upon request, the Secretary intends 
that it may be made readily available to scientists, members of Institutional Review Boards, 
and Federal employees. The two-volume Appendix, containing the lengthy reports of experts 
and specialists who assisted the Commission in fulfilling this part of its charge, is available 
as DHEW Publication No. (OS) 78-0013 and No. (OS) 78-0014, for sale by the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 
Unlike most other reports of the Commission, the Belmont Report does not make specific 
recommendations for administrative action by the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare. Rather, the Commission recommended that the Belmont Report be adopted in its 
entirety, as a statement of the Department's policy. The Department requests public comment 
on this recommendation. 
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Veillette, P.R. (2012). Give e-checklists an A+. Business & Commercial Aviation. Retrieved 
from FAA website: http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/Northwest255/E_Checklists.pdf 
 
Summary: The introduction of any new technology to a cockpit always carries the risks of 
unanticipated errors and unintended consequences. But electronic checklist technology 
has matured and proven itself and should be embraced. We need to learn from past 
checklist-related incidents and accidents and adapt electronic lists and presentations 
accordingly. Also, users should insist that manufacturers design electronic checklists so 
they can be easily modified to coincide with an operator’s FAA-approved checklists. It is 
time for this technology to be fully implemented to its maximum potential. It stops errors 
and can save lives. 
 
 
Veitengruber, J.E., & Rankin, W.L. (1995). Use of crew-centered design philosophy allows the 
introduction of new capabilities and technology. ICAO Journal, 20–22. 
 
Abstract: Crew-centered principles used in designing the Boeing 777 flight deck were 
developed from worldwide operational experience with previous generations of commercial 
jet transport aircraft. 
 
 
Wiener, E.L. (1993). Intervention strategies for the management of human error (NASA 
Contractor Report #4547). Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. 
 
Summary: This report examines the management of human error in the cockpit. The 
principles probably apply as well to other applications in the aviation realm (e.g. air traffic 
control, dispatch, weather, etc.) as well as other high-risk systems outside of aviation (e.g. 
shipping, high-technology medical procedures, military operations, nuclear power 
production). Management of human error is distinguished from error prevention. It is a more 
encompassing term, which includes not only the prevention of error, but also a means of 
disallowing an error, once made, from adversely affecting system output. Such techniques 
include: traditional human factors engineering, improvement of feedback and feedforward of 
information from system to crew, 'error-evident' displays which make erroneous input more 
obvious to the crew, trapping of errors within a system, goal-sharing between humans and 
machines (also called 'intent-driven' systems), paperwork management, and behaviorally 
based approaches, including procedures, standardization, checklist design, training, cockpit 
resource management, etc. Fifteen guidelines for the design and implementation of 
intervention strategies are included. 
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4. Accident and Incident Reports 
 
 
Aviation Safety Reporting System. (2012a). [Report Number 989180]. Retrieved March 29, 
2013, from: http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov 
 
Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew experiences a LE flap transit light after flap retraction. QRH 
procedures do not remedy the situation and flight returns to departure airport for a partial flap 
landing. Database search on “checklist incidents” results in a pilot’s report that, “procedures 
do not remedy the situation.”  
 
 
Aviation Safety Reporting System. (2012b). [Report Number 1006482]. Retrieved March 29, 
2013, from: http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov 
 
Synopsis: A B767-300 experienced smoke and fumes in flight followed by numerous EICAS 
messages and warning lights associated with system anomalies that would contribute to the 
physical evidence. They [the pilots] declared an emergency and made a rapid descent and 
overweight landing at a nearby enroute airport. Pilot reports, “too much…with not a lot of 
time in an emergency.”  
 
 
Aviation Safety Reporting System. (2012c). [Report Number 1008744]. Retrieved March 29, 
2013, from: http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov  
 
Synopsis: B777 flight crew discovers airborne that they have departed with conflicting 
MEL's concerning Main Deck shut off valves. After consulting with Maintenance the flight 
continues to destination. Pilot reports, “they [procedures] conflicted with MELS.”  
 
 
Aviation Safety Reporting System. (2012d). [Report Number 1009419]. Retrieved March 29, 
2013, from: http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov  
 
Synopsis: Following a go around for a TE FLAP DISAGREE EICAS, the B757 Captain 
expressed frustration with the lack of training and flight crew communications to address 
new and revised Company procedures. Pilot states, “I do not like to criticize, but my level of 
frustration relating to all of the new protocols is very high. I have been on this fleet for 
somewhere upward of 21 years. I do not worry about flying the airplane but I do worry about 
how we are being trained on our New and Improved Procedures and using them on a daily 
basis. While I have been using the QRH, it is still not fluid as the old ways were. I firmly 
believe that all of the pilots affected by these new protocols should be trained in a simulator.”  
 
 
Aviation Safety Reporting System. (2012e). [Report Number 1012507]. Retrieved March 29, 
2013, from: http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov 
 
Synopsis: A320 Captain reports departing late due to a maintenance required repair of the 
Green hydraulic system. Once in cruise the Green system quantity is found to be decreasing 
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and the crew elects to divert. The pilot reports, “...By this time we had already reviewed the 
QRH, and had not found any procedure for our situation.” 
 
 
Bureau Enquêtes-Accidentes. (1999). Airfrance boeing 747-428B. Tahiti faa’a international 
airport, French polynesia. December 13, 1993. (Aircraft accident report, F-TA930913). 
Le Bourget cedex, France. 
 
Summary: On final approach, the pilot flying countermanded an automatic go-around 
initiated by the automatic flight system. He continued the approach by overriding the auto 
throttle. During landing, the outside left engine went into full forward thrust; the aircraft left 
the runway to the right and came to a halt in the lagoon. Probable Causes: The accident was 
caused by a non-stabilized approach and a strong forward thrust application to engine 1 on 
landing, consequences of an idiosyncrasy of the automatic flight system that caused a shift 
into go-around mode at a point in the path that corresponded to the à la decision height. This 
caused: a long touchdown at excessive speed and a trajectory that pulled right so that the 
airplane left the runway sideways. Failure to observe operational procedures regarding call-
outs during approach and landing as well as the lack of communication between the pilots 
were factors that contributed greatly to the accident. In particular, deviations from the norms 
for several flight parameters should have led to initiating a go-around. The absence of 
information from the manufacturer to operators and crews regarding this particular feature of 
the automatic flight system was also a contributing factor to the accident. 
 
 
Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviación Civil. (2008). Accident 
involving a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82 (MD-82) aircraft, registration EC-HFP, 
operated by Spanair, at Madrid-Barajas Airport, on 20 August 2008 (Report A-032/2008). 
Madrid, Spain. 
 
Summary: The Civil Aviation Accident and Incident Investigation Commission was notified 
of the accident at 14:43 on 20 August 2008 by means of a telephone call placed from the 
Airport Operations Office (AOO) at Barajas Airport. A team consisting of six investigators, 
as well as the President of the Commission, immediately proceeded to Barajas. In keeping 
with international regulations, the NTSB of the United States of America was notified as the 
representative of the State of design and manufacture of the aircraft. Also informed were 
national civil aviation authorities, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The NTSB appointed an accredited 
representative to participate in the investigation, assisted by experts from the NTSB, the 
FAA, Boeing, as successor of the rights and obligations of the original aircraft 
manufacturer, and from Pratt & Whitney, the engine manufacturer. Spanair, the operator of 
the aircraft, participated in and cooperated with the investigation, providing experts on 
operations, airworthiness and maintenance. Spain’s DGAC and the Aviation Safety Agency 
also collaborated in supplying information and were kept apprised of the more important 
aspects of the investigation. The investigation has determined that the accident occurred 
because: The crew lost control of the airplane as a consequence of entering a stall 
immediately after takeoff due to an improper airplane configuration involving the non-
deployment of the slats/flaps following a series of mistakes and omissions, along with the 
absence of the improper takeoff configuration warning. The crew did not identify the stall 
warnings and did not correct said situation after takeoff. They momentarily retarded the 
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engine throttles, increased the pitch angle and did not correct the bank angle, leading to a 
deterioration of the stall condition. The crew did not detect the configuration error because 
they did not properly use the checklists, which contain items to select and verify the position 
of the flaps/slats when preparing the flight. Specifically: They did not carry out the action to 
select the flaps/slats with the associated control lever (in the “After Start” checklist);They 
did not cross check the position of the lever or the status of the flaps and slats indicating 
lights when executing the “After Start” checklist; They omitted the check of the flaps/slats 
when doing the “Takeoff Briefing” in the “Taxi” checklist; During the visual check 
performed as part of the “Final Items” in the “Takeoff Imminent” checklist, the actual 
position of the flaps/slats as shown on the cockpit instruments was not verified. The 
CIAIAC has identified the following contributing factors: The absence of a takeoff 
configuration warning resulting from the failure of the TOWS to operate, which thus did not 
warn the crew that the airplane’s takeoff configuration was not appropriate. The reason for 
the failure of the TOWS to function could not be reliably established. Improper crew 
resource management (CRM), which did not prevent the deviation from procedures in the 
presence of unscheduled interruptions to flight preparations. As a result of the investigation, 
33 recommendations on operational safety have been issued to the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of the United 
States, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Spain’s Aviation Safety Agency 
(AESA), the provider of airport and air navigation services in Spain, AENA (Spanish 
Airports and Air Navigation), and to the operator, Spanair, as appropriate. 
 
 
Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg. (2003). Accident of Fokker 27 Mk050 registered LX-LGB,  
LG 9642/LH 2420. Niederanven, Luxembourg. November 6, 2002. Luxembourg, Europe. 
Retrieved from: http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/674.pdf 
 
Summary: During an ILS approach to runway 24, whilst established on the centreline, the 
aircraft disappears from the radar screens. It is located again at three point five kilometres to 
the east of threshold runway 24, seven hundred metres north of the centreline. Causes: The 
initial cause of the accident was the acceptance by the crew of the approach clearance 
although they were not prepared to it, namely the absence of preparation of a go-around. It 
led the crew to perform a series of improvised actions that ended in the prohibited override of 
the primary stop on the power levers. Contributory factors can be listed as follows: 1. A lack 
of preparation for the landing, initiated by unnecessary occupations resulting from an 
obtained RVR value, which was below their company approved minima, created a 
disorganisation in the cockpit, leading to uncoordinated actions by each crewmember. 2. All 
applicable procedures as laid down in the operations manual were violated at some stage of 
the approach. All this did not directly cause the accident, but created an environment 
whereby privately designed actions were initiated to make a landing possible. 3. Routine and 
the will to arrive at its destination may have put the crew in a psychological state of mind, 
which could be the origin of the deviations from standard procedures as noticed. 4. The low 
reliability of the installed secondary stop safety device that was favoured by the non-
application of service bulletin ABSC SB F050-32-4. Also the mode of distribution of the 
safety information (Fokker Aircraft B.V. – Service letter 137) to the operator as well as the 
operator’s internal distribution to the crews that did not guarantee that the crews were aware 
of the potential loss of secondary stop on propeller pitch control. 5. The lack of harmony 
resulting from the use of various training centres and non-standardised programs that might 
have impaired the synergy of the crew.  
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National Transportation Safety Board. (1988). Aircraft accident report—Northwest Airlines, 
Inc., McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, N312RC, Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, 
Romulus, Michigan. August 16, 1987 (Aircraft accident report, NTSWAAR-88/OS). 
Washington, DC. 
 
Summary: About 2046 eastern daylight time on August 16, 1987, Northwest Airlines, Inc., 
flight 255 crashed shortly after taking off from runway 3 center at the Detroit Metropolitan 
Wayne County Airport, Romulus, Michigan. Flight 255, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, 
U.S. Registry N312RC, was a regularly scheduled passenger flight and was en route to 
Phoenix, Arizona. According to witnesses, flight 255 began its takeoff rotation about 1,200 
to 1,500 feet from the end of the runway and lifted off near the end of the runway. After 
liftoff, the wings of the airplane rolled to the left and the right about 35” in each direction. 
The airplane collided with obstacles northeast of the runway when the left wing struck a light 
pole located 2,760 feet beyond the end of the runway. Thereafter the airplane struck other 
light poles, the roof of a rental car facility, and then the ground. It continued to slide along a 
path aligned generally with the extended centerline of the takeoff runway. The airplane broke 
up as it slid across the ground and post impact fires erupted along the wreckage path. Three 
occupied vehicles on a road adjacent to the airport and numerous vacant vehicles in a rental 
car parking lot along the airplane’s path were destroyed by impact forces and/or fire. Of the 
persons on board flight 255, 148 passengers and 6 crewmembers were killed; 1 passenger, a 
4-year-old child, was injured seriously. On the ground, two persons were killed, one person 
was injured seriously, and four persons suffered minor injuries. The National Transportation 
Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the flight crew’s failure 
to use the taxi checklist to ensure that the flaps and slats were extended for takeoff. 
Contributing to the accident was the absence of electrical power to the airplane takeoff 
warning system, which thus did not warn the flightcrew that the airplane was not configured 
properly for takeoff. The reason for the absence of electrical power could not be determined. 
 
 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2000). Controlled flight into terrain, Korean Air flight 
801, Boeing 747-300, HL7468. Nimitz Hill, Guam. August 6, 1997 (Aircraft accident 
report, NTSB/AAR-00/01). Washington, DC. 
 
Summary: This report explains the accident involving Korean Air flight 801, a Boeing 747-
300, which crashed into high terrain at Nimitz Hill, Guam, on August 6, 1997. Safety issues in 
the report focus on flight crew performance, approach procedures, and pilot training; air 
traffic control, including controller performance and the inhibition of the minimum safe 
altitude warning system at Guam; emergency response; the adequacy of Korean Civil 
Aviation Bureau and Federal Aviation Administration oversight; and flight data recorder 
documentation. Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, the Governor of the Territory of Guam, and the Korean Civil 
Aviation Bureau. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the captain’s failure to adequately brief and execute the non-
precision approach and the first officer’s and flight engineer’s failure to effectively monitor 
and cross-check the captain’s execution of the approach. Contributing to these failures were 
the captain’s fatigue and Korean Air’s inadequate flight crew training. Contributing to the 
accident was the Federal Aviation Administration’s intentional inhibition of the minimum safe 
altitude warning system at Guam and the agency’s failure to adequately manage the system. 
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National Transportation Safety Board. (2007a). Attempted takeoff from wrong runway, 
Comair flight 5191, Bombardier CL-600-2B19, N431CA. Lexington, Kentucky. August 
27, 2006 (Aircraft accident report, NTSB/AAR-07/05). Washington, DC. 
 
Summary: This report explains the accident involving a Bombardier CL-600-2B19, 
N431CA, operated by Comair, Inc., which crashed during takeoff from Blue Grass Airport, 
Lexington, Kentucky. The safety issues discussed in this report focus on the need for (1) 
improved flight deck procedures, (2) the implementation of cockpit moving map displays 
or cockpit runway alerting systems, (3) improved airport surface marking standards, and 
(4) air traffic control policy changes in the areas of taxi and takeoff clearances and task 
prioritization. Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the Federal 
Aviation Administration. Probable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board 
determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crewmembers’ failure to 
use available cues and aids to identify the airplane’s location on the airport surface during 
taxi and their failure to cross-check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway 
before takeoff. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew’s nonpertinent 
conversation during taxi, which resulted in a loss of positional awareness, and the Federal 
Aviation Administration’s failure to require that all runway crossings be authorized only by 
specific air traffic control clearances. 
 
 
 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2007b). Runway overrun and collision, Southwest 
airlines flight 1248, Boeing 737-7H4, N471WN. Chicago Midway International Airport, 
Chicago, Illinois. December 8, 2005 (Aircraft accident report, NTSB/AAR-07/06). 
Washington, DC. 
 
Summary: This report explains the accident involving a Boeing 737-7H4, N471WN, 
operated by Southwest Airlines (SWA), which departed the end of runway 31C after 
landing at Chicago Midway International Airport. The safety issues discussed in this report 
include the flight crew’s decisions and actions, the clarity of assumptions used in on board 
performance computers, SWA policies, guidance, and training, arrival landing distance 
assessments and safety margins, runway surface condition assessments and braking action 
reports, airplane-based friction measurements, and runway safety areas. Safety 
recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the Federal Aviation 
Administration. Probable Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that 
the probable cause of this accident was the pilots’ failure to use available reverse thrust in a 
timely manner to safely slow or stop the airplane after landing, which resulted in a runway 
overrun. This failure occurred because the pilots’ first experience and lack of familiarity 
with the airplane’s auto brake system distracted them from thrust reverser usage during the 
challenging landing. Contributing to the accident were Southwest Airlines’ 1) failure to 
provide its pilots with clear and consistent guidance and training regarding company 
policies and procedures related to arrival landing distance calculations; 2) programming 
and design of its on board performance computer, which did not present inherent 
assumptions in the program critical to pilot decision-making; 3) plan to implement new 
auto brake procedures without a familiarization period; and 4) failure to include a margin 
of safety in the arrival assessment to account for operational uncertainties. Also 
contributing to the accident was the pilots’ failure to divert to another airport given reports 
that included poor braking actions and a tailwind component greater than 5 knots. 
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Contributing to the severity of the accident was the absence of an engineering materials 
arresting system, which was needed because of the limited runway safety area beyond the 
departure end of runway 31C. 
 
 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2009). In-flight left engine fire, American Airlines flight 
1400, McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, N454AA. St. Louis, Missouri. September 28, 2007 
(Aircraft accident report, NTSB/AAR-09/03). Washington, DC. 
 
Summary: This report explains the September 28, 2007, accident involving a McDonnell 
Douglas DC-9-82, N454AA, operated as American Airlines flight 1400. The airplane 
experienced an in-flight engine fire during departure climb from Lambert St. Louis 
International Airport, St. Louis, Missouri, and the flight crew conducted an emergency 
landing. The safety issues discussed in this report relate to the following: characteristics of 
the “Air Turbine Starter Valve (ATSV) Open” light; emergency task allocation guidance; 
guidance and training on the interrelationship between pneumatic cross feed valves and 
engine fire handles; multiple simultaneous emergencies training; guidance on evacuation 
preparation on the ground; guidance and training on communications between flight and 
cabin crews during emergency and unusual situations; ATSV air filter replacement intervals; 
and American Airlines’ Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System. Safety 
recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the Federal Aviation 
Administration and American Airlines. 3.2 Probable Cause: The National Transportation 
Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was American Airlines’ 
maintenance personnel’s use of an inappropriate manual engine-start procedure, which led 
to the uncommanded opening of the left engine air turbine starter valve, and a subsequent left 
engine fire, which was prolonged by the flight crew’s interruption of an emergency checklist 
to perform nonessential tasks. Contributing to the accident were deficiencies in American 
Airlines’ Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System program. 
 
 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2010). Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air, Inc., 
Operating as continental connection flight 3407, Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ. 
Clarence Center, New York. February 12, 2009 (Aircraft accident report, NTSB/AAR-
10/01). Washington, DC. 
 
Summary: This report discusses the accident involving a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-
8-400, N200WQ, operating as Continental Connection flight 3407, which experienced a loss 
of control on an instrument approach to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport, Buffalo, New 
York, and crashed into a residence in Clarence Center, New York, about 5 nautical miles 
northeast of the airport. The safety issues discussed in this report focus on strategies to 
prevent flight crew monitoring failures, pilot professionalism, fatigue, remedial training, pilot 
training records, airspeed selection procedures, stall training, Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) oversight, flight operational quality assurance programs, use of 
personal portable electronic devices on the flight deck, the FAA’s use of safety alerts for 
operators to transmit safety-critical information, and weather information provided to pilots. 
Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the FAA. Probable Cause: 
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident 
was the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an 
aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. Contributing to the accident were 
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(1) the flight crew’s failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the low-
speed cue, (2) the flight crew’s failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) the 
captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight, and (4) Colgan Air’s inadequate 
procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions. 
 
 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2011a). Crash during approach to landing, Empire 
Airlines flight 8284, Avions de transport régional aerospatiale alenia ATR 42-320, 
N902FX. Lubbock, Texas. January 27, 2009 (Aircraft accident report, NTSB/AAR-
11/02). Washington, DC. 
 
Summary: This accident report discusses the January 27, 2009, accident involving Empire 
Airlines flight 8284, an Avions de Transport Régional Aerospatiale Alenia ATR 42-320, 
N902FX, which crashed short of the runway at Lubbock Preston Smith International Airport, 
Lubbock, Texas. The captain sustained serious injuries, and the first officer sustained minor 
injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to FedEx 
Corporation and operated by Empire Airlines, Inc., as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 
121 supplemental cargo flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an 
instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The safety issues discussed in this report include 
the flight crew’s actions in response to the flap anomaly, the continuation of the un-stabilized 
approach, the dispatch of the flight into freezing drizzle conditions, the efficiency of the 
emergency response, and simulator-based training for pilots who fly in icing conditions. Nine 
safety recommendations are addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration. Probable 
Cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this 
accident was the flight crew’s failure to monitor and maintain a minimum safe airspeed while 
executing an instrument approach in icing conditions, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall 
at low altitude. Contributing to the accident were 1) the flight crew’s failure to follow 
published standard operating procedures in response to a flap anomaly, 2) the captain’s 
decision to continue with the un-stabilized approach, 3) the flight crew’s poor crew resource 
management, and 4) fatigue due to the time of day in which the accident occurred and a 
cumulative sleep debt, which likely impaired the captain’s performance. 
 
 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2011b). Runway collision of USAir flight 1493, Boeing 
737 and Skywest flight 5569, Fairchild metroliner. Los Angeles International Airport, Los 
Angeles, California. February 1, 1991 (Aircraft accident report, NTSB/AAR-91/08). 
Washington, DC. 
 
Summary: This report explains the collision of USAir flight 1493 and Skywest flight 5569 on 
a runway at the Los Angeles International Airport on February 1, 1991. The safety issues 
discussed in the report are air traffic management and equipment at the airport; aircraft 
exterior lighting and conspicuity; pilot situational awareness during takeoff and landing and 
operations on airport surfaces; air traffic controller workload, performance, and supervision; 
and air transport accident survivability, evacuation standards and procedures, interior 
furnishing flammability standards, and survival devices. Recommendations concerning these 
issues were made to the Federal Aviation Administration. Probable cause: The National 
Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the 
failure of the Los Angeles Air Traffic Facility Management to implement procedures that 
provided redundancy comparable to the requirements contained in the National Operational 
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Position Standards and the failure of the FAA Air Traffic Service to provide adequate policy 
direction and oversight to its air traffic control facility managers. These failures created an 
environment in the Los Angeles Air Traffic Control tower that ultimately led to the failure of 
the local controller 2 (LC2) to maintain an awareness of the traffic situation, culminating in 
the inappropriate clearances and the subsequent collision of the USAir and Skywest aircraft. 
Contributing to the cause of the accident was the failure of the FAA to provide effective 
quality assurance of the ATC system. 
 
 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2013). Southwest Airlines, Flight 812, Boeing 737-3H4, 
N632SW. Yuma International Airport, Yuma, Arizona. April 11, 2011 (Aircraft accident 
report, NTSB/AAB-13/02). Washington, DC. 
 
Summary: On April 1, 2011, about 1558 mountain standard time (MST),1N632SW, 
operating as Southwest Airlines flight 812 experienced a rapid decompression while 
climbing through flight level 340. The flight crew conducted an emergency descent and 
diverted to Yuma International Airport (NYL), Yuma, Arizona. Of the 5 crewmembers and 
117 passengers on board, one crewmember and one non-revenue off-duty airline employee 
passenger sustained minor injuries. Probable cause: The National Transportation Safety 
Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the improper installation of the 
fuselage crown skin panel at the S-4L lap joint during the manufacturing process, which 
resulted in multiple site damage fatigue cracking and eventual failure of the lower skin panel. 
Contributing to the injuries was flight attendant A’s incorrect assessment of his time of 
useful consciousness, which led to his failure to follow procedures requiring immediate 
donning of an oxygen mask when cabin pressure is lost. 
 
 
Statens Haverickommission. (1993). Air traffic accident on 27 December 1991 at Gottrora, AB 
county, Case L-124/91. Retrieved from SKYbary website: 
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/540.pdf 
 
Summary: The accident was caused by SAS’ instructions and routines being inadequate to 
ensure that clear ice was removed from the wings of the aircraft prior to takeoff. Hence the 
aircraft took off with clear ice on the wings. In connection with lift off, the clear ice loosened 
and was ingested by the engines. The ice caused damage to the engine fan stages, which led to 
engine surges. The surges destroyed the engines. Contributory causes were: The pilots were 
not trained to identify and eliminate engine surging. ATR - which was unknown within SAS - 
was activated and increased the engine power without the pilots’ knowledge. As a result of its 
investigation the Board of Accident Investigation is submitting 15 recommendations. 
 
 
Transportation Safety Board. (2012). In-flight fire leading to collision with water, Swissair 
transport limited, McDonnell Douglas MD-11 HB-IWF. Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia 5 nm 
SW. September 2, 1998 (Report number, A98H0003). Retrieved from: Transportation 
Safety Board of Canada website: http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-
reports/aviation/1998/a98h0003/a98h0003.pdf 
 
Summary: On 2 September 1998, Swissair Flight 111 departed New York, United States of 
America, at 2018 eastern daylight savings time on a scheduled flight to Geneva, Switzerland, 
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with 215 passengers and 14 crew members on board. About 53 minutes after departure, while 
cruising at flight level 330, the flight crew smelled an abnormal odour in the cockpit. Their 
attention was then drawn to an unspecified area behind and above them and they began to 
investigate the source. Whatever they saw initially was shortly thereafter no longer perceived 
to be visible. They agreed that the origin of the anomaly was the air conditioning system. 
When they assessed that what they had seen or were now seeing was definitely smoke, they 
decided to divert. They initially began a turn toward Boston; however, when air traffic 
services mentioned Halifax, Nova Scotia, as an alternative airport, they changed the 
destination to the Halifax International Airport. While the flight crew was preparing for the 
landing in Halifax, they were unaware that a fire was spreading above the ceiling in the front 
area of the aircraft. About 13 minutes after the abnormal odour was detected, the aircraft’s 
flight data recorder began to record a rapid succession of aircraft systems-related failures. 
The flight crew declared an emergency and indicated a need to land immediately. About one 
minute later, radio communications and secondary radar contact with the aircraft were lost, 
and the flight recorders stopped functioning. About five and one-half minutes later, the 
aircraft crashed into the ocean about five nautical miles southwest of Peggy’s Cove, Nova 
Scotia, Canada. The aircraft was destroyed and there were no survivors. One of the findings 
as to causes and contributing factors: There was no integrated in-flight firefighting plan in 
place for the accident aircraft, nor was such a plan required by regulation. Therefore, the 
aircraft crew did not have procedures or training directing them to aggressively attempt to 
locate and eliminate the source of the smoke, and to expedite their preparations for a possible 
emergency landing. In the absence of such a firefighting plan, they concentrated on preparing 
the aircraft for the diversion and landing. 
 
 
 
 
